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INTRODUCTION
“...but if you observe, people always live for ever when there is
an annuity to be paid them; and she is very stout and healthy,
and hardly forty.
An annuity is a very serious business; it comes over and over
every year, and there is no getting rid of it.”
Mrs Dashwood, Sense and Sensibility, by Jane Austen (1811)
1.1 Introduction
The ﬁrst babyboomers are retiring while pension wealth is low because of
the ﬁnancial crisis, putting additional pressure on annuity providers. As a
consequence, old-age income security systems are under review all over the
world. There are discussions about, for instance, the retirement age, and who
should bear the investment and longevity risk. In this thesis, I will address
several issues concerning old-age income security, mainly focussing on an-
nuities. A (whole life) annuity is deﬁned as a contract which states that the
annuity provider pays an individual or group of individuals an income each
period until death in return for a lump sum (or premium) paid in advance
(Cannon and Tonks, 2008). I will ﬁrst discuss a brief history of annuities.
During his incumbency as Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, 1613 −
1620, Sir Edward Coke deﬁned an annuity as “a yearly payment of a certain
sum of money granted to another in fee, for life or years, charging the person
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of the grantor only” (Kopf, 1927). However, annuities have existed well before
this period.
As early as 2500 B.C., there may already have been some form of annuities
in Babylon. From the researches of Trenerry, one may develop the idea that
there was a fairly wide-spread practice of granting a series of periodic pay-
ments secured by land or other property. Annuities may have been adopted
from the commercial codes of the Hindus and Chinese, antedating the Baby-
lonian era (Kopf, 1927). Kopf (1927) also reports that annuities where already
sold in Egypt roughly 1000 year Before Christ. Annuities, then called annua,
existed also in the ancient Roman times, (see James (1947) quoted in Poterba
(2001)). The ﬁrst recorded life table for the purpose of computing the value
of annuities was ascribed by Aemilius Macer in 220 AD to Domitius Ulphi-
anus (Haberman, 1996). Macer notes that a more practical formula was often
used: for someone over the age x of 30, the purchase price was calculated as
60− x (Cannon and Tonks, 2008). The price of annuities has increased signif-
icantly, partly due to a steep increase in life expectancy. In the Roman times,
the remaining life expectancy for a male aged 65 was 5.3 years, whereas the
life expectancy for a male aged 65 in the Netherlands in 2009 is 17 years ac-
cording to Statistics Netherlands. For an overview of the history of annuities
see Cannon and Tonks (2008) and the references in it.
Annuities are appealing to individuals because they insure individuals
against the risk of outliving their assets, i.e., becoming old is seen as a risk.
As off retirement, individuals ﬁnance consumption by depleting their assets.
Withoutanannuity andin case the age ofdeath iscertain, the individual could
compute the time proﬁle of consumption that would exhaust his wealth when
he died. However, the age of death is generally uncertain. Moreover, because
of inﬂation it is also not certain how much consumption he can ﬁnance from
his assets. In addition, the individual should be able to compute the time pro-
ﬁle of consumption and act accordingly. The latter may be a problem. (Orszag
and Stiglitz, 2001) quote the chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission as stating that over 50 percent of Americans did not know the
difference between a stock and a bond. Consequently, they may not be able to
compute the time proﬁle of consumption. If the individual buys an annuity, a
periodic payment is made conditional on being alive. So, annuities solve the
problem of planning consumption when the future lifetime is uncertain. An-
other advantage of annuities is that, if costs are low, the return on an annuity
exceeds the return on the equivalent non-annuitized asset for those who are
alive because the annuity provider pools mortality risk across individuals, seeCHAPTER 1 3
for instance, Poterba (2001); Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005).
There have been many developments in the annuity market since the an-
cientRomantimes. Iwill discuss several developmentsbelow. Annuitieshave
become more freely available, and there are currently many different varieties
of annuities available. They differ with respect to the beneﬁciaries, the timing,
and the beneﬁt level. The most common annuity is a single-life annuity, which
makes a periodic payment to the beneﬁciary as long as he or she is alive. For
households, a joint & survivor annuity is developed, which makes a periodic
payment as long as both spouses are alive and a (reduced) periodic payment
when only one of the spouses is alive. Concerning the timing there are im-
mediate annuities and deferred annuities. Immediate annuities make a periodic
payment immediately after the purchase of the annuity whereas deferred annu-
ities make a periodic payment beginning at some future date. Both annuities
payout conditional on the lifeofthe beneﬁciary. Concerningthebeneﬁtlevels,
three different types can be considered: single-level annuities, inﬂation-linked
annuities, and variable annuities. The beneﬁt level of single-level annuities re-
mains constant over time whereas the beneﬁt level of inﬂation-linked annuities
increases annually with inﬂation. The beneﬁt level of variable annuities de-
pends on the performance of the underlying portfolio. In the latter case, the
insurer can guarantee a minimum payment. For an overview of all annuity
products, see Cannon and Tonks (2008).
There are also varieties in who provides the annuities and how they are
paid for. Annuities can be provided by the state, by pension funds (through
employer-sponsored schemes), and by insurance companies. In most coun-
tries the state provides a basic state pension for its citizens. The state pen-
sion may be ﬁnanced either by a pay-as-you-go system or it may be funded.
Pay-as-you-go pensions are paid out of current revenue. The current working
population pays for the current retired population. Funded pensions are paid
from accumulated funds. In employer-sponsored schemes, there are generally
two types of pension schemes, namely: deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned con-
tribution (DC). In case of pure DB scheme, the contribution is ﬂexible and the
employee’s pension beneﬁt is an annuity. In a DC scheme, the contribution is
ﬁxed and the pension beneﬁt can either be a lump sum or can be converted
to an annuity. Participation in employer-sponsored schemes may be manda-
tory. Annuities may also be voluntarily bought by individuals from insurance
companies. Although research has derived conditions under which annuities
should beattractive toindividuals(see Yaari, 1965;Diamond, 2005), most indi-
vidualsdonotannuitize voluntarily. Thisisgenerallyreferred toas“theannu-4 INTRODUCTION
itypuzzle”. Therehavebeenmanyexplanationsforthispuzzle. Awilldiscuss
a few of them. First, individuals may not want to annuitize fully because they
would like to leavea bequest. However, there is conﬂicting evidenceabout the
importance of bequests to individuals (see Cannon and Tonks, 2011). Second,
the price of the annuity may be too high. Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and
Brown (1999) found that the expense loading, which covers among others ad-
ministrative costs and a risk premium, is about 7.3%. Third, individuals might
not want to annuitize fully because they might want to have precautionary
savings to cover for instance unexpected health expenditures (Peijnenburg,
Nijman, and Werker, 2011). Health care cost have increased rapidly in the last
decades, especially in the U.S.. Fourth, individuals may have less desire for
annuities because they can share part of the risk within the family (Kotlikoff
and Spivak, 1981). Finally, means-tested beneﬁts may reduce further annuity
demand (Bütler and Teppa, 2007).
In this thesis I will address three issues concerning annuities. First I con-
sider individuals who have the option to defer the payment of their pension
beneﬁts. Currently, individuals in many countries can choose the age as off
which they would like to receive their pension beneﬁts. Take the basic state
pension as an example. In the U.S., individuals can claim beneﬁts before, at,
or after the full retirement age, currently set at age 66. In case beneﬁts are
claimed before the full retirement age the annual beneﬁt received is reduced
and in case beneﬁts are claimed after the full retirement age the annual ben-
eﬁt received is increased. In the U.S. and the U.K., the annual old-age Social
Security beneﬁt is increased with 8% and 10.4% respectively, for each year
beneﬁt claiming is delayed after the full retirement age. In the Netherlands,
there is a proposal to increase the annual beneﬁt of the AOW pension with
6.5% for each year that beneﬁt claiming is delayed after the full retirement
age. In Chapter 2, I discuss under which conditions insurers can offer a prod-
uct which dominates the option to delay beneﬁt claiming as offered in many
state pension schemes. I derive preference-free conditions under which in-
surers can offer this dominating product. The conditions depend on the term
structure of interest rates, the expense loading, and individual characteristics
which inﬂuence the survival probabilities. The conditions are irrespective of
the individual’s utility function. This chapter is based on Sanders, De Waege-
naere, and Nijman (2011b).
In Chapter 3, I estimate the effect of imperfections in the annuity market on
the optimal annuity portfolio of a couple. Consider a traditional household
where only the husband has accrued pension rights and suppose that the an-CHAPTER 1 5
nuity prices must be based on gender-neutral survival probabilities. In many
employer-sponsored pension schemes, there will be a drop in income when
the husband dies but there will be no a drop in income when the wife dies.
When both spouses have the same utility function, this will not be optimal.
The couple may want to receive a higher income when both spouses are alive
and a reduced income when only one of the spouses is alive. The reason for
this is that the cost of living for an individual is lower than for a couple. In
Chapter 3 I discuss several of these imperfections in the annuity market. We
quantify the welfare losses couples bear because of these imperfections. We
alsoinvestigate the impactofgender-neutral pricing.1 Sincethe wife generally
outlives the husband, annuity prices based on the wife’s survival probabili-
ties are typically higher than annuity prices based on the husband’s survival
probabilities. Consequently, the gender-neutral priced annuities are priced fa-
vorable for the wife and less favorable for the husband, increasing demand
for the annuity which pays out when only the wife is alive and decreasing
demand for the annuity which pays out when only the husband is alive. This
chapter is based on Sanders, De Waegenaere, and Nijman (2011a).
In Chapter 4, I estimate the joint survival probabilities of spouses, tak-
ing into account the possible dependence between the remaining lifetimes of
spouses. Previous literature suggests that the husband’s and wife’s remain-
ing lifetimes are positively correlated. The dependence may affect the price
of for instance, a joint & survivor annuity, which in turn affects the value of
the liabilities of annuity providers. I use a sub-sample of a rich data-set con-
taining all Dutch individuals from the period January 1995 until January 2008
to estimate the joint survivor probabilities. Both parametric models and semi-
nonparametric models are used for the estimation. Estimation results are used
to determine the actuarially fair value of different annuities. This chapter is
based on Sanders and Melenberg (2011).
1The relevance of this issue is underlined by the recent European court ruling that as off
December 2012 insurers are not allowed to differentiate annuity prices based on gender.CHAPTER2
WHEN CAN INSURERS OFFER PRODUCTS THAT
DOMINATE DELAYED OLD-AGE PENSION BENEFIT
CLAIMING?
“I advise you to go on living solely to enrage those who are
paying your annuities. It is the only pleasure I have left.”
François Marie Voltaire
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is based on Sanders, De Waegenaere, and Nijman (2011b). In
many countries, individuals can decide either to claim their Social Security
old-age pension beneﬁts once the minimal retirement age has been reached, or
to delay beneﬁt claiming. In case of delay, the individual is offered the same
choice next period and so on, until either the maximum age at which bene-
ﬁts can be claimed has been reached or beneﬁts have been claimed. When
an individual defers pension receipts, the beneﬁt level is subjected to an ac-
tuarial adjustment for each year that beneﬁt claiming is delayed.1 In many
cases, the adjustment is a constant fraction of the beneﬁt level at the normal
retirement age, irrespective of age, gender, and other individual characteris-
1Such possibilities exist in Social Security pension systems in, e.g., the U.S., the U.K., the
Netherlands, Japan, Germany, France, Australia. (see Queisser and Whitehouse, 2006).
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tics. In the U.S. and the U.K., the beneﬁt levelsincrease by respectively 8% and
10.4% for each year beneﬁt claiming is delayed (see Diamond, 2005; Queisser
and Whitehouse, 2006). In the Netherlands a proposal has been put forward
to increase the beneﬁt level by only 6.5% for each year of delay. As argued
by, e.g., Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008), governments seem to want sim-
ple and standardized rules for annuitization applied to a large heterogeneous
group of retirees, which may be the reason for choosing a ﬁxed instead of an
age-dependent accrual.
The adjustment of the beneﬁt level in case of delayed beneﬁt claiming is
typically not actuarially neutral in the sense that the expected present value
of the missed beneﬁts in case beneﬁt claiming is delayed is typically not equal
to the expected present value of the additional beneﬁts received once beneﬁts
are claimed (see, e.g., Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten, 2002; Duggan and
Soares, 2002; Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003; Sun and Webb, 2009).
This lack of actuarial neutrality occurs for several reasons. First, the expected
present value of the missed and additional beneﬁts in case of delayed beneﬁt
claiming dependson the term structure of interest rates. Higher short-term in-
terestratestypically decreasetheexpectedpresentvalueofthemissed beneﬁts
relative to the expected present value of the additional beneﬁts. The opposite
holds for high long-term interest rates. The adjustment of the beneﬁt level in
case of delayed beneﬁt claiming, however, is typically ﬁxed for a number of
years and therefore not adjusted for changes in the term structure of interest
rates. Second, an age-independent accrual leads to actuarial unfairness be-
cause, as age increases, the number of years over which the increased beneﬁt
level should be paid out decreases, and the level of the missed beneﬁts due
to deferral of one more year increase. Finally, the expected present value of
the missed and additional beneﬁts in case of delayed beneﬁt claiming depend
on survival probabilities, which in turn, depend on individual characteristics
such as gender and socio-economic status. Thus, heterogeneity among par-
ticipants leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the individual level (see Brown,
2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003).2
2The actuarial nonequivalence is well-documented in the literature. For example, Duggan
and Soares (2002) calculate actuarially fair adjustment factors when beneﬁts are claimed at
ages 62 to 70, and ﬁnd that results depend strongly on both gender and discount rate. They
also ﬁnd that the annual accrual for delayed beneﬁt claiming of 8%, given in the U.S., is too
lowin most cases. Desmet andJousten(2003)show thatthereis ahigh degreeofheterogeneity
among participants of a large public pension system, so that beneﬁt adjustments that are
based on the “average” participant can lead to large degrees of actuarial unfairness at the
individual level .CHAPTER 2 9
As argued by Duggan and Soares (2002) actuarially nonequivalent beneﬁt
adjustments may have unintended consequences in the sense that they affect
claiming behavior. Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002) and Sun and
Webb (2009) consider optimal claiming of Social Security beneﬁts in the U.S.,
and argue that even when the adjustment of the beneﬁt level is lower than
actuarially fair, delaying beneﬁt claiming can be attractive to risk averse indi-
viduals from a utility perspective. This occurs because a risk-averse individ-
ual attaches more value to the increased longevity insurance due to the higher
beneﬁt level.3 Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002) ﬁnd that delaying
Social Security annuitization for a period of time after the minimal retirement
age is optimal in a wide variety of cases under expected utility maximization.
Sun and Webb (2009) ﬁnd that, for plausible preference parameters, the opti-
mal age to claim Social Security beneﬁts for single individuals is between 67
and 70.
Our goal in this paper is to show that the actuarial unfairness inherent in
many public pension systems implies that an individual who wishes to de-
fer the receipt of pension beneﬁts can be better off by claiming Social Security
beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy annuity products. We consider
settings where individuals are allowed to work after they have claimed pen-
sion beneﬁts. This is for instance allowed in the U.S. and the Netherlands.4
Consider, for example, a man aged 66 who would like to receive pension ben-
eﬁts as of age 67. He can do so by deferring beneﬁt claiming with one year,
which implies that his beneﬁt level will be increased. At age 66 the individual
can ﬁnance his current consumption with, for instance, labor income, savings,
or by borrowing money (at some interest rate). Suppose now that the level
of the accrual is actuarially unfair for this particular man in the sense that the
expected present value of the missed beneﬁts at age 66 is higher than the ex-
pected present value of the additional beneﬁts received as of age 67. If the
difference is sufﬁciently large, insurers may be able to offer a deferred annuity
3There is an extensive literature that characterizes individuals’ optimal behavior with re-
gard to the timing and level of annuitization of their wealth (see, e.g., Yaari, 1965; Brugiavini,
1993;Brown, 2001;Milevsky, 2001;Brown, 2003;Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond, 2005;Gupta
and Li, 2007; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus, 2006; Milevsky and Young, 2007a,b; Ger-
rard, Højgaard, and Vigna, 2010, to name just a few). Our focus is on claiming behavior in
Social Security systems with delay options.
4Since the elimination of the Earnings Test for individuals over the full retirement age in
the U.S., (see Benítez-Silva and Heiland, 2008), there are no complications anymore to con-
tinue working while receiving pension beneﬁts. For a detailed analysis of how the Earnings
Test works (see Michaud and van Soest, 2008).10
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that starts to pay out as of age 67, with a beneﬁt level that is higher than the
accrual offered by the pension provider, and for a periodic premium that is
lower than the beneﬁts received in case they are claimed at age 66. If this is
the case, the individual is better off by claiming beneﬁts at age 66, and using
these beneﬁts to buy the deferred annuity than to delay beneﬁt claiming un-
til age 67. The individual’s consumption at age 66 can again by ﬁnanced by
either labor income, savings, or borrowed money. Therefore, for our analy-
sis, consumption at age 66 is irrelevant, since the individual can use the same
source of ﬁnancing in case he defers beneﬁt claiming until age 67 as when
he claims beneﬁts at age 66 and uses the beneﬁts received to buy an annu-
ity product at an insurer. Stated differently, the individual’s preference order
does not change if we do not take the ages before beneﬁts are received into
account because the individual’s behavior can be the same in both cases.
In this paper we characterize conditions under which insurers can offer
super-replicating annuity products. The annuity product is super-replicating if
it satisﬁes two conditions. First, it can be bought for a periodic premium that
is at most equal to the beneﬁt level obtained in case Social Security beneﬁts
are claimed immediately. Second, upon annuitization it yields a beneﬁt level
that combined with the Social Security income is at least equal to the ben-
eﬁt level received in case Social Security beneﬁts would have been claimed
at that age. If these two conditions are satisﬁed, deferred beneﬁt claiming is
dominated because the individual is better off by claiming beneﬁts immedi-
ately and using them to buy the annuity product. An important aspect of
this approach is that because the annuity product is super-replicating, there is
preference-free dominance of immediate beneﬁt claiming. All that is required
for the individual to prefer claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to
buy the annuity product is that more is preferred to less. To characterize such
preference-free dominance conditions, we consider two cases. First we con-
sider the case where an individual at a given age decides as of which age he
would like to receive his pension beneﬁts, and derive conditions under which
insurers can offer deferred annuities that the individual prefers above defer-
ring beneﬁt claiming. Next, we determine conditions under which insurers
can offer super-replicating annuity options for those individuals who want
to defer receipt of pension beneﬁts until an unspeciﬁed age. The individual
who buys the annuity option can, year by year, decide whether he wants to
annuitize, or defer annuitization for at least one more year.
Whether insurers will be able to offer super-replicating annuity products
depends on the degree of actuarial unfairness in the Social Security system, asCHAPTER 2 11
well as on how insurers price annuity products. Two factors are important.
First, annuities offered by insurance companies are typically also actuarially
unfair in the sense that the premium includes a load to cover costs. Second, in
contrast to Social Security providers, insurers can adjust premium conditions
to the prevailing term structure of interest rates. Moreover, they can to some
extent differentiate premiums based on individual characteristics that affect
survival probabilities. We ﬁrst consider the case where insurers can differenti-
ate premiums on the basis of age and gender only, and characterize conditions
on the level of the premium load and the term structure of interest rates under
which they can offer super-replicating annuity products to men and women,
respectively. We ﬁnd that there is ample room for insurers to proﬁtably of-
fer annuity products that men prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming. For
women it is less likely that dominating strategies exist. We then consider
the case where insurers can also differentiate premiums based on factors that
are correlated with educational level. This additional ﬂexibility increases the
room for insurers to offer super-replicating annuity products, in particular to
individuals with lower educational levels. This occurs because individuals
with lower educational levels have lower life expectancy, and therefore the
accruals offered by the social security system are more unfair for them.
Our results potentially have important implications because the existence
of super-replicating annuity products can alter claiming incentives and may
thereby distort beneﬁt acceptance decisions. Speciﬁcally, it can imply that in-
dividuals may decide not to defer beneﬁt claiming, even though they do wish
to defer annuitization. This can affect the long-run program costs of public
pensions (see Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos, 2004). Beneﬁt claiming deci-
sions are not only important for public pensions but also for deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) pensions. It is not uncommon that participants in a (DB) pension plan
can, at least to some extent, choose at which age they claim beneﬁts. The an-
nual beneﬁt level isthen adjusted to the age at which beneﬁts are ﬁrst claimed.
When the adjustments are not actuarially neutral with respect to the age at
which beneﬁts are claimed, participants may choose to strategically exploit
outside options offered by insurance companies. This may affect claiming be-
havior, which in turn affects the plan’s liabilities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
factors that generate actuarial unfairness in Social Security pension systems
with delay options. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we consider the case where insur-
ers differentiate premiums based on gender only, and characterize conditions
under which they can offer super-replicating annuity products for men and12
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women, respectively. We also quantify the potential gains for both individ-
uals and insurers. Section 2.3 considers individuals who wish to defer the
receipt of pension beneﬁts to a speciﬁc age. Section 2.4 extends the analysis to
cases where the individual wishes to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts to an
unspeciﬁed age. In Section 2.5 we illustrate the potential gains when insurers
can, in addition to gender, also differentiate premiums on the basis of factors
correlated with educational level. We end with the conclusions in Section 2.6.
2.2 Actuarial unfairness
Existing literature shows that the option to delay Social Security beneﬁt claim-
ing is often actuarially unfair in the sense that the expected present value of
the additional beneﬁts in case of deferred beneﬁt claiming is strictly lower
than the expected present value of the missed beneﬁts (see, e.g., Coile, Di-
amond, Gruber, and Jousten, 2002; Duggan and Soares, 2002; Brown, 2003;
Desmet and Jousten, 2003; Sun and Webb, 2009). This unfairness implies that
individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts may be better off
by claiming beneﬁts immediately, and using them to buy annuity products at
the market. Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002) show that despite the
actuarial unfairness, risk-averse individuals may want to delay beneﬁt claim-
ing to increase longevity protection. Our goal is to characterize under which
preference-free conditions insurers can offer annuity products that individu-
als prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming.
We focus on cases in which an individual wishes to delay the receipt of
pension beneﬁts beyond the so-called full retirement age, which we denote by
x.5 Each year, the individual decides either to claim old-age pension beneﬁts
immediately, or to delay beneﬁt claiming for a period of at least one year.6
In case of delay, the individual is offered the same choice next year and so
on, until either the maximum age at which beneﬁts can be claimed has been
reached or beneﬁts have been claimed. We denote the maximum age at which
beneﬁts can be claimed by x. When the individual claims beneﬁts, he receives
them in the form of a whole life annuity that periodically pays a ﬁxed amount
5In many countries (including, e.g., the U.S.), individuals can also claim pension bene-
ﬁts at an earlier age than the full retirement age, in which case the beneﬁt level is adjusted
downwards. Our focus is on delayed beneﬁt claiming.
6It is not uncommon that individuals can decide on a monthly basis to claim beneﬁts or
delay beneﬁt claiming. For expositional convenience, we assume that the decision is made
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as long as he is alive. Without loss of generality, we normalize the annual
beneﬁt level in case beneﬁts are claimed at the full retirement age to 1. For
each year of delay, the beneﬁt level increases by a ﬁxed amount a, for some
a > 0. Therefore, in case beneﬁt claiming is deferred until age y > x, the
annual beneﬁt level is equal to 1+ (y − x)a.
Whether insurers will be able to offer more attractive delay options clearly
depends on the degree of actuarial unfairness in the Social Security system.
This degree of unfairness depends not only on the accrual a, but also on the
term structure of real interest rates and individual characteristics that affect
survival probabilities (see, e.g., Duggan and Soares, 2002). First, higher long-
term interest rates lead to less expensive annuities, which may result in an op-
portunity for insurance companies to outperform the Social Security provider.
Second, the delayed retirement credit does not differ with individual charac-
teristics (such as, e.g., gender) even though survival probabilities do differ
with these characteristics. This leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the indi-
vidual level. Thus, even if the system would be fair for the “average” individ-
ual, it would be unfair to certain groups of individuals (see, e.g., Brown, 2003;
Desmet and Jousten, 2003). Insurers can, at least to some extent, differentiate
premiums and may therefore be able to offer more attractive delay options to
those individuals for which the Social Security system is actuarially unfair.
To illustrate that the degree of actuarial unfairness can be signiﬁcant, and
that it depends strongly on both the term structure of real interest rates and
individual characteristics, we determine the money’s worth of deferring the re-
ceipt of pension beneﬁts. The money’s worth of the option to delay beneﬁt
claiming is deﬁned as as the ratio of the expected present value of the addi-
tional beneﬁts received as of claiming age over the expected present value of
the missed beneﬁts (see, e.g., Sun and Webb, 2009). Let us denote R(τ) for
the τ-years real interest rate, and τpx for the probability that an individual
with age x survives at least the ﬁrst τ years. Now consider an individual
aged x who wants to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts to age y. Because
the missed beneﬁt equals 1+ a(x − x) at ages x,    ,y − 1, and the additional
beneﬁt equals a(y − x) annually as of age y, the money’s worth of deferring



















Figure 2.2 displays the money’s worth of delaying beneﬁt claiming from14
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Figure 2.1 – Term structures of real interest rates (in percentages), generated by a one-
factor Vasicek model with parameters given in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B.
age 66 to age y, for y = 67,    ,70, for men and women, and for the two term
structures of real interest rates displayed in Figure 2.1.7 The solid (dashed)
lines correspond to the lower (upper) term structure. We consider the U.S. set-
ting in which the annual accrual offered by the Social Security system equals
8% (i.e., a = 0.08), and the full retirement age equals 66 (i.e., x = 66).8 Sur-
vival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the years 2000 up to
and including 2004, as reported in the Human Mortality Database.9
The option to defer beneﬁt claiming to age y > 66 is actuarially unfair if
the corresponding money’s worth is below one, because this indicates that the
expected present value of the additional annuity received as of age y in re-
turn for delaying beneﬁt claiming is strictly lower than the present value of
the missed beneﬁts at ages 66,   y − 1. Figure 2.2 shows that the degree of
actuarial unfairness can be substantial, and that it depends strongly on the
7The term structures are generated by a one-Vasicek model with parameters as displayed
in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B, and with a short rate of 2% (solid lines) and 3% (dashed lines),
respectively. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 is needed to determine the prices of call options and to
generate the proﬁt distributions. For consistency, we use the same term structure of interest
rates in this Section.
8Because there is an earnings test for claiming beneﬁts before the full retirement age (i.e.,
between the age of 62 and 65) (see e.g., Song and Manchester, 2007), we focus on individu-
als who wish to delay beneﬁt claiming beyond the full retirement age of 66. However, the
analysis can be easily extended to individuals who want to claim before the full retirement
age.
9Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max
Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or
www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 05 − 01 − 2009). The survival probabilities
are displayed in Figure 2.9 in Appendix 3.B.CHAPTER 2 15
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(b) Women
Figure 2.2 – The money’s worth of deferring Social Security beneﬁt claiming from age
66 to age y (i.e., MW(y,66)) as a function of y, for men (a) and women (b), and for two
term structures of interest rates, generated by a one-factor Vasicek model with param-
eters given in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B. The solid lines (dashed lines) correspond to a
real short rate of 2% (3%). The annual accrual is a = 8%, and the full retirement age is
set at x = 66. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period
2000− 2004.
term structure of real interest rates as well as on individual characteristics
such as gender and the preferred deferral period. First, comparing the solid
and the dashed lines shows that the deferral option is more unfair when inter-
est rates are high. When interest rates are higher (dashed lines), the money’s
worth shifts downwards for both men and women, and for all deferral peri-
ods. Higher long term interest rates decrease the value of the additional ben-
eﬁts relative to the value of the missed beneﬁts, and therefore make deferral
more actuarially unfair. The ﬁgure also shows that the system is more unfair
for men than for women, and more unfair for those who wish to defer for a
longer period. Because women have higher life expectancy than men, they are
expected to receive the increased beneﬁt for a longer period of time. There-
fore, the money’s worth of deferring beneﬁt claiming is signiﬁcantly lower for
men than for woman. Consider, for example, the case where the real interest
rate is upward sloping from 2% for the real short rate to just above 3.3% for
a maturity of 30 years (Figure 2.1, solid line).10 The money’s worth for men
is below one for all deferral periods. For women, the money’s worth is above
one for deferral of at most two years, but strictly below one for longer deferral
10The resultsin this casearesimilar to those reportedin Sun andWebb (2009)using survival
probabilities of the Social Security administration, and a ﬂat term structure of 3%.16
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periods. Finally, for both men and women and for both term structures, the
money’s worth of deferring beneﬁt claiming is decreasing in the length of the
deferral period. Stated differently, the system is more unfair for those who
would like to delay beneﬁt claiming more than for those who would like to
delay beneﬁt claiming just a couples of years.
The above results suggest that the degree of actuarial unfairness in the So-
cial Security system is substantial, in particular for those who wish to defer
beneﬁt claiming for a longer period. In the next sections we show that this
unfairness implies that individuals who wish to defer the receipt of pension
beneﬁts may be better off by claiming beneﬁts immediately, and using them
to buy annuity products at the market.
2.3 Dominatingstrategiesusing deferred annuities
In this section we characterize conditions under which the market can offer
annuity products that are preferred by individuals above deferring pension
beneﬁt claiming. The annuity products must be attractive for both insurers
and participants, implying that insurers should be able to offer them on prof-
itable terms and individuals should achieve a higher beneﬁt level by buying
these products than by deferring beneﬁt claiming. Conditions will be deter-
mined under which this holds. When these conditions are satisﬁed, claiming
beneﬁts early and using them to buy a deferred annuity dominates deferring
beneﬁt claiming in the sense that the former strategy is preferred to the latter,
irrespective of the individual’s preference relation.11 An example of such a
preference-free choice is given below.
Suppose that a man with current age 66 would like to receive
pension beneﬁts as of age 67. Furthermore, assume that the
beneﬁt level of his pension when he claims beneﬁts immedi-
ately equals 100 and that when the man delays beneﬁt claiming
by one year, his future beneﬁt level will be increased by 8%.
Thus, when he defers pension beneﬁt claiming from age 66 to
11When the insured claims beneﬁts, they generally are taxed. However, in case the in-
come is used as a premium for annuities, they are in many cases received taxfree and then
taxed when the annuity pays out. In the U.S. there are some qualiﬁed retirement accounts
in which individuals can invest taxfree. The wealth invested can then be used to ﬁnance an-
nuities, where the payments of the annuities are taxed (see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and
Warshawsky, 2001). We assume a tax system were both premiums and returns on the premi-
ums for annuities are exempted from taxation, and only the annuity payments are taxed.CHAPTER 2 17
age 67, he will receive an annual beneﬁt of 108 as of age 67.
Now suppose that the man is able to buy a deferred annuity at
the market which gives an annual beneﬁt of 9 as of age 67 for
a price of 100. When he claims beneﬁts immediately and uses
the beneﬁts to ﬁnance this deferred annuity, he will receive an
annual beneﬁt level of 109 as of age 67. We will therefore ar-
gue that, independent of the individual’s preferences, claiming
beneﬁts at age 67 is dominated by claiming beneﬁts at age 66
and using the beneﬁts as a premium for a deferred annuity that
starts to pay out at age 67. The different strategies are displayed
in Table 2.1.
Strategy Annual Cash ﬂow at age
66 67 68 69 70 ....
Claim 66 100 100 100 100 100 ...
Claim 67 − 108 108 108 108 ...
Claim 66, buy deferred annuity − 109 109 109 109 ...
Table 2.1 – The annual payments in a stylized example for a man with age 66, for an
accrual a of 8%, and for different strategies.
First note from Table 2.1 that for the last two strategies, the man needs an
alternative source of income to ﬁnance consumption at age 66. For both strate-
gies, he can ﬁnance consumption at age 66 with for instance labor income, or
alternatively he may rely on his own savings or borrow money at some inter-
est rate. Since he can ﬁnance consumption at age 66 with the same income
source for both strategies, it does not affect the relative attractiveness of both
strategies in a utility framework. Therefore, for our analysis it is irrelevant
how consumption before the individual receives annuity income is ﬁnanced.
From Table 2.1 it is clear that claiming beneﬁts at age 67 is dominated by
claiming beneﬁts at age 66 and using the beneﬁts received that year to buy a
deferredannuity that starts to payoutat age67. Ofcourse this isjust a stylized
example and we still have to analyze the conditions under which insurers
can indeed offer a higher beneﬁt level. In the next subsection we determine
sufﬁcient conditions under which the market can outperform the option to
delay as offered by the Social Security Administration.18
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2.3.1 Characterizing conditions for dominance
In this section we consider an individual who, at a given age x (e.g., the full
retirement age), decides as of which age he would like to receive his pension
beneﬁts, and derive preference-free conditions under which insurers can offer
deferred annuities that the individual prefers above deferring beneﬁt claim-
ing.
For an individual aged x, deferring beneﬁt claiming to age y can be con-
sidered as buying a deferred real annuity. The premium equals the missed
beneﬁts at ages x,    ,y − 1. In return for this premium, a deferred annuity
with a beneﬁt level of (y − x)a as of age y is received. For example, in case
beneﬁt claiming is deferred to age x + 1, a premium of 1 (i.e., the beneﬁt level
in case the individual would have claimed at age x) is used to ﬁnance a de-
ferred annuity with start age x +1, and beneﬁt level a. If the expected present
value of the additional beneﬁts is lower than the premium paid (i.e., when the
money’s worth of this deferred annuity is less than one), the deferred annuity
offered by the pension provider is actuarially unfair, and so the market maybe
able to outperform the pension provider by offering a more attractive deferred
annuity.
Suppose that an individual with age x would like to receive pension ben-
eﬁts as of age y, with y > x. He could do so by deferring beneﬁt claiming
until age y, in which case the beneﬁt level will equal 1 + (y − x)a. Alterna-
tively, however, the individual could claim beneﬁts at age x, and (conditional
on being alive) use the beneﬁts received up to age y as periodic premiums to
ﬁnance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age y.12 Let by,x denote the
beneﬁt level offered by the insurer. Then the aggregate beneﬁt level received
as of age y equals the sum of the Social Security beneﬁts that were claimed at
age x, 1+ (x − x)a, and the payoff from the deferred annuity, by,x, i.e.,
By,x := 1+ (x − x)a + by,x. (2.1)
This strategy is preferred if insurers can offer a deferred annuity with a beneﬁt
level by,x that is strictly higher than the accrual offered by the Social Security
12Alternatively, the individual could use only part of the claimed beneﬁts to buy a deferred
annuity. It can be veriﬁed that assuming that the claimed beneﬁts are fully used is without
loss of generality. Deferring beneﬁt claiming is dominated by claiming immediately if and
only if this is the case when the claimed beneﬁts are fully used. Note that for both strategies,
the individual needs additional ﬁnancial resources to fund his consumption at age x until age
y − 1. However, since the same ﬁnancial resource can be used for both strategies, this does
not affect the relative attractiveness of both strategies.CHAPTER 2 19
system, i.e., if
by,x > (y − x)a. (2.2)
Indeed, (2.1) and (2.2) imply that the aggregate beneﬁt level is strictly higher
than the beneﬁt level received in case Social Security beneﬁt claiming is de-
ferred to age y, i.e., By,x > 1+ (y − x)a.13
Whether insurers will be able to offer deferred annuities that individuals
prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming clearly depends on the prices charged
for deferred annuities. The annuity insurers offer is in general not actuarially
fair because insurers impose a premium load. The load may include costs for
administration and adverse selection, but also a risk premium, and is typically
expressed as a percentage l of the premium (see, e.g., Mitchell, Poterba, War-
shawsky, and Brown, 1999). Now consider an individual who claims beneﬁts
at age x, and uses the beneﬁts received at ages x,    ,y − 1, as periodic pre-
miums to ﬁnance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age y. Then, the
beneﬁt level by,x that insurers would offer follows from setting the expected
present value of the premium net of cost loading equal to the expected present
value of the payments of the deferred annuity, i.e.,


















Combined with (2.2), this implies that claiming beneﬁts immediately and us-
ing them to buy a deferred annuity dominates deferring beneﬁt claiming if
by,x :=
















  > (y − x)a. (2.4)
Whether this condition can be satisﬁed depends on the term structure of real
interest rates as well as on the premium load l. In the next subsection, we in-
vestigate the effect of the term structure of real interest rates and the premium
load on the existence of dominating strategies.
2.3.2 Effect of term structure and premium load
In this subsection conditions are characterized under which insurers can prof-
itably offer deferred annuities that individuals prefer above deferring beneﬁt
13For simplicity we ignore default risk of the insurer and the state.20
WHEN CAN INSURERS OFFER PRODUCTS THAT DOMINATE DELAYED
OLD-AGE PENSION BENEFIT CLAIMING?
claiming. To do so, we compare the beneﬁt levels individuals can obtain by
either delaying beneﬁt claiming or by claiming immediately and using the
beneﬁts to buy a deferred annuity at the market. We ﬁrst consider a base
case in which the term structure of real interest rates is as displayed in Fig-
ure 2.1, solid line. It is upward sloping from 2% for the real short rate to just
above 3.3% for a maturity of 30 years. The premium load equals 7.3%, i.e.,
l = 0.073.14 We then investigate the sensitivity of the results with respect to
changes in the term structure of real interest rates or in the premium load.
Annuity Claim age (x) Men Claim age (x) Women
Age (y) 66 67 68 69 70 66 67 68 69 70
66 1.00 1.00
67 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.08
68 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.16 1.16
69 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.24
70 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.35 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.32
Table 2.2 – The aggregate beneﬁt level received as of age y for an individual aged x,
when Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age x and used to ﬁnance a deferredannu-
ity that starts to payout atage y (By,x, off-diagonalelements), and when claiming Social
Security beneﬁts is deferred to age y (diagonal elements). The left (right) panel corre-
sponds to men (women). The bold entries represent dominating strategies. The annual
accrual a equals 8% and the load l equals 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of
U.S. males (females) for the period 2000-2004. The term structure of real interest rates
is as displayed in Figure 2.1, solid line.
Table 2.2 displays the beneﬁt levels for the base case. For any given age y =
66,    ,70, the diagonal displays the beneﬁt level received as of age y when
Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age y, and the off-diagonal elements
(i.e., for x < y) yield the beneﬁt level the individual receives as of age y when
he claims Social Security beneﬁts at an earlier age x, and uses them to ﬁnance
a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age y. If the latter exceeds the
former (bold entries), deferring beneﬁt claiming is suboptimal. For example,
in case a man aged 66 would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age 68,
the dominating strategy he can follow is claiming beneﬁts immediately and
using these beneﬁts to buy a deferred annuity which starts paying off at age
14For most maturities the interest rate is lower than the 3% real interest rate as assumed in
for instance Sun and Webb (2009), and Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002). The load
is taken from the 1999 annuity value per premium dollar computed on an after tax basis in
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999).CHAPTER 2 21
























































Figure 2.3 – The aggregate beneﬁt level received as of age y, as a function of the real
short rate at age 66 , when Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age 66 and used to
ﬁnance a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age y (By,66, upward sloping lines),
and when claiming Social Security beneﬁts is deferred to age y (horizontal lines). The
left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The annual accrual a equals 8% and the
load l equals 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the
period 2000− 2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to a speciﬁc
real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters given in
Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B.
68. Men with age 67 or higher and women with age 68 or higher are better off
by claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy a deferred annuity
than by delaying beneﬁt claiming, regardless of how long they wish to defer
the receipt of their pension beneﬁts.
The above results correspond to the term structure as displayed in Fig-
ure 2.1, solid line. Higher long-term interest rates make deferred annuities
cheaper, and so it becomes more likely that insurers will be able to offer de-
ferred annuities that individuals prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming. The
opposite holds for lower long-term interest rates. To investigate the sensitiv-
ity of our results with respect to changes in the term structure of real interest
rates, we use a one-factor Vasicek model (Vasicek, 1977). In this one-factor
model, the term structure is fully determined by the short rate, and so the
sensitivity of the results with respect to the term structure of real interest rates
can be investigated by varying the short rate. Details on the one-factor Vasicek
model can be found in Appendix 2.B.
Figure 2.3 displays the beneﬁt level that an individual aged 66 can obtain
as of age y, for y = 67,    ,70, as a function of the real short rate, and for two
strategies: claimingbeneﬁts immediatelyand usingthem to ﬁnance adeferred22
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annuity that starts to pay out at age y (upward sloping lines), and deferring
beneﬁt claiming until age y (horizontal lines).
The ﬁgure shows that for each annuity age y, there exists a critical value
of the real short rate at which the individual is indifferent between these two
strategies. Whenever the short rate is higher than this critical value, annu-
ities are relatively cheap, and insurers can proﬁtably offer annuities that yield
higher beneﬁt levels than the accrual offered by the Social Security (upward
sloping line higher than horizontal line). Thus, deferring beneﬁt claiming is
dominated by claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy a de-
ferred annuity. Below the critical real short rate, deferring pension beneﬁt
claiming is preferred above buying additional annuities at the market. Sec-
ond, the ﬁgure shows that dominating strategies are more likely to exist for
men than for women. For a man aged 66 who would like to receive pension
beneﬁts as of age 67 (solid lines), claiming beneﬁts early to ﬁnance a deferred
annuity dominates delayed beneﬁt claiming in case the real short rate is above
2.25%. For a woman, the critical real short rate for deferral of one year equals
4.7%, which is quite high. As a result, dominating strategies are not likely
to exist in this case. Finally, the ﬁgure shows that for both men and women,
the critical real short rate decreases when the age as of which they would
like to receive pension beneﬁts increases. For men (women), it decreases to
−1.8% (1.2%) for deferral to age 70 (dashed-dotted lines). This occurs because
the system is more unfair for those who would like to delay beneﬁt claiming
more than for those who would like to delay beneﬁt claiming just a couples
of years (recall that the money’s worth of deferring beneﬁt claiming decreases
when the deferral period increases, see Figure 2.2). Consequently, there is
more room for dominance for individuals who wish to delay the receipt of
pension beneﬁts for a longer period.
The above results correspond to settings where the premium load equals
7.3%. Itisimmediatelyclearfrom (2.4)that ahigher premium load reducesthe
beneﬁt level that insurers can offer for a given premium, and therefore makes
it less likely that insurers are able to offer deferred annuities that individuals
prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming. In order to investigate the sensitivity
ofourresults tothelevelofthe premiumload, wedeterminetheload suchthat
the individual is indifferent between deferring beneﬁt claiming, and claiming
immediately and buying a deferred annuity. Consider an individual aged x
would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age y, with y > x. The individual
is indifferent between the two strategies if they yield the same beneﬁt level,CHAPTER 2 23
i.e., if
by,x = (y − x)a.



















  = 1− MW(y, x).
As long as the premium load is strictly lower than lmax, the market can offer
deferred annuities that (combined with the Social Security beneﬁts claimed at
age x) give a higher beneﬁt level than the beneﬁt level offered by the Social Se-
curity provider in case beneﬁt claiming is delayed until age y. Thus, deferring
beneﬁt claiming is dominated by claiming immediately.
Table 2.3 displays the maximum load under which claiming Social Security
beneﬁtsand usingthem to buy adeferred annuity dominatesdeferring beneﬁt
claiming, for all possible combinations of the claim age x and the annuity age
y > x.
Annuity Claim Age (x) Men Claim Age (x) Women
Age (y) 66 67 68 69 66 67 68 69
67 6.51 −6.64
68 12.41 16.39 −0.06 4.29
69 18.14 21.82 24.90 5.30 9.86 13.72
70 23.72 27.10 29.93 32.10 11.06 15.31 18.91 21.97
Table 2.3 – The maximum load lmax (in percentages) under which, at age x, deferring
beneﬁt claiming to age y > x is dominated by claiming Social Security beneﬁts at age
x and using them to buy a deferred annuity that starts to pay out at age y. The left
(right) panel corresponds to men (women). The accrual is set at a = 8%. The survival
probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for the period 2000 − 2004. The term
structure of real interest rates is as displayed in Figure 2.1, solid line.
For men aged 66 who would like to receive pension beneﬁts as of age 67,
the load insurance companies can impose should be below 6.5%. However,
for men who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts until at least age 68,
loads can be imposed that are signiﬁcantly higher than the benchmark level
of 7.3%. For women aged 66 who would like to receive pension beneﬁts as
of age 67 or 68, dominating strategies will not exist because a negative load is
needed. This occurs because for them the option to defer beneﬁt claiming in
the Social Security system is more than actuarially fair (i.e., the money’s worth24
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is higher than one; see Figure 2.2, solid line). For women aged 68 or women
who would like to defer beneﬁt claiming for a longer period, the loads are also
signiﬁcantly higher than the benchmark level.
2.4 Dominating strategies using annuity options
In the previous section we characterized conditions under which it is opti-
mal for the individual to claim pension beneﬁts at an earlier age than the age
as of which he wants to receive annuity beneﬁts, and use the pension bene-
ﬁts to buy a deferred annuity. We considered the case where an individual at a
given age decides as of which age he would like to receive pension beneﬁts, so
that a deferred annuity with the corresponding deferral period can be bought.
This section considers an individual who wishes to defer the receipt of pen-
sion beneﬁts until an unspeciﬁed age. We develop an annuity product, called
an annuity option, in which the individual can, year by year, decide whether
he wants to annuitize or defer annuitization for at least one more year. We
characterize conditions under which insurers can offer annuity options that
super-replicate those offered by the Social Security provider.
2.4.1 Super-replicating annuity options
In this subsection we design an annuity option that super-replicates the option
to delay beneﬁt claiming in the Social Security system. The individual who
buys this option pays a periodic premium (in case he is still alive) until the
time he decides to annuitize, and from there on receives annuity payments
from the insurer. The level of the periodic premium depends on the age at
which the product is bought. The level of the annuity payment depends on
the age at which the option to annuitize is exercised, as well as on the age at
which the option is bought. Let us denote:
• x for the age at which the insured buys the annuity option;
• Y ∈ {x + 1,..., x} for the age at which the insured annuitizes. Y is un-
known until it is reached, we denote y for any given realization of Y;
• π(x) for the premium paid at ages z ∈ {x,...,Y − 1}, conditional on
being alive, and given that the annuity option was bought at age x;
• by,x for the beneﬁt level of the annuity, conditional on annuitizing at age
y, and given that the annuity option was bought at age x. We assumeCHAPTER 2 25
that:
0 = bx,x ≤ bx+1,x ≤     ≤ bx,x.
At each age z ∈ {x + 1,..., x − 1}, the individual decides either to pay a
premium of π(x) and defer annuitization for at least another year, or to stop
paying premium and annuitize. When he annuitizes, he receives an immedi-
ate annuity from the insurance company with a beneﬁt level by,x that depends
on his current age y, and the age x at which he bought the annuity option. The
beneﬁt levels are determined at the moment the annuity option is bought.
This annuity option (weakly) dominates the option to delay beneﬁt claim-
ing in the Social Security system if the periodic premium is at most equal to
the beneﬁt level obtained in case beneﬁts are claimed at age x, and, for each
possible annuity age y, the level of the annuity payment is at least equal to the
accrual offered by the Social Security system in case beneﬁt claiming would
have been delayed to that age, i.e.,
π(x) ≤ 1+ (x − x)a, (2.5)
by,x ≥ (y − x)a, for all y = x + 1,    , x. (2.6)
If these two conditions are satisﬁed with at least one strict inequality, then for
an individual aged x who did not yet claim pension beneﬁts, further defer-
ring beneﬁt claiming is dominated by claiming beneﬁts (of 1 + (x − x)a) and
using (part of) these beneﬁts to pay the periodic premiums for the annuity
option. Indeed, (2.5) implies that the beneﬁts are sufﬁcient to pay the periodic
premium, and (2.6) implies that, for any given annuity age y, the aggregate
beneﬁt level (from Social Security beneﬁts claimed at age x and from the an-
nuity option),
By,x := 1+ (x − x)a + by,x,
is weakly higher than the beneﬁt level received in case Social Security beneﬁt
claiming is deferred to age y. Condition (2.6) needs to be satisﬁed for each y ∈
{x+1,.., x} because the individual can decide on a yearly basis to delaySocial
Security beneﬁt claiming. Thus, for dominance the beneﬁt level obtained by
buying the annuity option needs to be at least as high as beneﬁt level obtained
by delaying Social Security beneﬁt claiming for each age y ∈ {x + 1,.., x} .
Whether insurers will be able to offer super-replicating annuity options
clearly depends on how they are priced. Because the risk associated with un-
certainty in the age at which the individual will exercise the option to annu-
itize cannot be hedged, the payoffs of the annuity option cannot be replicated26
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bypayoffs from existing assets. In the following subsection we determine con-
ditions under which there exists a selfﬁnancing strategy that super-replicates
the payoffs of the annuity option. The strategy is selfﬁnancing if any new
assets or annuity payments can be ﬁnanced from revenues from previously
bought assets combined with the premium received from the individual. If
these conditions are satisﬁed, insurers can offer annuity options that satisfy
the dominance conditions (2.5) and (2.6), while making nonnegative proﬁts in
each future year.
2.4.2 The ﬁnancing strategy of the insurer
The risk due to the uncertainty with respect to the age at which individuals ex-
ercise the annuity option is idiosyncratic because it depends on, for instance,
the state of the economy. Therefore, we ﬁrst design a strategy such that at ev-
ery possible exercise date, the insurer holds a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds
with a market price equal to the price of the annuity in case the insured annu-
itizes at that date. To hedge the interest risk in the bond portfolio, the insurer
buys a porfolio of call-options. If the insured does not annuitize, the payoff
of the bond portfolio is used to ﬁnance a new bond portfolio. If the insured
annuitizes, the bond portfolio is sold to ﬁnance the immediate annuity. For-
mally, suppose that an individual aged x buys an annuity option at time t = 0,
and consider the following strategy:
• At age x, the insurer knows that the beneﬁt level of the annuity will be at
least bx+1,x. He buys a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds which cash ﬂow
matches the expected payments (plus cost loading) of the annuity in case
the insured annuitizes at age x + 1. We assume that 110−x+τpx = 0 for




spx, in years s = 1,...,110− x.
• At age x < z < Y, the insured does not yet annuitize, and the insurer
knows that the beneﬁt level upon annuitization will be at least bz+1,x,
i.e., the beneﬁt level increases by at least
  bz,x =bz+1,x − bz,x.
Therefore, theinsurerbuys, inaddition, aportfolio ofzero-coupon bonds
with cash ﬂows
   bz,x
1−l
 
spx, in years s = z − x + 1,    ,110 − x. DeﬁneCHAPTER 2 27
˜ bx,x = bx+1,x. Combined with bonds bought at ages x,    ,z − 1, this













spx, in years s = z − x + 1,...,110− x.





z−xpx from previously bought bonds,
as well as a premium payment equal to π(x) from every insured that







• At age z = Y, the insured annuitizes. The insurer holds a portfolio of





spx, in years s = Y − x,...,110− x.
The market price of this bond portfolio equals the price of the annuity
that pays off bY,x in every future year that the insured is alive.
This strategy yields the desired payoff as of age Y. For it to be selfﬁnancing,
however, revenue at each age before annuitization needs to be sufﬁcient to
ﬁnance the new bond portfolio. In every year in which the insured has not
yet exercised the annuity option, the insurer receives revenue which consists
of the premium paid by the insured and the cash ﬂow of previously bought
bonds which mature. From this revenue, he needs to ﬁnance a bond portfolio.
The strategy therefore involves losses when the price of the bond portfolio
exceeds the revenue. Moreover, for ages z > x, the price of the bond portfolio
that needs to be bought at age z depends on the term structure of real interest
rates in year t = z − x > 0. To eliminate this interest rate risk, the insurer
can, for each age z = x + 1,    , x − 1, buy a call option with maturity date
t = z − x on the corresponding bond portfolio. To minimize the price of the
call options while still guaranteeing that revenue is sufﬁcient to buy the bond
portfolio, we set the strike price K(z, x) of the call option on the bond portfolio








In the following table we summarize the insurer’s revenue and expenses at
each age, with and without call options. We denote PCalls(x) for the date t = 028
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price of the portfolio of call options. Moreover, to avoid overloaded notation,
we denote PBonds(z, x) for the date t = z − x price of the bond portfolio that
needs to be bought at age z.








Expenses without options PBonds(x, x) PBonds(z, x)
with options PCalls(x) + PBonds(x, x) min{PBonds(z, x),K(z, x)}
Proﬁt without options +/− +/−
Sign with options +/− +
Table 2.4 – The insurer’s revenue and expenses at age z (i.e., in year t = z − x), for
z = x,    ,Y − 1, for an insured who buys the annuity option at age x and exercises it
at age Y, and for two ﬁnancing strategies: the case where the insurer buys call options
and the case where he does not buy call options. The last two rows display the sign of
the corresponding proﬁt (revenue minus expenses).
With call options, expenses at age x increase, but expenses at ages z ∈ [x +
1,Y−1] (weakly) decrease because the required bond portfolio can be bought
at the minimum of the market price and the strike price of the call option.
Moreover, because the strike price of the call option on the bond portfolio that
needs to be bought at a given age is set equal to the revenue at that age, the
revenue always weakly exceeds the expenses at any age z > x. Thus, the
insurer can offer the annuity option at a nonnegative proﬁt in every year if
and only if revenue exceeds expenses at age x, i.e., if and only if
PCalls(x) + PBonds(x, x) ≤ π(x). (2.8)
Our goal is to characterize conditions on the premium load l, and the term
structure of real interest rates underwhich the dominance conditions (2.5)and
(2.6), and the proﬁt condition (2.8) are satisﬁed. When these conditions are
satisﬁed, insurers can proﬁtably offer annuity options such that individuals
who wish to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts until an unspeciﬁed age are
better off by claiming beneﬁts and using them to buy the annuity option. This
approach is conservative in the sense that it assumes that the insurer wishes
to eliminate all interest rate risk. If insurers are willing to bear some risk, the
conditions under which they can offer super-replicating annuity options will
become less strict. The insurer buys call options for each possible exercise age
of each individual.CHAPTER 2 29
2.4.3 When can the insurerproﬁtably offera super-replicating
annuity option?
In this section we ﬁrst determine conditions on the term structure of real inter-
est rates under which insurers can proﬁtably offer super-replicating annuity
options. We then investigate the sensitivity of these results to the level of the
premium load charged by insurers. Finally, we quantify the potential gains
for insurers from offering super-replicating annuity options.
To characterize conditions on the term structure of real interest rates and
the proﬁt loading under which insurers can proﬁtably offer super-replicating
annuity options, we consider the annuity option that replicates the option to
defer beneﬁt claiming in the Social Security system, i.e., we set
π(x) = 1 + (x − x)a, (2.9)
by,x = (y − x)a, for all y = x + 1,    ,70. (2.10)
and investigate under which conditions an insurer who uses the selfﬁnancing
strategy deﬁned in Subsection 2.4.2 makes a strictly positive proﬁt in the year
in which the annuity option is sold (i.e., PCalls(x)+ PBonds(z, x) < π(x)). If this
is the case, the insurer can proﬁtably offer the replicating annuity option be-
cause, as can be seen from Table 2.4, the revenue weakly exceeds expenses in
all future years. Moreover, since the proﬁt in the ﬁrst year is strictly positive,
either the annual premium π(x) could be decreased or the beneﬁt level for at
least one annuity age y could be increased, so that a super-replicating annu-
ity option can be offered while still making a positive proﬁt. An individual
who wishes to defer annuitization until an unspeciﬁed age is then better off
by claiming beneﬁts and using them to buy that annuity option than by fur-
ther delaying beneﬁt claiming. Indeed, either the individual has strictly more
wealth before annuitization (if π(x) < 1+ (x − x)a), or the beneﬁt level as of
annuitization is strictly higher for at least one annuity age (if by,x > (y − x)a).
Figure 2.4 displays the insurer’s revenue (horizontal lines) and expenses
(downward sloping lines) in the year in which the annuity option is sold, as a
function of the real short rate at that time.15 The revenue equals the premium
paid by the individual. The expenses are equal to the price of the portfolio
of call options and bonds that needs to be bought at the time the contract is
15Recall that in the one-factor Vasicek model, the term structure is fully determined by the
short rate, and so the sensitivity of the results with respectto the term structure of realinterest
rates can be investigated by varying the short rate. Details on the Vasicek model as well as
on how the price of the portfolio of call options and bonds is determined can be found in
Appendices B and C.30
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Figure 2.4 – The insurer’s revenue (π(x), horizontal lines) and expenses (PCall(x) +
PBonds(x,x), downward sloping lines) in the year in which the annuity option is sold,
as a function of the real short rate at that time. The solid (dashed) lines correspond
to an individual who buys the annuity option at age x = 66 (x = 67). The accrual a
offered by the Social Security system is set at 8%, and the proﬁt load l equals 7.3%. The
left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The survival probabilities are those of
U.S. males (females) for the period 2000−2004. The term structure of real interest rates
corresponding to a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model,
with parameters given in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B.
sold (for details, see Table 2.4). The ﬁgure considers two cases. The solid lines
correspond to an annuity option sold to an individual aged 66, for a periodic
premiumof 1(i.e., the Social Security beneﬁtlevelifbeneﬁtsare claimedatage
66). The dashed lines correspond to an annuity option sold to an individual
aged 67, for a periodic premium of 1.08 (the Social Security beneﬁt level if
beneﬁts are claimed at age 67).
First consider men who buy the annuity option at age x = 66 (left panel,
solid lines). The ﬁgure shows that there exists a critical value of the real short
rate at which the insurer’s expenses in the ﬁrst year are equal to the revenue
(the premium received from the insured). When the real short rate is above
the critical value of 2.25%, the portfolio of call options and bonds becomes
less expensive, i.e., the expenses decrease. This implies that the insurer can
proﬁtably offer a super-replicating annuity option. Men aged 66 who wish to
defer beneﬁt claiming until an unspeciﬁed age are then better off by claiming
beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy that annuity option. Indeed, that
strategy yields a higher beneﬁt level, regardless of when they will decide to
annuitize. When the annuity option is bought at age of 67 instead of age 66
(left panel, dashed lines), the conditions for dominance are even more likely toCHAPTER 2 31
be fulﬁlled. The reason is that the maximum premium the insurer can ask (the
beneﬁt level in case Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age 67) increases
from 1 to 1.08, and the minimum beneﬁt level that he needs to offer when
the individual annuitizes at age y (the accrual offered by the Social Security
beneﬁts when beneﬁt claiming is deferred to age y) decreases from (y − 66)a
to (y − 67)a. Therefore, the insurer’s revenue increases (the horizontal line
shifts upwards), and the expenses decrease (the downward sloping line shifts
downwards). For men aged 67 (left panel, dashed lines), a positive real short
rate is enough for them to prefer buying an annuity option above deferring
beneﬁt claiming. For women (right panels), dominating strategies are less
likely to exist. Because they have higher life expectancy, the option offered by
the Social Security provider is less unfair for them. For women aged 66, the
real short rate would need to be well above 4%, which is unlikely to be the
case. For women aged 67, insurers can offer annuity options that they prefer
above deferring beneﬁt claiming if the real short rate is above 2.75%.
The above results correspond to a premium load of 7.3%. In order to in-
vestigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to the level of the premium
load, we determine the maximum value of the premium load under which an
insurer who follows the selfﬁnancing strategy described in Subsection 2.4.2
can proﬁtably offer the replicating annuity option. Speciﬁcally, we determine
the load such that the insurer’s expenses in the ﬁrst year equal the premium
received from the insured in that year, i.e., PCalls(x) + PBonds(z, x) = π(x).
Whenever the load charged by insurers is strictly lower than this maximum
load, the market can offer super-replicating annuity options that individuals
strictly prefer above deferring Social Security beneﬁt claiming.
Figure 2.5displaysthe maximum feasible load asafunction of the real short
rate. The solid (dashed)lines correspond to a super-replicating annuity option
sold to an individual aged 66 (67). The left panel corresponds to men; the
right panel corresponds to women. Because higher values of the real short
rate make annuities less expensive, the maximum feasible load is increasing in
the real short rate. There is more room for insurers to offer annuity products
that individuals prefer above deferring beneﬁt claiming when interest rates
are high. For men who buy the annuity option at age 66, the feasible load is
above 7% whenever the short rate is at least 2%. For women, the maximum
load is negative for most realistic values of the real short rate, indicating that
dominating strategies are not likely to exist. However, when the product is
bought at age 67, the maximum feasible load increases signiﬁcantly for both
men and women.32
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Figure 2.5 – The maximum load lmax (in percentages) under which insurers can offer
a super-replicating annuity option to men (left panel) and to women (right panel) aged
66 (solid lines) and aged 67 (dashed lines), as a function of the real short rate. The
accrual a is set at 8%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S. males (females) for
the period 2000 − 2004. The term structure of real interest rates corresponding to a
speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model, with parameters
given in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B.
The above results were determined for the case where the insurer uses a
conservative ﬁnancing strategy in which all interest rate risk is eliminated. In-
surers, however, may be willing to take some risk, which implies that there
may be more room to offer super-replicating annuity options. To conclude
this section, we therefore quantify the potential gains for insurers from offer-
ing super-replicating annuity options under the two ﬁnancing strategies de-
scribed in Subsection 2.4.2: eliminating all interest rate risk by buying a port-
folio of call options, and accepting some interest rate risk. In both cases, the
ﬁnancing strategy is such that upon annuitization, the insurer holds a port-
folio of bonds with a market price equal to the market price of the annuity.
Therefore, the insurer’s proﬁt consists of proﬁt made in all years prior to an-
nuitization.
As an illustration, we consider a super-replicating annuity option sold to
an individual aged 66 for a periodic premium equal to 1 (the Social Security
beneﬁts claimed at age 66), with beneﬁt levels given by:
by,x = 0.08, for y = 67,
= 0.08+ (y − 67)0.09, for y = 68,    ,70.
(2.11)
Thus, the beneﬁt level received upon annuitization is strictly higher than the
accrual offered by the Social Security system as soon as annuitization is de-CHAPTER 2 33
layed until at least age 68. We determine the probability distribution of the
present value of the insurer’s proﬁts in all years prior to annuitization, in case
the individual exercises the option to annuitize at age 68. The proﬁt in the
ﬁrst year depends on the short rate at the time the annuity option is sold (i.e.,
when the individual turns 66 ); the proﬁt made in the year in which the in-
sured turns 67 depends on the short rate next year (see Table 2.4 for details on
these proﬁts). The former is known when the contract is offered, but the latter
is stochastic.
Figure 2.6 displays the probability distribution of the insurer’s proﬁt for
two values of the short rate at the time the contract is sold. The upper (lower)
panel corresponds to the case where the real short rate at the time the contract
is sold equals 2.25% (3%). In each case, the ﬁgure displays the present value of
the insurer’s proﬁt as a function of the real short rate next year (bars), as well
as the probability that the real short rate next year falls into the correspond-
ing bracket (stems). It considers two ﬁnancing strategies: buying call options
(light grey bars) and not buying call options (dark grey bars). The premium
load is set equal to 7.3%. Proﬁt values are displayed on the left y-axis, proba-
bility values are displayed on the right y-axis.
The ﬁgure shows that for both ﬁnancing strategies and for both values of
the short rate at the time the contract is sold, the insurer’s proﬁt is (weakly)
increasing in the real short rate next year. This occurs because a higher short
rate next year makes the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at age 67 less
expensive. Comparing the upper and the lower panel shows that proﬁts are
also increasing in the current real short rate. A higher real short rate at the
time the contract is bought (lower panel) makes the portfolio that needs to be
bought in the ﬁrst year less expensive, and, in addition, makes it more likely
that the short rate in the second year is also higher, so that the bond portfolio
that needs to be bought at age 67 also becomes less expensive. When the short
rate at the time the contract is sold equals 3%, the insurer’s proﬁt is very likely
positive even when interest rate risk is not hedged.
We now discuss the effect of the ﬁnancing strategy. When call options
are bought, the ﬁrst year proﬁt is strictly lower, but the second year proﬁt
is weakly higher because the bond portfolio that needs to be bought at age 67
can then be bought at the minimum of the market price and the strike price of
the call option. Because the market price of the bond portfolio is decreasing
in the short rate, there exists a critical value of the short rate in the second
year such that the present value of proﬁts with call options is lower (higher)
when the short rate is below (above) the critical value. Speciﬁcally, when the34
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Figure 2.6 – The present value of the insurer’s proﬁt for a man who buys the annuity
option at age 66 and exercises it at age 68. The bars represent the present value of the
insurer’s proﬁt as a function of the real short rate next year, for two ﬁnancing strate-
gies: buying call options (light grey bars) and not buying call options (dark grey bars).
The stems represent the probability that the real short rate next year falls into the cor-
responding bracket.Proﬁt values are displayed on the left y-axis, probability values are
displayed on the right y-axis. The upper (lower) panel corresponds to the case where
the real short rate at age 66 equals 2.25% (3%). The beneﬁt levels of the annuity op-
tion are as given in (2.11). The accrual offered by the Social Security system is set at
8%. The premium load is set equal to 7.3%. The survival probabilities are those of U.S.
males (females) for the period 2000−2004. The term structure of real interest rates cor-
responding to a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model,
with parameters given in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B.
short rate in the second year is above 2.125%, the market price of the bond
portfolio is lower than the strike price of the call option. Therefore, the proﬁt
madein the second yearisthe same forthe two ﬁnancing strategies, andso the
present value of proﬁts is lower when call options are bought. The differenceCHAPTER 2 35
(the price of the call options) is about 0.5% of the annual premium when the
current short rate is 2.5% (upper panel, dark grey bars), and negligibly small
in case the current short rate is 3% (lower panel). When the short rate in the
second year falls below the critical level of 2.125%, the price of the bond port-
folio is strictly higher than the strike price. Therefore, the second year’s proﬁt
is zero in case the insurer bought call options, but strictly negative in case he
did not. So, without call options the present value of proﬁts can be negative,
but the size and likelihood of such losses depend strongly on the current real
short rate. When the current short rate is 2.25% (upper panel), a loss is made
whenever the short rate falls below the critical level of 2.125%. In contrast,
when the current short rate is 3% (lower panel), the proﬁt made in the ﬁrst
year is signiﬁcantly higher, and high enough to compensate for the loss made
in the second year as long as the short rate is in the second year is not below
1.375%. The probability that the short rate falls below this level is negligibly
small, so that the insurer almost surely makes no losses, even when interest
rate risk is not hedged.
2.4.4 How much can individuals gain from buying annuity
options?
The previous subsection shows that, depending on the real short rate and the
premium load, insurers can make signiﬁcant proﬁts from offering a replicat-
ing annuity option. This suggests that they may also be able to offer annuity
options with beneﬁt levels that are signiﬁcantly higher than those offered by
the Social Security system, while still making a nonnegative proﬁt. In this
subsection we quantify the potential gains for individuals from such super-
replicating annuity options.
Recall that in case of delayed Social Security beneﬁt claiming, the accrual
received for an additional year of delay equals a for every year of delay. Such
a ﬁxed accrual implies that the deferral option is more unfair for those who
wish to defer for a longer period (recall that the money’s worth is decreasing
in the length of the deferral period, see Figure 2.2). This occurs because the
expected number of years over which the additional beneﬁt payment should
be made decreases when beneﬁt claiming is delayed further. Consequently,
insurers might be able to offer annuity options in which the accrual received
for an additional year of delay increases each year. To illustrate the potential
gains for insureds, we consider the case where the insurer offers an annuity36
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option with the following conditions:





(1 + c)τb, (2.13)
for some b,c ∈ (0,1]. Thus, the annual premium for the annuity option is
equal to the Social Security beneﬁts received in case they are claimed at age x,
and the accrual received for an additional year of delay increases by c% each
year. Consider, for example, an individual aged x = x = 66 who would like
to defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts. If he claims Social Security beneﬁts
immediately and uses them to buy the annuity option, he will receive an an-
nual beneﬁt level as of age 69 of 1 +
 
1+ (1 + c) + (1 + c)2 
b. In contrast, if
he delays Social Security beneﬁt claiming until age 69, he receives 1+ 3a.
Figure 2.7 displays the total beneﬁt levels received as of age y = 67,    ,70,
as a function of the real short rate, for two strategies: the case where the indi-
vidual claims beneﬁts at age x and uses them to buy the annuity option (up-
ward sloping lines), and the case where he defers beneﬁt claiming until age y
(horizontal lines). The upper (lower) panels correspond to x = 66 (x = 67).
The beneﬁt levels offered in the annuity option are as deﬁned in (2.13). To
illustrate the potential gains for individuals, we choose c = 10%, and let b be
the level that insurance companies can offer in a competitive market in which
excess proﬁts are driven to zero (i.e., condition (2.8) is satisﬁed in equality).
The accrual offered in the Social Security system is set at a = 8% and the
premium load is set at l = 7.3%.
The ﬁgure shows that insurance companies are able to offer an attractive
alternative to the option to defer pension beneﬁt claiming as offered by the
Social Security provider when the real short rate is sufﬁciently high. Strict
dominance occurs when for every given annuitization age y, the beneﬁt level
received in case the annuity option is bought is higher than when beneﬁt
claiming is deferred (i.e., the upward sloping line is above the horizontal line
for all annuity ages y). In order to have strict dominance a real short rate of
2.25% is needed for men and of 4% for women. However, some individuals
may know for sure that they do not wish to annuitize before a certain age.
In such cases, insurers are able to offer attractive annuity options even when
the short rate is lower. Suppose, for example, that an individual with age 66
knows that he would like to defer annuitization until at least age 68. Then,
dominating annuity options exist already when the real short rate is above
1% for men and 3.5% for women. When the individual knows he would likeCHAPTER 2 37
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Figure 2.7 – The aggregate beneﬁt level received as of age y, as a function of the real
short rate at age x, when Social Security beneﬁts are claimed at age x and used to buy
the annuity option (By,x, upward sloping lines), and when claiming Social Security
beneﬁts is deferred to age y (horizontal lines). The upper (lower) panel corresponds
to x = 66 (x = 67). The left (right) panel corresponds to men (women). The annual
accrual a equals 8% and the load l equals 7.3%. The beneﬁt levels of the annuity op-
tion are as deﬁned in (2.13) with c = 0.1. The survival probabilities are those of U.S.
males (females) for the period 2000−2004. The term structure of real interest rates cor-
responding to a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model,
with parameters given in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B.
to defer until at least 69, the critical values of the real short rate decrease to
0.25% for men, and 2.75% for women. There is even more room for insurers
to offer attractive annuity options when the option is bought at age 67 (lower
panels). An individual can, for example, defer social security beneﬁt claiming
until age 67 , and then use the claimed beneﬁts to buy an annuity option. In
this case, insurers can offer a product that dominates further delay of pension38
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beneﬁt claiming irrespective of the real short rate for men. The reason is that
a higher annual premium is paid (1.08 instead of 1) and that the minimum
required beneﬁt level upon annuitization (the accrual offered by the Social Se-
curity beneﬁts when beneﬁt claiming is further deferred to age y) decreases.
2.5 DominatingStrategiesusingdifferentiatedsur-
vival probabilities
Inthe previous sections we characterized conditions underwhich insurers can
offer super-replicating annuity products, taking into account that they can dif-
ferentiate premium and beneﬁt levels on the basis of gender. There is strong
empirical evidence, however, that mortality probabilities also depend sub-
stantially on individual characteristics such as, for example, educational level.
This heterogeneity leads to actuarial nonequivalence at the individual level
(see, e.g., Brown, 2003; Desmet and Jousten, 2003). In contrast to Social Secu-
rity providers, insurers may, at least to some extent, be able to differentiate
premiums on factors that affect survival probabilities. If this is the case, there
is more room to offer super-replicating annuity products for those individuals
for which the accruals offered in the Social Security system are more unfair.
To illustrate the potential effects, we characterize conditions under which in-
surers are able to offer the super-replicating annuity option deﬁned in (2.13)
to groups of individuals who differ in educational level. Three educational
levels are distinguished: less than high school, high school plus up to three
years of college, and college graduates. We use relative mortality factors dif-
ferentiated to age, gender, and educational level determined by Brown (2003)
to calculate the differentiated survival probabilities (see Appendix 2.D). As in
the previous section we consider the case where excess proﬁts are driven to
zero, i.e., the beneﬁt level b is such that the insurer’s proﬁt in the ﬁrst year is
zero.
Figure 2.8 displays the beneﬁt level that an individual aged 66 can obtain
as of age 67, as a function of the real short rate at age 66 , and for two strate-
gies: claiming beneﬁts immediately and using them to buy the annuity option
(upward sloping lines), and deferring beneﬁt claiming until age 67 (horizon-
tal lines). It distinguishes three educational levels: low education (solid lines),
high school education (dashed lines), college graduate (dashed-dotted lines).
The ﬁgure shows that the critical level of the real short rate above which insur-
ers can offer super-replicating annuity options is increasing in the educationalCHAPTER 2 39




















































Figure 2.8 – The beneﬁt level (B67,66) as a function of the real short rate for different
groups who buy an option to annuitize at age 66 and annuitize at age 67. The hori-
zontal line denotes the beneﬁt level when beneﬁts are claimed at age 67. A factor c of
10% and a load l of 7.3% were assumed. The survival probabilities are those of U.S.
males (females) for the period 2000−2004. The term structure of real interest rates cor-
responding to a speciﬁc real short rate is generated with a one-factor Vasicek model,
with parameters given in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.B.
level. Because individuals with lower educational levels have lower life ex-
pectancy, they expect to receive the additional beneﬁts offered by the Social
Security system for a shorter period of time, which implies that the system is
more unfair for them. The differences for men are large. For men with low
education, the critical short rate is 0.2%. For college graduates, it increases to
2.7%.
2.6 Conclusions
Inmany countries accruals to annual pension beneﬁts are offered to those who
claim beneﬁts later. Typically, these accruals are ﬁxed for a number of years,
and are independent of both interest rates and individual characteristics such
as gender. In addition, the accrual received for an additional year of delay is
typically a ﬁxed percentage of the beneﬁt level in case beneﬁts are claimed at
the full retirement age. The actuarially fair value of the additional deferred an-
nuity that the individual receives in case he delays beneﬁt claiming, however,
depends nontrivially on the length of the deferral period, the term structure
of real interest rates, and individual characteristics that affect survival proba-
bilities. As a consequence, public pension systems with ﬁxed accruals are not40
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actuarially fair, and the degree of unfairness varies over time (as it depends
on the term structure of real interest rates). Moreover, the degree of unfairness
depends on individual characteristics.
We show that the actuarial unfairness implies that individuals who wish to
defer the receipt of pension beneﬁts may be better off by claiming beneﬁts and
using them to buy annuity products at the market. Conditions under which
it is optimal for them to do so are investigated in a preference-free setting as-
suming only that more is preferred to less. We ﬁrst quantify the degree of
unfairness in the public pension system on the basis of the market term struc-
ture of real interest rates, generated by a Vasicek term structure model. We
then characterize conditions under which insurers can offer attractive deferral
options without taking any interest rate risk. Our results suggest that there
is a broad range of settings (for market conditions, required premium loads,
and individual characteristics) in which insurers can proﬁtably offer deferral
options that are more actuarially fair than those offered by the public pension
provider. Individuals can exploit these options by claiming beneﬁts early, and
using them to buy annuity products from insurers. The potential gains for
individuals and insurers increase when market conditions are more favorable
(e.g., when interest rates are relatively high), and when insurers have more
ﬂexibility to differentiate premium and beneﬁt levels on the basis of individ-
ual characteristics. If individuals choose to strategically exploit outside op-
tions offered by insurance companies, this will affect beneﬁt claiming behav-
ior, which in turn affects long run program costs.
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2.A Survival Probabilities
Throughout the paper, we use the one-year mortality probabilities differen-
tiated to age and gender reported by the Human Mortality Database for U.S.CHAPTER 2 41
males (females) for the year 2000 up to and including 2004.16 Let qx denote the
probability that an individual with age x dies within one year. The probability







Figure 2.9 displays the cumulative survival probabilities, conditional on
being alive at age 66 , i.e., τp66, as a function of τ.























Figure 2.9 – The cumulative survival probabilities (τp66), as a function of age (66+ τ)
for men (solid line) and women (dashed line) respectively with age 66.
2.B The One-factor Vasicek Model
The Vasicek model assumes that the instantaneous real short rate at time t, rt,
is generated by:
drt = κ[θ − rt]dt + σdWt, r(0) = r0,
where Wt is a Wiener process, θ denotes the long-run mean, κ the parameter
of mean reversion, and σ the volatility.
The time-t price of a zero-coupon bond which matures at time T, denoted
by P(rt,t,T), is given by:
P(rt,t,T) = exp{A(t,T)} exp{−B(t,T)rt},
16Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max
Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or
www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 05-01-2009).42
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with
B(t,T) =
1− exp{−κ(T − t)}
κ
, (2.14)
A(t,T) = [B(t,T) − (T − t)]
 







and where λ denotes the market price of risk. Then, the time-t real interest












Table 2.5 – The parameter values of the Vasicek model for interest rate.
The long-term average θ is set equal to 2%. Moreover, the market price of
risk λ is set equal to 0.5. This reﬂects a setting in which the real interest rate
for a maturity of six years is 0.5% higher than the short rate. The benchmark
case displayed in Figure 2.1, solid line, corresponds to the case where the real
short rate equals the long-term average θ.
2.C Pricing call options on bond portfolios
In this subsection we determine the price PCalls(x) of the portfolio of call op-
tions that the insurer buys in order to eliminate interest rate risk. Jamshid-
ian (1989) has derived an exact formula to price options on (coupon-bearing)
bonds, assumingthatinterest ratesaregeneratedbyaone-factor Vasicekmodel.
The pricing problem is further addressed in Hull (2003) and Brigo and Mer-
curio (2001). Let us denote P(r,t,s) for the date-t price of a zero-coupon bond
with maturity date s, given that the real short rate attime t equalsr. The date-0
price of a call option with strike price K and maturity date t, on a zero-coupon
bond with maturity s and principal L, is given by:
C(s,t,K, L) = LP(r0,0,s)Φ(h) − KP(r0,0,t)Φ(h − σP),CHAPTER 2 43
where Φ() denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function, r0



















respectively, where κ denotes the parameter of mean-reversion and σ denotes
the volatility of real short rate.
Recall that, for each age z = x +1,    , x−1, the insurer needs to buy a call
option with strike price K(z, x) given by (2.7), on a portfolio of zero-coupon
bonds with maturity dates s = z − x + 1,...,110− x, and with corresponding
principals Lz,x,s =
   bz,x
1−l
 
spx. The price of this call option is equal to the
price of a portfolio of call options, one for each individual zero-coupon bond,
where the strike prices K(z, x,s) of the individual call options are such that
∑K(z, x,s) = K(z, x), and they all have the same exercise region, i.e.,
K(z, x,s) = Lz,x,sP(r∗,z − x,s)




Lz,x,sP(r∗,z − x,s) = K(z, x).
(2.18)
Given that a call option is needed for every age z = x + 1,    , x − 1, the price








C(s,z − x,K(z, x,s), Lz,x,s), (2.19)
Now, the price of the portfolio of call options follows from (2.19), with Lz,x,s =    bz,x
1−l
 
spx, and with K(z, x,s) determined by (2.7) and (2.18).
2.D Differentiated survival probabilities
In this Appendix we discuss how we determine survival probabilities differ-
entiated by age, gender, and educational level using the relative mortality fac-
tors from Brown (2003). He constructs age-speciﬁc relative mortality factors
for black, white, and Hispanic men and woman, where the white and black
groups are then further differentiated on the basis of education. Three ed-
ucational levels are distinguished for whites, namely: less than high school,
high school plus up to three years of college, and college graduates. To obtain44
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survival probabilities differentiated by educational level, we multiply the rel-
ative mortality factors for white men and women with different educational
level with the mortality probabilities from the Human Mortality database as
described in Appendix 3.B. Let c
(e)
x denote the relative mortality factor of an
individual with age x with educational level e. The probability that an indi-
vidual with educational level e is alive over τ years conditional on being alive










Thedifferentiated cumulative survival probabilitiesforwhitesaredisplayed
in Figure 2.10.

















































Figure 2.10 – The cumulative survival probabilities differentiated to gender and edu-
cational level for men (left) and women (right), conditional on being alive at age 66.CHAPTER3
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS FOR COUPLES OF ANNUITY
MARKETS INCOMPLETENESS
“Sex differences in mortality are well established facts. In the
human population of developed countries where infectious
diseases are not signiﬁcant causes of death, the penalty for
maleness is that almost every important disease has a higher
mortality rate in males than in females”
Leonard Hayﬂick (1982)
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is based on Sanders, De Waegenaere, and Nijman (2011a). Most
individuals save for retirement while working to smooth consumption over
time. At retirement, the savings can be annuitized such that a periodic pay-
ment is received until death. An individual with a partner may not only want
to protect himself from outliving his assets, but he may also want to protect
his partner from outliving her assets. Consequently, a periodic payment must
be made until both individuals have deceased. To support living after retire-
ment, couples can typically buy a single-life annuity, a joint annuity, a sur-
vivor annuity, or a portfolio of these annuities. A single-life annuity insures
the individual against outliving one’s assets, i.e., a periodic payment is made
to the individual as long as he or she is alive. A joint annuity makes a periodic
4546
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payment as long as both spouses are alive and a survivor annuity makes a
periodic payment as of the moment one of the spouses has deceased and the
other spouse is still alive. In this paper, we ﬁrst investigate the effect of mar-
ket imperfections on couples’ optimal annuity decisions, and then use these
results to investigate the welfare losses they bear because of the imperfections.
Although there isanextensive literature investigating annuitydemand
for singles, the literature about annuity demand for couples is much smaller.
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) analyze annuitization decisions in families. They
demonstrate that implicit risk-sharing arrangements within marriage and the
family can substitute to a large extent for the purchase of annuities in public
markets. Brown and Poterba (2000) estimate the “annuity equivalent wealth”,
which determines the amount of wealth that couples would need in the ab-
sence of actuarially fair annuity markets in order to achieve the same utility
level as in case they would have access to these markets. An annuity is actu-
arially fair when the price of the annuity equals the expected discount present
value of the annuity. They ﬁnd that a couple consisting of a man aged 65
and woman aged 62 who have access to an actuarially fair annuity market
would require between 18 and 39 percent more wealth in case no such market
is available to obtain the same utility level. Dushi and Webb (2004) ﬁnd that
it is optimal for married couples to delay annuitization because of the actu-
arial unfairness of annuities. Fitzgerald (1989) examines the wealth allocation
decision of married couples between consumption for the surviving widow
should the husband die, and consumption for the couple should both live. He
ﬁnds that the annuitized consumption of widows of older husbands is gen-
erally higher than if their husbands had lived. He also ﬁnds that younger
widows tend to be relatively worse off in terms of annuitized consumption
than older widows. In Schmeiser and Post (2005) self-annuitization strategies
are investigated. Self-annuitization means that the wealth is not annuitized
but invested in an investment fund from which a payout stream is generated.
Self-annuitization strategies create opportunities for the retiree to leave a be-
quest. However, the retiree bears the risk of outliving his assets. Therefore,
Schmeiser and Post (2005) propose a family strategy where heirs bear both
the chances of receiving a bequest and the risk that the retiree outlives his
assets. Post, Gründl, and Schmeiser (2006) demonstrate that the family self-
annuitization strategy is optimal for a wide range of parameter values. Vidal-
Meliá and Lejárraga-García (2006) extend the model of Brown and Poterba
(2000) by adding a bequest motive. Hurd (1999) investigates consumption
levels of couples subject to their bequest motive.CHAPTER 3 47
In this paper, we investigate the effect of market imperfections on cou-
ples’ optimal annuity decisions, and on the welfare losses they bear because of
the imperfections. We consider three sources of market imperfections. First,
couples typically only have access to annuities that yield ﬂat beneﬁt levels,
i.e., the payment of the annuity is state dependent but not time dependent.
Second, there are several reasons why the survival probabilities used by the
annuity provider for pricing annuities can differ from the survival probabil-
ities used by the couple to determine the utility they derive from a speciﬁc
annuity portfolio. Such differences can occur, for example, due to information
asymmetry between the annuity provider and the couple, or due to gender
neutral pricing in collective pension plans. Third, many individuals have ac-
crued pension rights in the form of a single-life annuity or a single-life with
survivor annuity while working. It is common practice that they can, at re-
tirement, exchange (part of) the single-life annuity for a survivor annuity or
vice versa, but the exchange in many cases is subject to restrictions.1 A typical
restriction is that the insured can exchange (part of) his single-life annuity for
a survivor annuity for his spouse, but cannot exchange part of his single-life
annuity for a single-life annuity for his spouse or for a survivor annuity for
himself. This implies that when only the husband has accrued pension rights,
there is no reduction in the couple’s income upon the spouse’s death, creating
an asymmetric form of protection, where primary longevity protection is for
the participant and secondary protection is for the spouse.
We investigate the effect of these market imperfections on the couples’
optimal annuity decisions, and on the welfare they derive from buying an-
nuities. We do so by comparing the optimal consumption pattern given the
imperfections to the optimal consumption pattern in a benchmark case with
a complete annuity market with time- and state-dependent Arrow annuities
(see, e.g., Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005)).
First, we ﬁnd that how the absence of time-dependent annuities affects
the couple’s optimal consumption pattern depends strongly on whether and
how the survival probabilities used by the annuity provider differ from those
1Johnson, Ucello, and Goldwyn (2003) measure the share of married retirees with pension
annuities who forgo survivor protection. They examine which factors inﬂuence the decision
between a single-life annuity and a joint & survivor annuity, ﬁnding that retirees are more
likely to reject survivor protection when the spouse has access to alternative sources of sur-
vivor protection, the pension wealth is limited, they expect to outlive their spouse, and the
relationship with the spouse is weak. Previtero (2010)ﬁnds that those retiring after stock mar-
ket increases of six to 12 months are much more likely to select the lump sum option rather
than lifetime income.48
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used by the couple. Absent such differences, the couple prefers a ﬂat con-
sumption level over time, and so the fact that only annuities with ﬂat beneﬁt
levels are available does not affect their optimal consumption pattern. In con-
trast, when the survival probabilities used by the annuity provider differ from
those used by the couple, these differences affect the relative attractiveness of
survival annuities and single-life annuities. As a consequence, the optimal
consumption pattern is no longer necessarily ﬂat over time, and so the couple
may bear welfare losses in case only ﬂat annuities are available. However, dif-
ferences between the survival probabilities used by the annuity provider and
by the couple can also imply that some annuities are priced relatively attrac-
tively, which can lead to welfare gains.
Second, for couples with illiquid pension wealth in the form of pre-
accrued pension rights, restrictions imposed on the exchange of pension rights
affect the couple’s optimal consumption pattern in case one of the spouses
has accrued signiﬁcantly more pension rights than the other spouse. These
restrictions then imply that upon the death of the spouse that has accrued
less pension rights, the surviving spouse’s consumption is sub-optimally high
as compared to the case where all wealth is liquid. The welfare losses are
strongly affected by differences in survival probabilities used by the couple
and the provider of the annuities, and by whether the couple holds illiquid
longevity insurance in the form of a state pension. When the couple is also
entitled to receive a state pension, welfare losses increase when both spouses
have accrued pension rights, but decrease when only one of the spouses has
accrued pension rights.
Finally, many pension schemes offer a default option, and existing lit-
erature suggests that many couples tend to follow the default. A common
default is for the spouse to receive 50% of the participant’s monthly beneﬁt
upon the participant’s death. Our results, however, suggest that the optimal
survivor fraction is higher than 50%.2 We quantify the welfare losses that cou-
ples bear in case they choose the default option.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, the
optimal portfolio of annuities for a couple is determined in a benchmark case
with a complete market with time-dependent Arrow annuities. In Section 3.3,
we determine the optimal portfolio of annuities when only annuities with a
ﬂat beneﬁt level over time are available. We distinguish the case where all
pension wealth is liquid, and the case where the couple has pre-accrued pen-
2Smith (2003) ﬁnds that the survivor’s living expenses are between 60% and 80% of the
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sion rights that cannot freely be reallocated. In Section 3.4 we determine the
welfare losses the couple bears due to these market imperfections, and show
how these welfare losses are affected by differences in survival probabilities
used by the annuity provider and by the couple. We also determine the wel-
fare losses a couple bears in case they choose the default option. Section 4.8
concludes.
3.2 Optimal annuity portfolio in complete markets
In this section, we consider optimal annuity decisions by couples in the bench-
mark case in which the couple has access to a complete market of time- and
state-dependent annuities. In Subsection 3.2.1 we ﬁrst discuss how we model
the lifetime expected utility of couples. We analyze optimal consumption pat-
ternsinSubsection 3.2.2. Usingtheseoptimal consumption patterns, we deter-
mine the optimal survivor fraction in Subsection 3.2.3. The survivor fraction
of a spouse is deﬁned as the ratio of the consumption of that spouse in case
the other spouse has deceased over the aggregate consumption of the couple
in case they are both alive.
3.2.1 The couple’s lifetime expected utility
We use the utility framework of Brown and Poterba (2000) to model the life-
time expected utility of couples. They have extended the utility framework
of Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) by allowing for consumption externalities be-
tweenspouses, or“jointconsumption”. Consumption externalitiesarisewhen
the purchase of a good by one spouse is utility increasing for the other spouse,
or vice versa. For example, two spouses have to pay only one mortgage or
only one newspaper. The joint consumption can also be interpreted as public
consumption.
The couple consists of a husband (m) and wife (f). We assume that the
couple does not have a bequest motive, i.e., they do not derive utility from
income after decease. Let us further denote:
• Ct(mf) for the joint real consumption in period t of the husband and
wife when both spouses are alive in period t and Ct(m) (Ct(f)) for the
real consumption in period t of the husband (wife) when the husband
(wife) is alive in period t but the wife (husband) has deceased;
• T for the maximum remaining lifetime of the longest living spouse;50
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• pt(m) (pt(f)) for the (subjective) probability that the husband (wife) is
alive in period t given that the husband (wife) is alive in the current
period. The couple may not know their actual survival probabilities but
they can maximize their lifetime expected utility using their subjective
survival probabilities.
Following Brown and Poterba (2000), we assume that the couple has in-
tertemporal separable utility, and that husband and wife have the same CRRA
utility function. We choose a CRRA utility function because we can normal-
ize the wealth level without loss of generality. Speciﬁcally, for all periods
t ∈ {0,    ,T}, the utility that a spouse (husband or wife) derives from con-






1−γ , for γ > 1,
log(C +  C′), for γ = 1,
where   is the degree of joint consumption and γ is the parameter for risk
aversion.   could also be interpreted as the economies of scale parameter. The
utility of the couple in period t when one spouse consumes C and the other
spouse consumes C′ is the sum of the utility of the husband and wife, i.e.,
U(C,C′) + U(C′,C). For computational ease, we assume that the utility func-
tion of the husband and wife are identical. For more general utility functions,
we refer to Appendix 3.C.1.
To determine the lifetime expected utility of the couple, we distinguish four
possible states: both spouses are alive, only the husband is alive, only the wife
is alive, both spouses have deceased. The utility in case both spouses have
deceased is not deﬁned. In case both spouses are alive, they need to optimally
divide the aggregate consumption Ct(mf) between themselves. Because the
husband and the wife have the same concave utility function, they optimally
consume equal amounts when they are both alive, that is, C = C′ = 1
2Ct(mf).3


























(1 + ρ)t , (3.1)
where ρ is the rate of time preference. The lifetime expected utility of the cou-
ple is the discounted value of the sum over time of the couple’s utility when
3Maximizing U(C,C′) + U(C′,C) subject to C + C′ = Ct(mf) yields C = C′ = Ct(mf)/2.CHAPTER 3 51
all households renters wife aged 60 or older
mean 0.69 0.69 0.66
5% quantile 0.50 0.48 0.49
95% quantile 0.85 0.85 0.77
Table3.1 – The mean degreeof joint consumption andthe 5%and95%quantiles forall
households, households who rent, and households where the wife is aged 60 or older.
both spouses are alive multiplied with the probability that both spouses are
alive in that period, the husband’s utility when only the husband is alive mul-
tiplied with the probability that only the husband is alive in that period, and
the wife’s utility when only the wife is alive multiplied with the probability
that only the wife is alive in that period. Throughout the paper we assume
that the couple’s rate of time preference equals the interest rate.
In Subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 we analyze the couple’s optimal consump-
tion pattern in case they have access to a complete market of time- and state-
dependent annuities. In the remainder of this section, we ﬁrst discuss how
the parameter values used in the numerical examples are calibrated. All nu-
merical results are displayed for a couple consisting of a husband and wife
aged 65 and 62 respectively at the moment annuities are purchased. Follow-
ing Brown and Poterba (2000), we set the degree of risk aversion equal to 2
or 5. The degree of joint consumption ( ) is calibrated with data from the
Longitudinal Internet Studies for Social Sciences (LISS) panel, which is a large
socio-economic survey representative of the U.S. population of ages 16 and
older.4 Some 5000 households (comprising 8000 individuals) received a ques-
tionnaire about, among others, intrahousehold consumption. See van Soest,
Vermeulen, and Schollier (2010) for a more detailed description of the data-
set. Table 3.1 displays summary statistics of the degree of joint consumption
of all households in the data-set. Detailed information about the data-set and
how the degree of joint consumption is determined can be found in Appendix
3.A.
We ﬁnd that the mean degree of joint consumption equals 70%. However,
there is a wide variation in the degree of joint consumption between couples.
The 5% quantile is 50% whereas the 95% quantile is 85%. Among couples
were the wife is at least 60 years old, the degree of joint consumption is lower.
One reason is that couples who own a house may already have paid off their
4The data are freely available for non-commercial research purposes. See www.liissdata.nl
for more information.52
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mortgages, decreasing the public consumption. In Brown (2001) the degree
of joint consumption is determined based on the work done on ‘equivalence
scales’ in household consumption by Citro and Michael (1995). Brown (2001)
ﬁnds that the degree of joint consumption equals 62.45%, which is slightly
below the values we ﬁnd. In our numerical result, we set the degree of joint
consumption ( ) equal to either 50% or 70%.
3.2.2 Optimal consumption patterns
In this subsection, we analyze optimal consumption patterns in case the cou-
ple has access to a complete market of “Arrow annuities” (see, e.g., Davidoff,
Brown, and Diamond, 2005). Whereas standard annuities yield payments that
are state-dependent but not time-dependent (i.e., the payment depends only
on whether or not the insured and/or his spouse are alive), the payment of an
Arrow annuity can be both time- and state-dependent.
We use the framework of Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) for a spe-
ciﬁc utility function. In contrast with Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005)
we take into account couples instead of singles. A single-life Arrow annuity
makes a periodic payment to an individual in a given period if the individual
is alive in that period. Because our focus is on annuity decisions by couples,
we consider in addition joint Arrow annuities that make a periodic payment to
a couple in a given future period if both spouses are alive in that period, and
survivor Arrow annuities that make a payment in a given future period to one
of the spouses if that spouse is alive, and the other spouse has deceased.
We allow for differences between the survival probabilities used by the an-
nuity provider for pricing the annuities and the survival probabilities the cou-
ple uses to maximize their lifetime expected utility. There are several reasons
why the survival probabilities used by the annuity provider may differ from
the survival probabilities used by the couple. First, there may be informa-
tion asymmetry between the couple and the annuity provider regarding fac-
tors that affect the couple’s mortality probabilities such as, for instance, their
health status.5 Second, the annuity provider may not be allowed to differen-
tiate premium based on characteristics such as ethnicity, educational level, or
even gender, although survival probabilities do depend on these characteris-
tics. This is particularly relevant for individuals who have accrued pension
5Salm (2010) ﬁnds that consumption and saving choices vary with surjective mortality
probabilities in a way that is consistent with a life cycle model of consumption and savings
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rights in collective pension plans. As argued above, upon retirement the par-
ticipant is often allowed to exchange rights for one type of annuity for rights
for another type of annuity, under the restriction that the actuarial value of
the pension rights before and after exchange is the same. To determine the
actuarial value, however, pension funds are not allowed to let the survival
probabilities depend on characteristics other than age.
Let p∗
t(m) (p∗
t (f)) denote the probability that the husband (wife) is alive in
period t given that the husband (wife) is alive in the current period, used by
the annuity provider to price annuities. The price of a joint Arrow annuity
which pays one unit of consumption in period t when both spouses are alive
in that period is then given by:
P∗




(1 + r)t , (3.2)
where l represents the expense loading and r denotes the discount rate, i.e.,
the price of the annuity is the discounted value of the probability that both
spouses are alive in period t, increased with the loading. The price of a sur-
vivor Arrow annuity that pays off one unit of consumption in period t if the
spouse with gender g is alive and the spouse with gender g′ has deceased is
given by:
P∗
surv,g(t) = (1 + l)
p∗
t (g)(1 − p∗
t (g′))
(1 + r)t , for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}. (3.3)
We refer to a survivor annuity that pays off when the husband is alive and
the wife has deceased as the husband’s survivor annuity and a survivor an-
nuity that pays off when the wife is alive and the husband has deceased as
the wife’s survivor annuity. Moreover, we denote Pjoint(t) and Psurv,g(t) for
the corresponding annuity prices in case the annuity provider would use the
couple’s survival probabilities and rate of time preference to price annuities,
i.e.,
Pjoint(t) = (1 + l)
pt(m)pt(f)
(1 + ρ)t , (3.4)
Psurv,g(t) = (1 + l)
pt(g)(1 − pt(g′))
(1 + ρ)t , for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}. (3.5)
Following Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005), we assume that couples
cannot invest in risky assets, and that the mortality credit is sufﬁciently large
such that buying annuities dominates saving against the risk-free rate r. This54
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implies that it is optimal for the couple to annuitize all wealth.6 The budget
constraint is then given by:











where W equals the wealth of the couple at current time 0, Ct(mf) is the bene-
ﬁt level of the joint annuity at time t, Ct(m) is the beneﬁt level of the survivor
annuity for the husband at time t, and Ct(f) is the beneﬁt level of the survivor
annuity for the wife at time t. Note that the optimal fraction of wealth in-
vested in the different Arrow annuities does not depend on the initial wealth
level W because of the CRRA utility function. Without loss of generality, we
can therefore normalize W. In all our numerical examples, the total wealth of
the couple at the moment they annuitize is set at W = 100.
We maximize the couple’s lifetime expected utility in (3.1) subject to the
budget constraint in (3.6) and subject to the constraints that consumption
should be non-negative in all states. This yields that, for any γ  = 1, the opti-
mal consumption in year t in case both spouses are alive is given by












and the optimal consumption in year t if the spouse with gender g is alive and











where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. λ is chosen such that (3.6) is satisﬁed.7
The results for more general utility functions is displayed in Appendix 3.C.1.









The left hand side of the inequality equals the price of one consumption unit in period t by
buying “Arrow annuities” for each state for which at least one spouse is alive, and the right
hand side equals the price of one consumption unit in period t in each state by saving. The
“Arrowannuities” aremore attractivewhen it is less expensive to ﬁnance futureconsumption
by buying these annuities than by saving, i.e., when the mortality credit is sufﬁciently large
to compensate for the proﬁt loading l.
7The expression for λ and the solution for γ = 1 are displayed in Appendix 3.C.CHAPTER 3 55
In the remainder of this section, we investigate how the optimal consump-
tion pattern is affected by differences in the survival probabilities used by the
couple and the annuity provider, respectively. In Section 4, we will use these
results to determine the effect of differences in survival probabilities on the
welfare losses couples bear due to market incompleteness.
When the survival probabilities used for pricing equal the couple’s (sub-
jective) survival probabilities (i.e., when p∗
t (m) = pt(m), and p∗
t (f) = pt(f),
for all t), the optimal consumption pattern is ﬂat over time, i.e., Ct+1(mf) =
Ct(mf) and Ct+1(g) = Ct(g), for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}. Speciﬁcally, the optimal con-
sumption pattern is given by:







γ, for g ∈ {m, f}, (3.10)
where λ is independent of t.
When the couple’s (subjective) survival probabilities differ from the sur-
vival probabilities used for pricing annuities, the optimal consumption pat-
terns are not necessarily ﬂat over time anymore. We can investigate this by



















, for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}. (3.12)
For any given period, an annuity is priced attractively in case the price based
on the couples survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) is higher than the price
based on the survival probabilities used by the insurer (p∗
t (m), p∗
t (f)), i.e.,
when Pjoint(t) > P∗
joint(t) for a joint annuity and Psurv,g(t) > P∗
surv,g(t) for a
survivor annuity. It follows immediately from (3.11) and (3.12) that consump-
tion is increasing from period t to t + 1 in the state where both spouses are
alive when Pjoint(t + 1)/P∗
joint(t + 1) > Pjoint(t)/P∗
joint(t), i.e., when the joint
annuity is priced relatively attractively in period t + 1 compared with period
t. Similarly, consumption is increasing from period t to t+1 in the state where
only the spouse with gender g is alive when Psurv,g(t + 1)/P∗
surv,g(t + 1) >
Psurv,g(t)/P∗
surv,g(t).
We illustrate the effect of differences in survival probabilities on the cou-
ple’s optimal consumption pattern in Figure 3.1. In the beginning of this sec-56
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tion, several reasons are given for differences between the survival probabili-
ties used by the annuity provider for pricing annuities and those used by the
couple to evaluate their lifetime expected utility. In our numerical examples,
we focus on the case where the annuity provider uses gender-neutral survival
probabilities. In many countries, regulators impose that survival probabilities
used for pricing annuities are gender-neutral.8 Moreover, it is common that
the gender-neutral survival probabilities in case of collective pension plans
depend on the distribution of men and women in the pension fund. We there-
fore consider the case where the gender-neutral survival probabilities used for
pricing annuities are given by:
p∗
t(m) = δ   pm,m,t + (1 − δ)   pf,m,t, for all t; (3.13)
p∗
t (f) = δ   pm,f,t + (1 − δ)   pf,f,t, for all t, (3.14)
where δ ∈ [0,1] reﬂects the gender composition of the fund, and pg,g,t for
g, g ∈ {m, f} denotes the t-year survival probability of an individual with
gender g with the same age as the insured with gender g. Note that p∗
t (m)
differs from p∗
t (f) only due to the age difference between man and wife. In
all our numerical examples, we consider the case where the survival prob-
abilities pg,g,t used by the annuity provider to determine the gender-neutral
survival probabilities in (3.13) and (3.14), as well as the survival probabilities
(pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple to determine the expected lifetime expected
utility are derived from age- and gender-speciﬁc population mortality prob-
abilities taken from the Human Mortality database.9 This implies that differ-
ences between the survival probabilities used by the couple and the annuity
provider arise only due to gender-neutral pricing.
Figure 3.1 displays the optimal consumption patterns for different gender-
neutral survival probabilities used for pricing the annuities. The left ﬁgure
displays the joint consumption level of the couple in case they are both alive,
the middle (right) ﬁgure displays the consumption level of the husband (wife)
in case the wife (husband) has deceased. Because the total wealth W is nor-
malized at 100, the consumption level in a given period and a given state can
8The European court has recently decided that as off December 2012 insurers are not al-
lowed to differentiate annuity prices based on gender.
9Speciﬁcally, for g ∈ {m, f}, we let pt(g) = (1 − q
(g)
x )(1 − q
(g)
x+1)   (1 − q
(g)
x+t−1), where
x denotes the age of the insured with gender g, and q
(g)
x+s denotes the one-year death prob-
ability of an individual with gender g and age x + s, as reported in the Human Mortality
Database. The corresponding t-year survival probabilities pt(g), are displayed in Appendix




x+1)   (1− q
(g)
x+t−1), where x denotes the age of
the insured with gender g.CHAPTER 3 57








































































(a) Ct(mf) (b) Ct(m) (c) Ct(f)
Figure 3.1 – Optimal consumption as a function of time, for a couple consisting of a
husband and wife with age 65 and 62, respectively, at the moment they buy the an-
nuities. Panel (a) displays optimal consumption when both spouses are alive. Panel
(b) displays optimal consumption when only the husband is alive, and panel (c) dis-
plays optimal consumption when only the wife is alive. The parameter of risk aver-
sion γ equals 2 and the parameter of joint consumption   equals 70%. The discount
rate r equals 3%. The survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age-
and gender-speciﬁc population survival probabilities for U.S. individuals in the period
2000− 2004. The gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the an-
nuity provider are determined from (3.13) and (3.14) for three values of δ. The black
solid lines correspond to δ = 80%, the dashed lines correspond to δ = 50%, and the
dotted lines correspond to δ = 20%. The grey lines represent the optimal consumption
patterns for the case where (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) equals (pt(m), pt(f)) for all t.
be interpreted as the percentage of total wealth consumed in that period and
that state.
Because of the differences between the survival probabilities used by the
couple and the annuity provider (i.e., differences between (pt(m), pt(f)) and
(p∗
t (m), p∗
t (f))), theoptimal consumption patternsarenotﬂatovertime. From
the ﬁrst order conditions in Appendix 3.C.1, it follows immediately that the
optimalconsumption patternsareingeneralnotﬂatovertime anymore. More-
over, comparing ﬁgures (b) and (c) shows that consumption when only the
wife is alive is higher than consumption when only the husband is alive. Since
the survival probability of a man is typically lower than the survival proba-
bility of a woman with the same age, the annuity prices under gender-neutral
pricing for the husband (wife) are relatively high (low). Therefore, the con-
sumption of the wife when the husband has deceased is optimally higher than
the consumption of the husband when the wife has deceased. Comparing dif-58
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ferent line types in each of the three ﬁgures shows that the optimal consump-
tion patterns depend strongly on the differences between (pt(m), pt(f)) and
(p∗
t (m), p∗
t (f)). For δ = 80%, consumption when both spouses are alive is in-
creasing over time whereas for δ = 50% or δ = 20%, consumption when both
spouses are alive is decreasing over time.
3.2.3 Optimal survivor fraction
Many collective plans include some form of survivor protection. In most
cases, however, there are implicit or explicit constraints on the survivor frac-
tion, i.e., the ratio of insured rights for survivor protection over insured rights
for joint-life protection. In this section, we analyze the optimal survivor frac-
tion in case the couple has access to a complete and frictionless market of
Arrow annuities. These results will then be used as a benchmark to quantify
the welfare losses couples bear from such restrictions.
We will denote the optimal survivor fraction for the husband and wife by
αt(m) and αt(f) respectively. The survivor fraction of a spouse in period t is
the consumption when only that spouses isalive relative to the joint consump-




, for g ∈ {m, f}. (3.15)
To obtain the optimal survivor fraction (αt(g) for g ∈ {m, f}), (3.7) and (3.8)
are substituted into (3.15). This yields the following proposition.





























, for g ∈ {m, f}. (3.16)
The optimal survivor fraction of a spouse is independent of the interest rate r and the
expense loading l. In addition, the optimal survivor fraction of a spouse is increasing
in the degree of joint consumption ( ) for γ > 1, and independent of the degree of
joint consumption for γ = 1. Moreover, it holds that:
(i) if annuity provider and couple use the same survival probabilities, thenCHAPTER 3 59
– αt(g) is independent of time and gender;
– αt(g) is increasing in γ when   > 0, and independent of γ when   = 0.
(ii) if annuity provider and couple use different survival probabilities, then
– αt(g) can depend on time and gender;








surv,g(t) > 1+  .









> 0, it follows from (3.16) that αt(g) is in-
creasing in   when γ > 1.
(i) When the annuity provider and the couple use the same survival proba-
bilities and interest rate, i.e., when
P∗
joint(t) = Pjoint(t), and P∗
surv,g(t) = Psurv,g(t) for all t and g ∈ {m, f}, it
follows from (3.16) that αt(g) simpliﬁes to 1
2(1 +  )
1− 1
γ, which is inde-
pendent of time and gender. Moreover, it is increasing in γ when   > 0,
and independent of γ when   = 0.
(ii) When P∗
joint(t)  = Pjoint(t), and P∗
surv,g(t)  = Psurv,g(t) for some t it follows
from (3.16) that αt(g) can depend on t and on g. The effect of γ on αt(g)
follows from the fact that
αt(g) = 1









The above proposition shows that differences in the survival probabilities
used by the annuity provider and by the couple affect the optimal survivor
fraction in a nontrivial way. First consider the case where annuity provider
and couple use the same survival probabilities and discount rate
((pt(m), pt(f)) = (p∗
t (m), p∗
t (f)) for all t). It then follows immediately from
(3.16) that
αt(g) = α =
1
2
(1 +  )
1− 1
γ, for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}. (3.17)
When there is no joint consumption, i.e., when   = 0, it follows from (3.17)
that the optimal survivor fraction is independent of time, and equal to 50%
for both genders. The reason is that risk averse couples prefer to smooth con-
sumption over time. Because they each consume half of the consumption in60
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS FOR COUPLES OF ANNUITY MARKETS
INCOMPLETENESS
case they are both alive, consumption remains ﬂat when one of them deceases
only if the survivor fraction is 50%.10 The optimal survivor fraction increases
when the degree of joint consumption   increases for γ > 1 The reason is
that when one of the spouses dies, the surviving spouse no longer receives the
consumption externalities from the former spouse’s consumption. Because a
risk-averse couple prefers to smooth consumption over time, couples with a
higher degree of joint consumption optimally choose a higher consumption
when only one of the spouses is alive. This effect is stronger to the extent that





































Figure 3.2 – The optimal survivor fraction α from (3.17),as a function of the parameter
of risk aversion γ, for different degrees of joint consumption  , for the case where
annuity provider and couple use the same survival probabilities, i.e., p∗
t(m) = pt(m)
and p∗
t(f) = pt(f) for all t. The survival probabilities used by the couple and by the
annuity providerareage-and gender-speciﬁcpopulation survival probabilities forU.S.
individuals in the period 2000− 2004.
In Figure 3.2 the effect of the degree of joint consumption ( ) and the pa-
rameter of risk aversion (γ) on the optimal survivor fraction (α) from (3.17)
is displayed when pt(m) = p∗
t (f), and pt(f) = p∗
t(f) for all t. A frequently
offered option is a joint annuity in combination with a 50% survivor annuity.
When there is no joint consumption, a 50% survivor beneﬁt is optimal. For all
other parameter values, the optimal survivor fraction is higher.
Now consider the case where annuity provider and couple use different
survival probabilities. First, it is seen immediately from (3.16) that in general
the optimal survivor fraction is no longer ﬂat over time. The reason is that
the relative attractiveness of consumption in the different states and periods
10Without the joint consumption, the couple solves the same maximization problem as two
singles solve.CHAPTER 3 61
is also affected by whether or not the corresponding annuity is priced attrac-
tively. Consider for example the case where there is no joint consumption, i.e.,
  = 0. Then, it follows from (3.2)-(3.5) and (3.16) that the optimal survivor






Pjoint(t) , and strictly













Pjoint(t) , the price the annuity provider charges for the sur-
vivor annuity, relative to the price of the joint annuity, is strictly smaller than
the price ratio that would result if the annuity provider would have used the
couple’s survivor probabilities. Thus, differences in survival probabilities in
this case make survivor annuities more attractive. As a consequence, the opti-
mal survivor fraction is higher than when there are no differences in survival






Pjoint(t) . Second, differences
in survival probabilities used by the annuity provider and the couple imply
that the optimal survivor fraction is no longer necessarily increasing in the






Pjoint(t) and   = 0,
the attractive pricing of the survivor annuity relative to the joint annuity im-
plies that the optimal survivor fraction αt(g) is higher than 50% (see (3.16)).
Because more risk averse couples attach more value to ﬂat consumption pat-
terns, and because with   = 0 a ﬂat consumption pattern is obtained when
αt(g) = 50%, an increase in the degree of risk aversion implies a decrease in
the optimal survivor fraction.
Figure 3.3 displays the husband’s optimal survivor fraction as a function of
time for different gender-neutral survival probabilities and different degrees
of risk aversion and degrees of joint consumption. Because of the unfavor-
able annuity prices for men, the husband’s optimal survivor fraction in case
of gender-neutral pricing is below his optimal survivor fraction when his sur-
vival probabilities would be used. Moreover, the optimal survivor fraction is
not ﬂat over time anymore. In Appendix 3.D, the wife’s optimal survivor frac-
tions are displayed. Because of the favorable annuity prices for the wife, the
optimal survivor fraction of the wife is even above 100% for some parameter
values, meaning that the total consumption of the couple is optimally higher
in states where only the wife is alive than in states where both spouses are
alive. In addition, the husband’s optimal survivor fraction is decreasing as a
function of time whereas the wife’s optimal survivor fraction is increasing as
a function of time.62
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(a) γ = 2,  = 70% (b) γ = 2,  = 50% (c) γ = 5,  = 70%
Figure 3.3 – The husband’s optimal survivor fraction as a function of time, for a cou-
ple consisting of a husband and wife with age 65 and 62, respectively, at the moment
they buy the annuities, for three combinations of the degree of risk aversion γ and the
degree of joint consumption  : γ = 2 and   = 70% (Figure (a)), γ = 2 and   = 50%
(Figure (b)), and γ = 5 and   = 70% (Figure (c)). The discount rate equals 3%. The
survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age- and gender-speciﬁc
population survival probabilities for U.S. individuals in the period 2000 − 2004. The
gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity provider are
determined from (3.13)and (3.14)for three values of δ. The black solid lines correspond
to δ = 80%, the dashed lines correspond to δ = 50%, and the dotted lines correspond to
δ = 20%. The grey lines represent the optimal consumption patterns for the case where
(p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) equals (pt(m), pt(f)) for all t.
3.3 Optimal annuity portfolios in incomplete an-
nuity markets
Compared to the benchmark case discussed in Section 3.2, there are two po-
tentially important sources of welfare losses. First, individuals typically only
have access to annuities that yield ﬂat beneﬁt levels over time, i.e., the pay-
ment of the annuity is state dependent, but not time dependent. Second,
when the couple has illiquid pension wealth in the form of pre-accrued pen-
sion rights, there is typically only a limited set of annuity portfolios they can
choose from. For example, it is common in many collective pension schemes
that individualswho have accrued the right to receive a single-life annuity can
exchange part of that annuity for a survivor annuity for their spouse. How-
ever, they are typically not allowed to exchange their single-life annuity for a
single-life annuity for their spouse.
To determine the relative importance of these two sources of market im-
perfections, we ﬁrst determine the couple’s lifetime expected utility in caseCHAPTER 3 63
all pension wealth is liquid, and the only restriction is that annuities yield a
ﬂat payment over time (i.e., time independent). We then determine the cou-
ple’slifetimeexpected utility in casethe couple haspre-accrued pension rights
which can be reallocated to a limited set of actuarially equivalent portfolios of
annuities.
3.3.1 The effect of ﬂat annuities
When only annuities with ﬂat beneﬁt levelsover time are available, the couple
can obtain consumption patterns that are state dependent but not time depen-
dent. To compare with the setting where couples have pre-accrued pension
rights, we consider settings where the couple fully annuitizes at time t = 0.
The couple can save in all periods. Then, in all numerical examples consid-
ered, it is optimal for the couple to consume all annuity income each period.11
Let C(mf) denote the real aggregate consumption of the two spouses when
both spouses are alive, and C(m) (C(f)) the real consumption of the husband
(wife) when only the husband (wife) is alive. The couple can obtain this state
dependent consumption pattern by buying a joint annuity that pays C(mf)
in every year that both spouses are alive, a survivor annuity for the husband
that pays C(m) in every year that the husband is alive and the wife has died,
and a survivor annuity that pays C(f) in every year that the wife is alive, and
the husband has died. The prices of the joint annuity and of the two survivor
11Optimizing (3.23) subject to (3.24) yields the optimal consumption pattern under the as-
sumption that the couple consumes all annuity income in each period, i.e., it ignores the
possibility to change the consumption pattern through saving. However, if r = ρ and con-
dition (3.18) is satisﬁed, saving is not optimal. Speciﬁcally, let ˜ p
(g)
x+t denote the probability
that an individual with age x + t and gender g survives at least one year for t ≥ 0. Let
C(mf),C(m),C(f) be the solution of (3.23) subject to (3.24). Let x be the husband’s age at
time t = 0 and y be the wife’s age at time t = 0. Then, when the rate of time preference equals










x+t(1 − ˜ p
(f)
y+t)α(m)−γ + ˜ p
(f)
















C(mf) for g ∈ {m, f}. It can be veriﬁed that this condition is satisﬁed for
all t ≥ 0 in all the numerical examples that we present. The derivation of the condition is
presented in Appendix 3.C.2. We also present the more general conditions in case r  = ρ.64
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annuities, respectively, are given by:
P∗







(1 + r)t , (3.19)
P∗





t (g)(1 − p∗
t (g′))
(1 + r)t , for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}. (3.20)
Based on the couple’s rate of time preference and (subjective) survival proba-
bilities, the annuity prices are given by:





(1+ ρ)t , (3.21)





(1 + ρ)t , for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}. (3.22)































The maximization problem and budget constraint are the same as in (3.1) and
(3.6), respectively, except that the annuity levels (and with that the consump-
tion levels) are time-independent. The solution of (3.23) subject to (3.24) is
displayed in Appendix 3.C.















, for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}.
It follows from (3.25) that the husband’s (wife’s) optimal survivor fraction
is decreasing in the ratio of the price of the survivor annuity over the price
of the joint annuity based on the survival probabilities uses by the annuity
provider (P∗
surv,g/P∗
joint), and decreasing in the price ratio that would resultCHAPTER 3 65
in case the annuity provider would have used the couple’s survival proba-
bilities (Psurv,g/Pjoint). In contrast to the benchmark case with a complete an-
nuity market with time-dependent Arrow annuities (see (3.16)) the optimal
survivor fraction for a spouse now depends on the survival probabilities of
both spouses. Moreover, it is also affected by the discount rate r and the rate












































































Figure 3.4 – The optimal survivor fraction α(g) from (3.25),as a function of the param-
eter of risk aversion γ, for different degrees of joint consumption  . The survival prob-
abilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age- and gender-speciﬁc population sur-




(3.13) and (3.14) for δ = 50%.
Figure 3.4 displays the optimal survivor fraction when gender-neutral sur-
vival probabilities are used to price the annuities and when only annuities
with a ﬂat beneﬁt payment over time are available. Because of the favor-
able annuity pricing for the wife, the optimal survivor fraction for the wife
is higher compared to the case of gender-dependent pricing. Likewise, the
optimal survivor fraction of the husband decreases compared to the case of
gender-dependent pricing because of the unfavorable annuity pricing for the
husband. For more risk averse couples, i.e., when γ is higher, the optimal sur-
vivorfractionsareclosertotheoptimal survivor fractionsincase(pt(m), pt(f))
equals (p∗
t (m), p∗
t (f)) for all t. Stated differently, differences between survival
probabilities used by the couple and by the annuity provider have less effect
on the couple’s optimal consumption pattern when the couple is more risk
averse. There is a tradeoff between beneﬁting from the relatively inexpen-
sive annuity prices for the wife and smoothing consumption over the differ-66
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ent states. The more risk averse the couple is, the more the couple wants too
smooth consumption over the different states and the less they beneﬁt from
the favorable annuity prices for the wife.
3.3.2 The effect of exchange restrictions in case of pre-accrued
pension rights
As argued above, another source of market incompleteness for individuals
with pre-accrued pension rights is that there are restrictions on the exchange
of pension rights. One of the possible restrictions is that the single-life annu-
ity for the husband can only be exchanged for a survivor annuity for the wife
and vice versa. Because of these restrictions, the couple may not be able to
obtain the same portfolio of annuities as in case all wealth was liquid. For ex-
ample, if all pension wealth is generated by one individual, death of his or her
partner will not reduce income, leading to a different optimal annuity port-
folio compared with the benchmark case of liquid wealth. In this subsection,
we determine the couple’s optimal annuity portfolio given the restrictions on
the exchange of pre-accrued pension rights. We assume that both spouses can
have pre-accrued pension rights and they are allowed to use these rights to
ﬁnance a single-life annuity on their own life and/or a survivor annuity on
their spouse’s life. The price of a single-life annuity that pays off one unit of
consumption in every year that the individual with gender g is alive is given
by:
P∗






(1 + r)t, for g ∈ {m, f}.
The price of the survivor annuity is as given in (3.22).
Let W(m) (W(f)) be the actuarial value of the husband’s (wife’s) accrued
pension rights net of the expense loading, based on the survival probabilities
(p∗
t(m), p∗
t (f)). We assume that the couple can exchange the accrued pension
rights to obtain a different portfolio of annuities under the following two re-
strictions. First, the portfolios of annuities before and after exchange are ac-
tuarially equivalent, based on the survival probabilities used by the annuity
provider. So whether the rights are initially accrued as a single-life annuity
or as a single-life with a survivor annuity is not of importance, as long as
the price of the portfolio before and after exchange is the same, based on the
survival probabilities (p∗
t (m), p∗
t (f)). Second, short selling of annuities is not
allowed, i.e., the couple is not allowed to sell an annuity on the husband’s
life nor on the wife’s life. This implies that the couple maximizes the lifetimeCHAPTER 3 67







C(mf) ≤ Csl(m) + Csl(f), (3.27)
C(g) ≤ Csl(g) + Csurv(g), for g ∈ {m, f}, (3.28)
Csl(m),Csl(f),Csurv(m),Csurv(f) ≥ 0, (3.29)
where Csl(g) is the beneﬁt level of the single-life annuity after exchange, and
Csurv(g) is the beneﬁt level of the survivor annuity after exchange. Equation
(3.25) (equation (3.26)) ensures that the actuarial value of the portfolio of the
husband’s (the wife’s) annuities equals the actuarial value of the pre-accrued
pension rights of the couple. Equation (3.27) ensures that in states where both
spouses are alive, they do not consume more than the beneﬁt level of the two
single-life annuities. So, when for instance the wife’s consumption level is
higherthan thebeneﬁtlevelofhersingle-life annuity, thehusband’sconsump-
tion level should be below the beneﬁt level of his single-life annuity such that
their total consumption level does not exceed their total beneﬁt level. Equa-
tion (3.28) ensures that when only one of the spouses is alive, that spouse does
not consume more than the beneﬁt level of both his own single-life annuity
and his survivor annuity. Equation (3.29) ensures that short selling of annu-
ities is not allowed.12
The short sales constraints in (3.29) imply that the couple cannot freely di-
versify their wealth over the three states.13 Suppose for example that only the
husband has accrued pension rights (so W(m) > 0,W(f) = 0). The couple
can allocate their wealth over a single-life annuity for the husband and a sur-
vivor annuity for the wife only. So, their wealth should be allocated over two
annuities, although there are three states (both spouses alive, only husband
alive, only wife alive). This implies that when both spouses are alive, they
12There will be no savings when (3.18) holds. In all numerical results displayed, this in-
equality is satisﬁed for all t ≥ 0.
13We allow thatboth spouses allocatetheir accruedpension rights such thatthe beneﬁtlevel
of the survivor annuity exceeds the beneﬁt level of the single-life annuity, which is typically
not allowed. However, in all our numerical cases, it is not optimal to have an increasing
income after one of the spouses deceases in case the annuity level is independent of time.
Therefore, imposing the additional restrictions that Csurv(m) ≤ Csl(f) and Csurv(f) ≤ Csl(m)
would not change the numerical results. Another difference is that we allow the couple can
choose any possible survivor fraction (α(m)(α(f))),where in reality, only a limited number of
survivor fractions may be offered.68
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consume C(mf) = Csl(m), and when only the husband is alive, he also con-
sumes C(m) = Csl(m). Stated differently, when only the husband has accrued
pension rights, the following holds:
C(m) = C(mf),
which implies that α(m) =
C(m)
C(mf) = 100%, i.e., the survivor fraction of the
husband equals 100%. Because each spouse consumes half of the aggregate
consumption in case they are both alive, this implies that consumption of the
husband doubles upon the decease of the wife. We know from Figure 3.2,
that this is not optimal for most parameter values. Absent the short sales con-
straint, the husband could reduce the income he receives when his wife dies
by selling income in that state, i.e., by choosing Csurv(m) < 0. The following
proposition shows that when the short sales constraints in (3.29) do not bind,
the optimal consumption pattern in case of pre-accrued rights equals the op-
timal consumption pattern in case of liquid wealth. Put differently, because of
(3.29) the results differ from the case where all wealth is liquid.
Proposition 2 Let W
1+l = W(m) + W(f). Then, the consumption pattern (C(mf),
C(m), C(f)) that maximizes (3.23) subject to (3.25)-(3.28) also maximizes (3.23)
subject to (3.24).
Proof. First, note that in the optimum for (3.23) subject to (3.25)-(3.28), the
constraints (3.27) and (3.28) are binding. Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to show that
for any (C(mf), C(m), C(f)) that satisﬁes (3.24), there exist Csl(m), Csl(f),
Csurv(m), Csurv(f) such that (3.25)-(3.28) are satisﬁed in equality, and vice
versa.
Let (C(mf), C(m), C(f)) be such that (3.24) is satisﬁed. It can be veriﬁed
easily that there exist unique Csl(m), Csl(f), Csurv(m), and Csurv(f) such that
(3.27) and (3.28) are satisﬁed in equality, and (3.25) is satisﬁed. So it remains
to show that Csl(m), Csl(f), Csurv(m), and Csurv(f) also satisfy (3.26). This can












= (Csl(m) + Csl(f)) P∗
joint + (Csl(m) + Csurv(m)) P∗
surv,m






























































Figure 3.5 – The optimal annuity portfolio as a function of the actuarial value of the
accrued pension rights of the husband (W(m)) for a man aged 65 and a wife aged 62.
The actuarialvalueof the annuity portfolio of the wife is given by W(f) = 100−W(m).
The degree of joint consumption   equals 70% and the risk aversion γ equals 2. The
discount is set at 3%. The survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are
age- and gender-speciﬁc population survival probabilities for U.S. individuals in the
period 2000 − 2004. The gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by






Using similar arguments, it can be shown that if there exist there exist Csl(m),
Csl(f), Csurv(m), and Csurv(f) such that (C(mf), C(m), C(f)) satisﬁes (3.25)-
(3.28) in equality, then it also satisﬁes (3.24). This concludes the proof.
The above proposition implies that if the short sales constraints in (3.29)
are not binding, then the optimal consumption pattern in case of pre-accrued
wealth equals the optimal consumption in case of liquid wealth. Stated dif-
ferently, the restrictions on the exchange of pension rights in this case do not
affect the couple’s optimal utility.
In the remainder of this section, we ﬁrst show the effect of restrictions on
the exchange of pension rights on the optimal annuity portfolio, and on the
corresponding optimal consumption patterns. We then show the effect on the
optimal survivor fractions.
Figure 3.5 displays the optimal annuity portfolio for a couple as a func-
tion of the actuarial value of the accrued rights of the husband, for W(f) =
100 − W(m). The ﬁgure shows that whether the short sales constraints are
binding depends on the division of pre-accrued pension wealth between the
two spouses.70
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First consider the case where the actuarial values of the pre-accrued pen-
sion rights of the husband and wife are the same (i.e., W(m) = W(f)). Then,
the short sales constraints are not binding, and so the optimal solution in case
of pre-accrued wealth equals the optimal solution in case of liquid wealth. To
understand the intuition, suppose for example that the husband would forego
survivor protection for his spouse, i.e., the couple would choose Csurv(f) = 0.
Then, incase ofdeceaseofthe husband, the wifewould consume lessthan half
of the aggregate consumption when they are both alive. To see why, ﬁrst note
that because the wife is younger than the husband, the gender-neutral sur-
vival probabilities used to determine the actuarial value of her pension rights
are higher than the gender-neutral survival probabilities used to determine
the actuarial value of the husband’s pension rights. Combined with (3.25) and
(3.28), this implies that Csl(m) ≥ Csl(f), i.e., the beneﬁt level of the single-life
annuity of the wife is lower than the beneﬁt level of the single-life annuity of
the husband. Therefore, in case of decease of the husband, the wife would
consume C(f) = Csl(f), which is less than half of the aggregate consump-




2 ). Stated differently, the wife’s
survivor fraction would be less than 50%. We know from Figure 3.4b, how-
ever, that it is optimal for a wife to have a survivor fraction that is higher than
50%. Therefore, the husband optimally chooses for a single-life with survivor
annuity. Whether it is also optimal for the wife to opt for a single-life and sur-
vivor annuity in general depends on the degree of joint consumption ( ) and
risk aversion (γ). Because of the gender-neutral pricing, single-life annuities
are priced relatively favorably for women, and unfavorably for men. Conse-
quently, the couple can beneﬁt from the gender-neutral pricing by increasing
the beneﬁt level of the annuities for the wife at the cost of annuities for the
husband. For the parameter values used in Figure 3.5, however, it is optimal
for the wife to buy survivor protection for the husband. Thus, the short sales
constraints are not binding in this case, and it follows from Proposition 2 that
the optimal annuity portfolio is the same as when these restrictions were not
imposed.
Nowconsiderinstead the casewhere the actuarial value ofthe accrued pen-
sion rights of one spouse is relatively low compared to the actuarial value of
the accrued pension rights of the other spouse. Then, some short sales con-
straints are binding. Speciﬁcally, consider the case where only the husband
has accrued pension rights, i.e., W(m) = 100, and W(f) = 0. As argued
above, this would imply that the survivor fraction of the husband would be
























Figure 3.6 – The optimal consumption in each state as a function of the actuarial value
of the annuity portfolio of the husband (W(m)) for a man aged 65 and a wife aged 62.
The actuarialvalueof the annuity portfolio of the wife is given by W(f) = 100−W(m).
The light grey lines represent the optimal consumption levels in case all wealth was
liquid. The degree of joint consumption   is set at 70% and the risk aversion γ is
set at 2. The discount rate r is set at 3%. The survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f))
used by the couple are age- and gender-speciﬁc population survival probabilities for
U.S. individuals in the period 2000 − 2004. The gender-neutral survival probabilities
(p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity provider are determined from (3.13) and (3.14) for
δ = 50%.
a consequence, the wife would optimally short sell survivor protection for
the husband. This, however, is not allowed. When the actuarial value of the
accrued pension rights of the wife are well below the actuarial value of the
accrued pension rights of the husband, the optimal strategy for the wife is
to choose a single-life annuity only, and the husband’s survivor fraction is
sub-optimally high compared to the case where all pension wealth is liquid.
Likewise, if the wife has accrued most of the pension rights, the husband op-
timally chooses for a single-life annuity only. The relative actuarial value as of
which a spouse opts for a single-life with survivor annuity instead of a single-
life annuity, however, depends on the gender of the spouse. As argued above,
because gender-neutral pricing impliesthat single-life annuities are priced rel-
atively favorable for women, and unfavorable for men. Therefore, the range
of values for which it is optimal for the wife to buy survivor protection for
the husband is smaller than the range of values for which it is optimal for the
husband to buy survivor protection for the wife.
The above analysis shows that if one spouse has accrued signiﬁcantly more
pension rights than the other spouse, short sales constraints imply that the
survivor fraction of the spouse that has accrued most of the pension rights72
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is sub-optimally high compared to the case where all pension wealth is liq-
uid. As a consequence, consumption in case both spouses are alive would
be sub-optimally low. We illustrate this in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6 displays
the optimal consumption levels in the three states: both spouses alive, only
the husband alive, and only the wife alive. The light-grey lines correspond
to the consumption levels in case all wealth was liquid. When both spouses
have accrued about the same pension wealth, short sales constraints are not
binding, and we know from Proposition 2 that the optimal solution in case of
pre-accrued pension rights is the same as the optimal solution in case of liquid
wealth. However, when one of the spouse has accrued signiﬁcantly more pen-
sion rights than the other spouse, consumption in case they are both alive is
sub-optimally low, and consumption in case the spouse with the lowest (high-
est) pension rights deceases is sub-optimally low (high).
The combinations of pre-accrued pension wealth (W(m),W(f)) for which
a short sales constraint is binding depend on the degree of risk aversion and
the degree of joint consumption. It follows from (3.25) that for γ > 1, a higher
degree of joint consumption leads optimally to a higher consumption in states
where only one of the spouses is alive relative to consumption when both
spouses are alive. Consequently, a higher degree of joint consumption re-
duces the combinations of (W(m),W(f)) for which the short sales constraints
are binding. Moreover, it follows from (3.25) that a higher degree of risk aver-









Psurv,g/Pjoint > 1+  . A higher degree of risk aversion there-
fore reduces the combinations of (W(m),W(f)) for which the short sales con-




Psurv,g/Pjoint < 1+  . We illustrate this in Figure 3.7.
In Figure 3.7 the optimal survivor fractions are displayed as a function of
the actuarial value of the pre-accrued pension rights of the husband (W(m)).
The optimal survivor fraction with pre-accrued pension rights differs from
the optimal solution in case all wealth is liquid, unless the actuarial value
of the rights accrued by both spouses is about equal. The range of values
of the accrued pension rights for which this holds depends on the degree of
risk aversion and the degree of joint consumption. Consider for example the
case where the degree of risk aversion equals 2, and the degree of joint con-
sumption equals 50%. Then, as long as W(m) is between 28% and 53% of the
total actuarial value of the couple’s pre-accrued pension rights, the husband’s
optimal survivor fraction equals 52%. It can be veriﬁed from (3.25) that this
fraction is optimal also in case pension wealth is liquid. Outside this range,CHAPTER 3 73














































































Figure 3.7 – The optimal survivor fraction as a function of the actuarial value of the
husband’s annuity portfolio (W(m)) for a man aged 65 and a wife aged 62. The actuar-
ial value of the wife’s annuity portfolio is given by W(f) = 100−W(m). The discount
rate is set at 3%. The survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age-
and gender-speciﬁc population survival probabilities for U.S. individuals in the period
2000− 2004. The gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the an-
nuity provider are determined from (3.13) and (3.14) with δ = 50%.
however, the husband’s survivor fraction in case of illiquid pension wealth is
suboptimally high compared to the case of liquid pension wealth. Now con-
sider instead the case where the degree of risk aversion is 5, and the degree of
joint consumption equals 70%. Then, the lower (upper) bound for of values of
the pre-accrued pension rights of the husband W(m) for which exchange re-
strictions do not affect the optimal consumption patterns decreases (increases)
to 17% (73%).
The above results show that exchange restrictions can lead to signiﬁcantly
higher survivor fractions when one of the spouses has accrued signiﬁcantly
more pension rights than the other spouse. As a consequence, the lifetime
expected utility of the couple in case of pre-accrued pension rights may be
lower than the lifetime expected utility of the couple in case of liquid wealth.
In the next section, we will quantify the welfare losses. We will ﬁrst analyze
the optimal annuity portfolios in case the utility functions of the husband and
wife are not identical74
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS FOR COUPLES OF ANNUITY MARKETS
INCOMPLETENESS
3.3.3 Theimpactofdifferentdegreesofriskaversionandjoint
consumption on the optimal survivor fraction
Throughout the paper, the assumption was made that both the husband and
wife have CRRA utility functions and that they have the same degree of risk
aversion and the same degree of joint consumption. In this subsection, we in-
vestigate the impact of different degrees of risk aversion and joint consump-
tion for the spouses. The the husband’s and wife’s utility function are respec-
tively given by:
Um(C,C′) =






C +  fC′ 1−γf
1− γf
,
where ( m, f) are the degree of joint consumption of the husband and wife,
respectively, and (γm,γf) are the degree of risk aversion of the husband and
wife, respectively. The couple maximizes the lifetime expected utility, given
by:
















(1 + ρ)t ,
(3.30)
where ˜ C(mf) ( ˜ C(fm)) isthehusband’s(wife’s)consumption whenboth spouses
are alive. In case only annuities with a ﬂat beneﬁt level are available, the bud-
get constraint is given by:
W
1+ l




˜ C(mf), ˜ C(fm) ≥ 0. (3.32)
The ﬁrst order conditions are displayed in Appendix 3.C.3. In case the couple
has pre-accrued pension rights, the lifetime expected utility as given in (3.23)






surv,m, (3.34)CHAPTER 3 75
˜ C(mf) + ˜ C(fm) ≤ Csl(m) + Csl(f), (3.35)
C(g) ≤ Csl(g) + Csurv(g), for g ∈ {m, f}, (3.36)
Csl(m),Csl(f),Csurv(m),Csurv(f) ≥ 0, (3.37)
˜ C(mf), ˜ C(fm) ≥ 0. (3.38)
Note that in both cases because of the asymmetries in the utility function,
constraint (3.32) or (3.38) may become binding. In both settings, it is also not
optimal to save for the numerical examples we have considered.14
Figure 3.8 displays the optimal survivor fractions when the spouses have
different degrees of risk aversion (3.8a and 3.8b) or joint consumption (3.8c
and3.8d)for the husband (3.8aand3.8c)andwife (3.8band 3.8d), respectively.
From the ﬁrst order conditions displayed in Appendix 3.C.3, we obtain that









   ˜ C(mf) +  m ˜ C(fm)
 −γm +  f









  ˜ C(mf) +  m ˜ C(fm)
 −γm +






14Optimizing (3.30) subject to (3.31) and (3.32) yields the optimal consumption pattern un-
der the assumption that the couple consumes all annuity income in each period, i.e., it ig-
nores the possibility to change the consumption pattern through saving. However, if r = ρ,
˜ C(mf), ˜ C(fm) > 0, and condition (3.39)is satisﬁed, saving is not optimal. Let ˜ p
(g)
x+t denote the
probability that an individual with age x + t and gender g survives at least one year. Let x
be the husband’s age at time t = 0 and y be the wife’s age at time t = 0. Further, let ˜ C(mf),
˜ C(fm), C(m), C(f) be the solution of (3.30) subject to (3.31) and (3.32). Then, when the rate of
time preference equals the interest rate and (3.32) is not binding, the couple will not save in
period t when the when the following inequality holds:
  ˜ C(mf) +  m ˜ C(fm)
 −γm +  f
 

















   ˜ C(mf) +  m ˜ C(fm)
 −γm +  f
 




It can be veriﬁed that this condition is satisﬁed in all the numerical examples that we present
for all t ≥ 0. Equation (3.32) is not binding in all numerical examples considered for all t ≥ 0.
The derivation of the condition is presented in Appendix 3.C.3. We also present the more
general conditions in case r  = ρ. When (3.30) is maximized subject to (3.33) until (3.38), (3.39)
also holds for all t ≥ 0 in all numerical examples considered.76
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Figure 3.8 – The optimal survivor fraction as a function of the actuarial value of the
husband’s annuity portfolio (W(m)) for a man aged 65 and a wife aged 62 for the hus-
band (a and c) and wife (b and d). In Figures (a) and (b) the degree of risk aversion
differs and the degree of joint consumption is 50% for both the husband and the wife.
Figures (c) and (d) the degree of joint consumption differs and the degree of risk aver-
sion is 2 for both the husband and the wife. The actuarial value of the wife’s annuity
portfolio is given byW(f) = 100−W(m). The black lines arethe survivor fractions un-
der pre-accrued pension rights and the ﬂat grey lines are the survivor fractions under
ﬂat-annuities. The interest rate is set at 3%. The survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f))
used by the couple are age- and gender-speciﬁc population survival probabilities for
U.S. individuals in the period 2000 − 2004. The gender-neutral survival probabilities
(p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity providerare determined from (3.13)and (3.14)with
δ = 50%.
Let ˜ C(mf), ˜ C(fm),C(m),C(f) be the optimal consumption for a couple. Then,
suppose that only the husband’s degree of risk aversion increases. Then, for
the given ˜ C(mf), ˜ C(fm),C(m),C(f), the husband’s expected marginal util-CHAPTER 3 77
ity and the couple’s expected marginal utility decrease. In the optimum, all
expected marginal utilities corrected for prices should be equal. So, in the op-
timum, either the wife’s expected marginal utility should decrease, or both
the husband’s expected marginal utility and the couple’s expected marginal
utility should increase. Since the budget constraint should be satisﬁed in the
optimum, C(f) will increase, and C(m) will decrease, and ˜ C(mf) or ˜ C(fm)
will increase. Since the marginal utility with respect to ˜ C(mf) should equal
the marginal utility with respect to ˜ C(fm), both will increase. When we com-
pare the solid lines with the dashed (dashed-dotted) line in Figures 3.8a and
3.8b, we see indeed that when the wife’s (husband’s) degree of risk aversion
increases, the husband’s (wife’s) optimal survivor fraction increases whereas
the wife’s (husband’s) optimal survivor fraction decreases. Note that when
the wife’s degree of risk aversion is higher than the husband’s degree of risk
aversion (dashed lines), there is only a small region where the exchange re-
strictions are not binding due to the low optimal survivor fraction for the wife.
Equation (3.40) shows that the relation between the husband’s and wife’s
marginal utility is not affected by a change in the degree of joint consumption
of one of the spouses. When we compare the solid lines with the dashed lines
in Figures 3.8c and 3.8d, we see indeed that when the wife’s degree of joint
consumption increases, both the husband’s and the wife’s optimal survivor
fraction increase.
3.4 Welfare losses
In this section we analyze the welfare losses couples incur because of imper-
fections in the annuity markets. In Subsection 3.4.1 we quantify the relative
importance of the different sources of market imperfection. In Subsection 3.4.2
we show how welfare losses are affected by the presence of a basic state pen-
sion. We also quantify the welfare losses in case the couple chooses the default
option instead of exchanging pension rights optimally.
3.4.1 The effect of market incompleteness
Our benchmark for determining welfare losses is the case where a complete
market with state- and time-dependent Arrow annuities is available, the an-
nuity provider and the couple use the same survival probabilities, and all
wealth is liquid. To quantify the relative contribution of different sources of
market imperfections to the welfare losses that couples bear compared to the78
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benchmark case, we ﬁrst determine the welfare losses when the only market
imperfection is that gender-neutral survival probabilities are used to price the
annuities. Second, we determine the additional welfare losses due to the fact
that, instead of state- and time-dependent annuities, only annuities with a ﬂat
beneﬁt over time are available. Finally, we determine the additional welfare
losses when couples have pre-accrued pension rights instead of liquid wealth.
To determine the welfare losses given market imperfections, we determine
the couple’s optimal life time utility L∗ given the market imperfections, and
given that total pension wealth is normalized at W = 100. We then determine
the minimal wealth W∗ needed to obtain the same lifetime expected utility
L∗ in the benchmark case where annuity markets are complete, (pt(m), pt(f))
equals (p∗
t (m), p∗
t (f)) for all t, and all wealth is liquid. We refer to W∗ as the
“annuity equivalent wealth” like in Brown and Poterba (2000). It is the mini-
mal wealth required to be just as well off when there are no market restrictions
as when market restrictions are imposed. If W∗ < W (W∗ > W), less (more)
wealth would be needed in absence of the restrictions to obtain the same life-
time expected utility, so the restrictions lead to welfare losses (gains). The
following cases are analyzed:
• Benchmark: a complete market with state- and time-dependent Arrow
annuities, the annuity provider and the couple use the same survival
probabilities, and all wealth is liquid (solid line).
• Gender neutral: a complete market with state- and time-dependent Ar-
row annuities, gender-neutral survival probabilities with δ = 50% are
used for pricing, and all wealth is liquid (dashed line).
• Flatannuities: onlyannuitieswithaﬂatbeneﬁtlevelareavailable,gender-
neutral survival probabilities with δ = 50% are used for pricing, and all
wealth is liquid (dotted line).
• Pre-accruedpensionrights: onlyannuitieswithaﬂatbeneﬁtlevelareavail-
able, gender-neutral survival probabilities with δ = 50% are used for
pricing, and couples have pre-accrued pension wealth (dashed-dotted
line).
Figure 3.9 displays the annuity equivalent wealth as a function of the actu-
arial value of annuity of the husband W. The annuity equivalent wealth of the
gender-neutral case is higher than the annuity equivalent wealth in the bench-
mark case, indicating that couple’s can proﬁt from the gender-neutral pricingCHAPTER 3 79


























Figure 3.9 – The annuity equivalent wealth as a function of the actuarial value of the
husband’s annuity portfolio (W(m)), for a man aged 65 and a wife aged 62. The ac-
tuarial value of the wife’s annuity portfolio is given by W(f) = 100 − W(m). The
discount rate is set at 3%. The degree of risk aversion γ equals 2 and the degree of joint
consumption   equals 50%. The solid line represents the benchmark case. The dashed
line represents the gender-neutral case. The dotted line represents the ﬂat-annuities case
and the dashed-dotted line displays the pre-accrued rights case. The survival probabili-
ties (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age- and gender-speciﬁc population survival
probabilities for U.S. individuals in the period 2000 − 2004. The gender-neutral sur-
vival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity provider are determined from
(3.13) and (3.14) for δ = 50%.
through buying more annuities for the wife and less for the husband. In Sec-
tion 3.2 we showed that when the annuities are priced gender-neutral, the
optimal consumption pattern is not ﬂat over time anymore. However, when
we compare the minimal wealth of the gender-neutral case and the ﬂat annu-
ities case, we ﬁnd that the annuity equivalent wealths are almost the same. So,
although optimal consumption levels are not ﬂat over time, the welfare loss
of imposing the restriction that annuities should have a ﬂat beneﬁt level over
time leads to only marginal welfare losses. When the couple has pre-accrued
pension rights instead of liquid wealth, they bear additional welfare losses
when one of the spouses has accrued signiﬁcantly more pension wealth than
the other spouse.
In previous sections we showed that the optimal consumption pattern de-
pends strongly on the choice of the gender-neutral survival probabilities.
Figure 3.10displaystheannuityequivalentwealthforthepre-accrued rights
case for different gender-neutral survival probabilities. The magnitude of the
welfare losses depends strongly on the gender-neutral survival probabilities.
For δ = 50%, the couple can gain from the favorable annuity prices for the80
































Figure 3.10 – The annuity equivalent wealth as a function of the actuarial value of the
husband’s annuity portfolio (W(m)), for a man aged 65 and a wife aged 62, in case of
pre-accruedrights andgender-neutralpricing. Theactuarialvalueofthe wife’sannuity
portfolio is given by: W(f) = 100 − W(m). The discount rate is set at 3%. The degree
of risk aversion γ equals 2 and the degree of joint consumption   equals 50%. The
survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age- and gender-speciﬁc
population survival probabilities for U.S. individuals in the period 2000 − 2004. The
gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity provider are
determined from (3.13) and (3.14) for δ = 50% (solid line), and for δ = 20% (dashed
line).
wife, whereas for δ = 20%, the couple bears a welfare loss compared to the
benchmark case for all combinations of (W(m),W(f)). The difference in the
annuity equivalent wealth for δ = 50% and δ = 20% ranges from 1.6 for
W(m) = 0 to 2.5 for W(m) = 26 to 0.4 for W(m) = 100. When the husband
has accrued all pension rights, the effect of the gender-neutral survival proba-
bilities is small.
We have illustrated the welfare losses couples can incur because they can-
not freely allocate their accrued pension rights over all types of annuities.
When one of the spouses has accrued (almost) no pension rights, large wel-
fare losses can be incurred. To avoid cases where one of the spouses has no
after-retirement income, manycountries havea basisstate pension. Inthe next
subsection, this state pension is introduced.
3.4.2 The effect of state pensions and default options
So far, the assumption was made that couples can exchange all their pre-
accrued pension rights optimally in order to maximize their lifetime expected
utility. In many countries, however, couples receive an illiquid basic state pen-CHAPTER 3 81
sion addition to their pre-accrued pension rights. So, they do not only have
pre-accrued pension rights which can only be exchanged for a single-life or
survivor annuity, but they also have accrued pension rights which cannot be
exchanged at all.
Suppose that each spouse receives some state pension αSP annually when
both spouses are alive, for some α ∈ [0,1], and SP annually when only one of
the spouses is alive, independent of other sources of income. Now, a couple
with pre-accrued pension wealth optimally exchanges their pension rights so
as to maximize the lifetime expected utility, taking into account the presence


























(1 + ρ)t , (3.43)
subject to the budget constraints (3.25) until (3.29). Depending on the pre-
accrued pension rights, the state pension may either be a large or only a small
fraction of the after-retirement income of the couple. To reﬂect this, we choose
values of the state pension SP such that the actuarial value of the state pension
is x% of the actuarial value of the total pension wealth (actuarial value of their
pre-accrued rights and of their state pension), which we normalize to 100.
That is, for any given value of x, we determine SP such that
x = 2αSP × P∗
joint + SP × P∗
surv,m + SP × P∗
surv,f. (3.44)
In the numerical results we set α equal to 0.75, and choose SP such that x is
equal to 20 (small state pension), 50 (median state pension), or 80 (large state
pension). The value of the husband’spre-accrued rights isW(m) ∈ [0,100−x]
and the value of the wife’s pre-accrued right is W(f) = 100− x −W(m).
To determine the welfare losses/gains, we again determine the annuity
equivalent wealth (W∗) which is needed in the benchmark case in order to ob-
tain the same utility level as when the couple has pre-accrued pension rights
and an illiquid basic state pension, and optimally exchanges the pre-accrued
rights to maximize their lifetime expected utility (3.43). We display the an-
nuity equivalent wealth (W∗) as function of the ratio of the husband’s accrued
pensionrights(W(m)) overthecouple’saccruedpensionrights (W(m)+W(f)).82
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Figure 3.11 – The wealth equivalent as a function of the ratio of the husband’s accrued
pension rights (W(m)) over the couple’s accrued pension rights (W(m) + W(f)) for a
husband aged 65 and a wife aged 62. The results are displayed for various levels of the
state pension. The actuarial value of the pre-accruedrights of the husband and wife are
given by W(m) ∈ [0,100 − x], and W(f) = 100 − x − W(m), respectively, where x is
either 20 (solid line), 50 (dashed line), or 80 (dotted line). The discount rate is set at 3%.
The degree of risk aversion γ equals 2 and the degree of joint consumption   equals
70%. The survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age- and gender-
speciﬁc population survival probabilities for U.S.individuals in the period2000−2004.
The gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity provider
are determined from (3.13) and (3.14) for δ = 50%.
In Figure 3.11 the welfare losses are displayed. Because of the state pension,
the welfare losses have decreased, especially for those couples for who the
state pension is an important source of their income. The reason for this is that
because of the state pension, the extreme situations were one of the spouses
had a much higher income than the other spouse have disappeared.
We have determined the welfare losses when the couple has an illiquid
state pension next to the pre-accrued rights. So far, the assumption was made
that the couple actively exchanges the pre-accrued rights optimally to maxi-
mize their lifetime expected utility. However, some research supports the idea
that couples not actively exchange their single-life and survivor annuities but
simply opt for the default. This may lead to additional welfare losses. We
determine the wealth equivalent from opting for the default instead of an-
nuity markets are complete, the couple’s survival probabilities are used for
pricing, and all wealth is liquid. In the U.S., the most common default option
is a single-life annuity with at least a 50% survivor annuity for married cou-
ples. We set the default at a single-life annuity with a 50% survivor annuity
and then determine welfare losses because of opting for the default instead ofCHAPTER 3 83































Figure 3.12 – The wealth equivalent of the default option of a single-life annuity with
a 50% survivor annuity, as a function of the ratio of the husband’s accrued pension
rights (W(m)) over the couple’s accrued pension rights (W(m) + W(f)) for a husband
aged 65 and a wife aged 62. The results are displayed for various levels of the state
pension. The actuarial value of the pre-accrued rights of the husband and wife are
given by W(m) ∈ [0,100 − x], and W(f) = 100 − x − W(m), respectively, where x is
either 20 (solid line), 50 (dashed line), or 80 (dotted line). The discount rate is set at 3%.
The degree of risk aversion γ equals 2 and the degree of joint consumption   equals
70%. The survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age- and gender-
speciﬁc population survival probabilities for U.S.individuals in the period2000−2004.
The gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity provider
are determined from (3.13) and (3.14) for δ = 50%.
exchanging optimally.
Figure 3.12 displays the wealth equivalent when the couple opts for the
default instead of optimally exchanging. When couples opt for the default in-
stead of exchanging optimally, they incur additional welfare losses. However,
the size of the loss depends on the default option and on the importance of the
state pension on the after retirement income. The welfare loss is the largest
for those couples for which the state pension is a small part of their income,
because the accrued pension rights form a big part of their after retirement
income.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the welfare losses couples bear due to imperfections
in annuity markets. Our results suggest that welfare losses, due to the fact
that only annuities with ﬂat beneﬁt levels over time are available, are rela-
tively limited. In contrast, for couples who accrued pension rights in the form84
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ofasingle-life annuityor asingle-life with survivor annuity, restrictions on the
exchange of these pension rights can induce signiﬁcant welfare losses. The op-
timal annuity portfolio of couples with a relatively low level of joint consump-
tion and relatively low degree of risk aversion are more likely to be affected by
the exchange restrictions than the optimal annuity portfolio of couples with a
higher degree of joint consumption or a higher degree of risk aversion. These
welfare losses depend on the relative actuarial value of the pension rights ac-
crued by the two spouses, on differences between survival probabilities used
by the annuity provider and by the couple, and on whether the couple in ad-
dition holds illiquid pension wealth in the form of a state pension that cannot
be exchanged for other types of longevity insurance. We ﬁnd that welfare
losses are signiﬁcant for couples for which one of the spouses has accrued sig-
niﬁcantly more pension rights than the other spouse. We also ﬁnd that the
use of gender-neutral survival probabilities for pricing annuities has signiﬁ-
cant effect on these welfare losses. Finally, in case the couple is also entitled to
receive an illiquid state pension, welfare losses become smaller for those cou-
ples for whom the state pension is an important source of their income after
retirement.
3.A The degree of joint consumption
Consumption can be divided into two types: goods and services that can be
publicly consumed by the household as a whole, and goods and services for
which it is plausible that they are privately consumed by on or more of the
household members. Public consumption contains: (1) expenditures on mort-
gages (rent and payment); (2) rent without expenditures on electricity and
heating; (3) utilities (heating, electricity, water, telephone, internet, etc. but
without insurances); (4) transportation costs; (5) insurances; (6) child care; (7)
alimony and ﬁnancial support to children who do not live at home; (8) expen-
ditures to service debt; (9) trips and holidays with (part of) the family; (10)
expenditures related to cleaning the house and gardening; and (12) other pub-
lic expenditures not mentioned above. The private consumption contains: (1)
food and drinks used at home; (2) food and drinks outside home; (3)cigarettes
and other tobacco products; (4) clothing; (5) personal care and services; (6)
medical expenditures not covered by an insurance; (7) leisure activities; (8)
schooling; (9) gifts; and (10) other expenditures not mentioned above. All par-
ticipants were asked how much they monthly spent on average on each of the
above categories. Let Cpri denote the average monthly private consumption ofCHAPTER 3 85
a spouse and let Cpub denote the public consumption of the same household.
We can than determine the degree of joint consumption of the household by




Cpub)(1 +  ) = Cpri + Cpub. (3.45)
Each spouse pays only half of the public consumption of the household, but
consumes all public consumption of the household.
3.B The cumulative survival probabilities of men
and women
Throughout this paper, we use the one-year death rates differentiated with
respect to age and gender from the Human Mortality Database of the U.S.A.
for the years 2000 up to and including 2004.15 Let q
(g)
x denote the probability
that an individual aged x with gender g dies within one year. The probability
that an individual with gender g is alive over τ years conditional on being










Figure 3.13 displays the cumulative survival probabilities, conditional on
being the husband being alive at age 65 , i.e., τp
(m)
65 , and the wife being alive at
age 62, i.e., τp
(f)
62 , as a function of τ.
3.C The solutions of the maximization problems
In this Appendix, the maximization problems are solves analytically. In Sub-
section 3.C.1 we solve the maximization problem of Section 3.2 and in Sub-
section 3.C.2 we solve the maximization problem of Subsection 3.3.1. We
solve the problems without taking into account that consumption should be
non-negative in each state and in each period. Since the solutions yield non-
negative consumption levels in each state, for each period, we do not have to
take these constraints into account.
15Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max
Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or
www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 05-01-2009).86
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Figure 3.13 – The cumulative survival probabilities, as a function of time for men (left)
aged 65 and women (right) aged 62.
3.C.1 The maximization problem in case of complete annuity
markets
In Section 3.2 (3.1) is maximized subject to the budget constraint (3.6) under
the assumption that markets are complete, i.e., the couple can buy “Arrow
annuities”.
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When γ = 1, we have a log utility. This leads to the following ﬁrst order
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So, for a degree of risk aversion of 1, the optimal consumption pattern is inde-
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The maximization problem for general utility functions
In this subsection we solve the problem for general utility functions. We con-
sider the case where, for all periods t ∈ {0,    ,T}, the utility that a spouse
(husband or wife) derives from consuming C in period t, when the other
spouse consumes C′ in that period is given by:
U(C,C′) = u
 
C +  C′ 
,88
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where   is the degree of joint consumption, and u is a utility function that sat-
isﬁes u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0. Further, limx→0 u′(x) = ∞ andlimx→∞ u′(x) =
0. It can be veriﬁed that maximizing U(C,C′) + U(C′,C) subject to C + C′ =
Ct(mf) yields C = C′ = Ct(mf)/2. Therefore, The couple’s lifetime expected
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Deﬁne ˜ Ct = 1
2(1 +  )Ct(mf), i.e., ˜ Ct is the consumption needed in case only
one of the spouses is alive to obtain the same utility level per person as when
both spouses are alive and consume Ct(mf). The ﬁrst order conditions are
given by:
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(1 + r)t , for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}.





















, for g ∈ {m, f},
where λ is such that the budget constraint is satisﬁed. The optimal survivor


















 , for g ∈ {m, f}.
3.C.2 The maximization problem in case of incomplete annu-
ity markets
In Subsection 3.3.1 the restriction is imposed that only annuities with a ﬂat
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The solution is given by:
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The maximization problem for general utility functions
In this Appendix we solve the problem for general utility functions. We use





















(1 + ρ)t . (3.49)
Deﬁne ˜ C = 1
2(1+ )C(mf), i.e., ˜ C is the consumption needed in case only one
of the spouses is alive to obtain the same utility level per person as when both
spouses are alive and consume C(mf). The ﬁrst order conditions are given by:
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(1 + r)t , for g, g′ ∈ {m, f}.
The optimal consumption levels are given by:
C(mf) =
2















), for g ∈ {m, f}.















 , for g ∈ {m, f}.
Conditions under which it is optimal not to save
In this Appendix we determine under which conditions the couple will not
save in the complete market case. We assume that the couple fully annuitizes
in period t = 0 and can consume and save in all periods. Optimizing (3.46)
subject to (3.47)yields the optimal consumption pattern under the assumption
that the couple consumes all annuity income in each period, i.e., it ignores
the possibility to change the consumption pattern through saving. Let u(m),CHAPTER 3 91
u(f) and u(c) be the utility of the husband when only he is alive, the wife
when only she is alive, and the couple when both spouses are alive. Then, the
corresponding utilities are given by:





















Because the objective function is concave, and the constraint set is convex, the
ﬁrst order conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient. For any given given annu-
ity income (A(mf), A(f), A(m)), where A(mf) denotes the annuity income
when both spouses are alive, A(f) denotes the annuity income when only the
wife is alive, and A(m) denotes the annuity income when only the husband is




























































Wt(lt) + A(lt) − Ct(lt) − St(lt) ≥ 0, for lt ∈ {m, f,mf}, (3.53)






s,t , and ν
(mf)
s,t are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers with
respect to the nonnegativity constraint of savings. ν
(lt)
s,t is positive when there
are no savings in period t and zero else for lt ∈ {m, f,mf}. Wt(lt) denotes the
wealth at time t, and St(lt) are the savings at time t for lt ∈ {m, f,mf}.
Because the objective function in strictly concave and the constraint set
is convex, there is a unique optimum. Therefore, the consumption pattern92
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(C(mf),C(f),C(m)) that follows from optimizing (3.46) subject to (3.47) is
optimal if saving is allowed if it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions with
(A(mf), A(f), A(m)) = (C(mf),C(f),C(m)), Wt(lt) = St(lt) = 0 and ν
(lt)
s,t =
















































(1 +  )C(mf)
 −γ 
. (3.58)
Inequalities (3.56) and (3.57) are fulﬁlled in all numerical examples we con-
sider since ρ = r and both
pt+1(m)
pt(m) < 1 and
pt+1(f)
pt(f) < 1 for all t ≥ 0. We simplify






































(1 +  )
 −γ 
. (3.59)
Note that α(m) =
C(m)
C(mf) and α(f) =
C(f)
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pt(f) < 1, such that for α(m) = 1 and α(f) = 1CHAPTER 3 93
the condition is fulﬁlled. In all our numerical examples, the conditions are
fulﬁlled for all t (including t = 0).
3.C.3 The maximization problem for asymmetric utility func-
tions
In this appendix we derive the ﬁrst order conditions when the husband and
wife have different degrees of risk aversion and joint consumption. Optimiz-
ing (3.30) subject to (3.31) yields the optimal consumption pattern under the
assumption that the couple consumes all annuity income in each period, i.e.,
it ignores the possibility to change the consumption pattern through saving.
The ﬁrst order conditions are given by:
   ˜ C(mf) +  m ˜ C(fm)
 −γm +  f








joint + ν ˜ Cmf,
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(1 + ρ)t = λP∗
surv,g, for g, g′ ∈ m, f,
where ν ˜ Cmf and ν ˜ Cfm are the lagrange multipliers with respect to the non-
negativity constraints of ˜ C(mf) and ˜ C(fm). In all numerical examples con-
sidered, ν ˜ Cmf and ν ˜ Cfm equal zero. We can again determine conditions under
which it is optimal not to save. Let u(m), u(f) and u(c) be the utility of the hus-
band when only he is alive, the wife when only she is alive, and the couple










(C +  mC′)1−γm
1− γm
+
(C +  fC′)1−γf
1− γf
.
For any given given annuity income (A(mf) A(m) A(f)), where A(mf) de-
notes the annuity income used to consume ˜ C(mf) + ˜ C(fm), the ﬁrst order94
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Wt(lt) + A(lt) − Ct(lt) − St(lt) ≥ 0, for lt ∈ {m, f,mf}, (3.65)





s,t , and ν
(mf)
s,t are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers with
respect to the nonnegativity constraint of savings. ν
(lt)
s,t is positive when the
couple does not save in period t and zero else for lt ∈ {m, f,mf}. Wt(lt)
denotes the wealth at time t, and St(lt) are the savings at time t for lt ∈
{m, f,mf}.
Because the objective function in strictly concave and the constraint set
is convex, there is a unique optimum. Therefore, the consumption pattern
( ˜ C(mf), ˜ C(fm),C(f),C(m)) thatfollowsfrom optimizing(3.30)subjectto(3.31)
is optimal if saving is allowed if it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions with
(A(mf), A(f), A(m)) = ( ˜ C(mf) + ˜ C(fm),C(f),C(m)), Wt(lt) = St(lt) = 0
for t ≥ 0, and ν
(lt)
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Because the optimization problem is strict concave, the optimum is unique
such that it is sufﬁcient to show that these conditions are fulﬁlled in the opti-
mums that we have found.
The left hand side and the right hand side of equations (3.69) and (3.70) are
the same. Consequently, we only have to check one of the two equations. In
all numerical examples considered, these conditions are satisﬁed for all t ≥ 0.96
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3.D The wife’s optimal survivor fraction


























































































(a) γ = 2,  = 70% (b) γ = 2,  = 50% (c) γ = 5,  = 70%
Figure 3.14 – The wife’s optimal survivor fraction as a function of time, for a cou-
ple consisting of a husband and wife aged 65 and 62 respectively at the moment they
buy the annuity, for three combinations of the degree of risk aversion γ and the de-
gree of joint consumption  : γ = 2 and   = 70% (Figure (a)), γ = 2 and   = 50%
(Figure (b)), and γ = 5 and   = 70% (Figure (c)). The discount rate equals 3%. The
survival probabilities (pt(m), pt(f)) used by the couple are age- and gender-speciﬁc
population survival probabilities for U.S. individuals in the period 2000 − 2004. The
gender-neutral survival probabilities (p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) used by the annuity provider are
determined from (3.13)and (3.14)for three values of δ. The black solid lines correspond
to δ = 80%, the dashed lines correspond to δ = 50%, and the dotted lines correspond to
δ = 20%. The grey lines represent the optimal consumption patterns for the case where
(p∗
t(m), p∗
t(f)) equals (pt(m), pt(f)) for all t.CHAPTER4
ESTIMATING THE JOINT SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES OF
MARRIED INDIVIDUALS
“Some of my colleagues at the Department of Sociology in
Helsinki wonder whether it is meaningfull to study mortality
differences. After all, the death rate is the same for everyone:
one death per person.”
Tapani Valkonem (1993)
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is based on Sanders and Melenberg (2011). In this paper we es-
timate the joint survival probabilities of married couples, taking into account
the possible dependence between the remaining lifetimes of married individ-
uals. The joint survival probabilities of spouses are important for determining
the liabilities of pension providers, such as state retirement systems, pension
and employee beneﬁt funds, and insurance companies. There is a large liter-
ature emphasizing the importance of annuities (see for instance Yaari, 1965;
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999; Davidoff, Brown, and Dia-
mond, 2005; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus, 2006, to name just a few). For
an overview of literature on annuities, see Cannon and Tonks (2008). Pension
providers typically offer not only single-life annuities but also joint & survivor
annuities. In the latter case, a periodic payment is made as long as at least one
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of the spouses is alive. Consequently, not only the marginal survival probabil-
ities, but also the dependence between the remaining lifetimes of spouses may
inﬂuence the demand for and the price of annuities. It is often claimed (see for
instance Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Brown and Poterba, 2000) that a couple
may have less need for an annuity, because as a couple they can hedge part of
the risk themselves, i.e., if one of the spouses becomes very old, he may out-
live the other spouse and receive a bequest from the other spouse to ﬁnance
(part of) his future consumption. However, when the remaining lifetimes of
spouses are positively dependent, the hedging potential within a couple de-
creases, which may make an annuity more valuable for a couple. The price of
an annuity is affected by the dependence between the marginal survival prob-
abilities because it affects both the probability that both spouses are alive, and
the probability that only one of the spouses is alive.
The joint survival probabilities of couples do not only affect the liabilities
of pension providers, but also spatial planning, health care, and personal ﬁ-
nances. As long as both spouses are alive they can provide informal care to
each other, which may reduce the demand for formal care.1 Spatial planning
may also be affected because elderly couples may have different needs con-
cerning housing than single elderly have. Further, elderly couples have to
make decisions about saving, budgeting, and credit management. To plan
savings adequately the joint survival probabilities of spouses are needed.
There are several reasons why the remaining lifetimes of spouses may be
dependent. Youn and Shemyakin (1999) mention three of them. The ﬁrst rea-
son is the so-called “broken heart” syndrome, which is the impact of the death
of one of the spouses on the mortality probability of the surviving spouse.
Parkes, Benjamin, and Fitzgerald (1969) already found that mortality proba-
bilities of widowers increase with 40% during the ﬁrst six months of bereave-
ment. They also found that mortality probabilities decreased relative to sin-
gles as of the ﬁfth year of bereavement. So, they ﬁnd positive dependence
in the short run and negative dependence in the long run. Their results are
based on a sample of 4486 widowers of 55 years and older who were followed
for 10 years. The second reason why joint survival probabilities of spouses
may be dependent is called “common disaster”: two spouses are more likely
to be involved in a disaster such as a car accident than two unrelated persons.
Both reasons affect the time difference between the deaths of the spouses, but
not directly the ages of death. To model the impact of the “common disaster”
1The availability of immediate family increases reliance on informal care and reduces re-
liance on formal care, see, e.g., Kemper (1992).CHAPTER 4 99
and “broken heart” syndrome, “common shock” models are used (see, for
instance, Marshall and Olkin, 1988). The third reason is “common lifestyle”:
spouses are expected to have the same lifestyle (for instance both spouses may
smoke)which inﬂuencestheirmarginal survival probabilitiesinthesameway.
When spouses have the same lifestyle, their ages of death are expected to be
correlated. The remaining lifetimes of spouses may be negatively dependent
because of “complementariness of needs of husband and wife”, i.e., individu-
als may select a mate with complementary needs, (see Winch, 1954). Opposed
to the theory of heterogamy (“opposites attract each other”) is the theory of
homogamy, which states that “like attract likes” (see Hollingshead, 1950). In
fact, as Burgess and Wallin (1943) already noted, both theories may be cor-
rect. Some couples may be attracted to each other by similarities and others
by dissimilarities. Moreover, couples may be attracted to each other both by
likeand unlikecharacteristics, i.e., there maybe similaritiesanddissimilarities
between spouses.
Next to “common shock” models, copulas are also widely used to estimate
joint survival probabilities. Different types of copulas have been used to es-
timate joint survival probabilities of spouses. For instance, Frees, Carriere,
and Valdez (1996) focus on Frank’s copula, whereas Carriere (2000) compares
different marginal survival probabilities and different copulas to estimate bi-
variate survival probabilities. Youn and Shemyakin (1999) add an additional
variable which captures the age difference between two spouses to estimate
the joint survival probabilities. In a more recent paper, Luciano, Spreeuw, and
Vigna (2008) estimate joint survival probabilities using copulas, ﬁnding that
the best ﬁt with the data is obtained with the so-called 4.2.20 Nelsen copula,
which allows for positive dependence. A special feature of this copula is that
the dependence is increasing with age. Not only copulas are used to estimate
the dependence of the remaining lifetimes of couples, also Markovian mod-
els. Norberg (1989) and Wolthuis (1994) proposed a Markovian model with
forces of mortality depending on marital status, see also, for instance, Denuit,
Dhaene, Le Bailly de Tilleghem, and Teghem (2001). The latter authors use
data from the Belgian National Institute of Statistics of the year 1991 to es-
timate the Markovian model. They also collected data from two cemeteries
in Brussel. They found a weak positive correlation between the husband’s
and wife’s remaining lifetimes. However, their data-set consists of only 533
couples. In a recent paper, Spreeuw and Wang (2008) extend the Markovian
model by allowing the force of mortality to depend on the time of death of
the spouse. Their extension of the model leads to more freedom which, in100
ESTIMATING THE JOINT SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES OF MARRIED
INDIVIDUALS
turn, may lead to a better ﬁt of the data. However, a disadvantage of all these
models remains that a speciﬁc dependence structure is imposed, leading to
potential misspeciﬁcation.
Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996), Carriere (2000), Youn and Shemyakin
(1999), Luciano, Spreeuw, and Vigna (2008), and Spreeuw and Wang (2008) es-
timate the dependencebased on a data-set ofa Canadianinsurer. This data-set
contains information of around 15 thousand couples and the length of the ob-
servation period is limited to 5 years. Moreover, most couples enter the data-
setatage60or later.2 Additionally, onlycouplesthathavebought ajoint &last
survivor annuity enter this data-set. As a result, the data-set does not seem to
berepresentative forthewhole Canadianpopulation. Itiswell-known thatthe
marginal survival probabilities of annuitants tend to be higher than the popu-
lation survival probabilities (see, for instance Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky,
and Brown, 1999). It may be that not only the marginal survival probabilities
differ, but also the dependence between the husband’s and wife’s remaining
lifetime may differ. Couples where one of the spouses has deceased before re-
tirement, or where one of the spouses is very ill, may buy a single-life annuity
instead of a joint & survivor annuity or no annuity at all. As a consequence,
these couples may be under-represented in the data-set of the Canadian in-
surer, leading to a potential overestimation of the dependence. Moreover, an-
nuities are provided not only by insurance companies, but also (and mainly)
by state retirement systems and pension funds. Although the Canadian data-
set may be representative for couples who voluntarily buy annuities, it may
not be representative for the couples who accrue annuities through the state or
through pension funds. For these annuity providers, a data-set containing all
individuals of the population may be more representative. Denuit, Dhaene,
Le Bailly de Tilleghem, and Teghem (2001) use a different data-set. However,
they have information of only one year from the Belgian National Institute of
Statistics. The probability that both spouses die within the same calender year
is very small. Consequently, they do not observe many couples where both
spouses have died. The other data-set they use, contains information of only
533 couples.
Most of the models discussed above have a very limited number of param-
eters (also because only a very limited data-set was available). In contrast, we
2Chen, Cox, and Wen (2009) notice that in the data-set of the Canadian insurer, only very
few people die above the age of 90. Therefore, they propose a model which uses extreme
value theory to estimate the survival probabilities at high ages. They use the same data-set as
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have a data-set containing the whole Dutch population. We have information
on 3.9 million couples included in this data-set, who are followed for a period
of 13 years. However, we base our results on a random sample of 50,000 cou-
ples. We use only a sub-sample because it takes too much computational time
to estimate the likelihood on the whole census. We estimate the joint survival
probabilities of spouses in a very ﬂexible way, using the semi-nonparametric
approach of Gallant and Nychka (1987) with two bivariate Weibull models
serving as parametric benchmarks. The estimates are used to determine the
period life expectancy. Because of the limited time period of the data avail-
able, we assume that the probability distribution does not change over time.
However, our framework can be extended to allow for a cohort-dependent
probability distribution.
The main results of the paper are the following. In the semi-nonparametric
model, Spearman’s rank correlation is well below the correlations found in for
instance Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996), Carriere (2000),or Youn and She-
myakin (2001). We ﬁnd that for all investigated ages, the remaining lifetimes
of spouses are positively dependent. We prefer the more ﬂexible approach
because the dependence between the remaining lifetimes of spouses depends
less on the structural form imposed. We ﬁnd that the husband’s and wife’s
life expectancy at birth is generally increasing with the other spouse’s age
of death. The different models are used to estimate actuarially fair annuity
prices. We ﬁnd that ignoring the possible dependence between the remain-
ing lifetimes of spouses may lead to an underestimation of the value of a joint
annuity for a couple of about ﬁve to ten percent, depending on the age as off
which the annuity pays out. In addition, ignoring dependence may lead to an
overestimation of the value of a survivor annuity on the husband’s life 25 per-
cent. When a joint & 70% survivor annuity is bought, these effects (partially)
cancel out.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2 a de-
scription of the data-set is given. Section 4.3 describes the correlation between
the remaining lifetimes we are interested in. Section 4.4 contains the method-
ology used to estimate the two bivariate Weibull models and their estimation
results. In Section 4.5 the semi-nonparametric approach is explained and the
results are shown. Section 4.6 determines the correlation between the remain-
ing lifetimes of spouses. Section 4.7 estimates the value of joint & survivor
annuities for the different models. Section 4.8 concludes.102
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4.2 Data Characteristics
Inthissection adescription ofthedata usedtoestimate thejoint survival prob-
abilities of spouses is given. Data of the Dutch municipality registers (GBA)
is used to estimate the joint survival probabilities of couples. The data-set we
use is the census. Therefore, there is by construction no sample selection bias
based on population choice when the whole population is of interest. In Sub-
section 4.2.1 we describe the data-set and in Subsection 4.2.2 we describe the
sample actually used.
4.2.1 Description of the census
Our data-set consists of all individuals who are a member of the Dutch pop-
ulation from the period January 1995 until January 2008.3 Of each individual
we observe many characteristics like date of birth, gender, address, marital
status, and ethnicity. At January 1995, the data-set has information of 7.6
million men and 7.8 million women (including children) of the 15.4 million
Dutch citizens. For all these individuals we observe their marital status. In to-
tal, there are about 3.5 million married couples,4 157 thousand widowed men,
and 720 thousand widowed women. The marital status of the remaining in-
dividuals is either “single” or “divorced”. Individuals who live together as
a couple but are not married to each other are not taken into account in the
estimation. We restrict ourselves to the married couples of whom at least one
of the spouses is alive at January 1, 1995. Consequently, we do not have any
individuals younger than 16 in the data-set.5
Although the marital status of each individual is given, the data-set does
not contain information about who is married to whom. Therefore, we cou-
ple the individuals ourselves. We assume that two individuals of opposite
sex are married to each other when the marital status of both individuals is
“married”, they live at the same address at the same time, and no other mar-
ried individual lives at that address at that time. This way, we match about
3.2 million couples. The following method is used to match some of the re-
3Individuals born in the Netherlands after January 1995 enter the data-set for in the year
of their birth. Immigrants to the Netherlands enter after January 1995 enter the data-set in the
year of their arrival.
4In this paper we refer to an individual as married either when the individual is married
or when the individual has a civil partnership.
5In the Netherlands, the minimal age as of which an individual is allowed to marry is 18,
unless there is a doctor’s certiﬁcate which states that the wife is pregnant or has already had
a baby. In that case, an individual is allowed to marry as of the age of 16.CHAPTER 4 103
maining couples: when more than two married individuals live at the same
address at the same time, we assume that two married individuals of oppo-
site sex are married to each other, when some of their personal characteristics
change at the same day, for instance, if they move at the same moment in time
and are also the only two who move, or when one dies and the other becomes
widowed the same day, or when they get a child at the same day, and so on.
About 74 thousand couples are matched using this additional method. In to-
tal we matched about 3.3 million couples. About 279 thousand couples of the
3.3 million are removed because they divorced during the observation period.
One of the reasons we cannot couple all married individuals is that we only
consider couples of opposite sex.
Asstated before, someindividualsenterthedata-setwith amarital status of
“widowhood”. Of these individuals we know that they were married before
and that their spouse has deceased. However, we do not observe any char-
acteristics of the former spouse. We assume that the widow(er) was married
to an individual from opposite sex and died at age 18 or later. We add these
877 thousand widow(er)s with their former spouse to the data-set leading to
a total of about 3.9 million couples.
All individuals enter the data-set at January 1995 and are observed for a
maximum period of 13 years. Individuals mainly leave the data-set because
of death, emigration, or because the end of the observation period is reached.
Of the 3.9 million couples, 7.4 thousand men and 13.6 thousand women leave
the data-set for an unspeciﬁed reason. Table 4.1 presents the frequency distri-
bution of the couples by sex, entry age, and mortality status. Three mortality
statuses are distinguished: individuals can die either before the observation
period started (B), during the observation period (D), or after the observation
period ended (A).6































































Mortality status Entry age husband Entry age Wife
Husband Wife < 50 50− 65 65− 80 80+ < 50 50− 65 65− 80 80+ Total
D D 1.9 18.6 104.7 45.8 3.3 26.8 110.6 30.3 170.9
0.05 0.47 2.67 1.17 0.08 0.68 2.82 0.77 4.35
B D - - - - 1.3 17.8 173.5 217.5 410.1
0.03 0.45 4.42 5.54 10.44
D B 0.5 7.1 48.9 48.5 - - - - 105.0
0.01 0.18 1.24 1.23 2.67
A D 29.3 52.3 50.0 2.8 35.5 53.1 43.4 2.3 134.3
0.75 1.33 1.27 0.07 0.90 1.35 1.10 0.06 3.42
D A 43.3 130.4 185.0 19.0 64.8 158.7 149.3 5.0 377.7
1.10 3.32 4.70 0.48 1.65 4.04 3.80 0.13 9.61
B A - - - - 23.3 91.8 164.7 19.6 299.4
0.59 2.34 4.19 0.50 7.62
A B 5.5 16.3 19.0 1.9 - - - - 42.7
0.14 0.41 0.48 0.05 1.09
A A 1528.8 689.6 167.5 1.9 1,691.7 587.8 107.8 0.6 2387.9
38.92 17.56 4.26 0.05 43.07 14.96 2.74 0.02 60.79
Table 4.1 – Mortality status and entry age of all couples in the data-set by thousand
couples. The Italic numbers represent the size of the group as percentage of all couples.
Both husband and wife can die either before the observation period started (B), during
the observation period (D) or after the observation period ended (A).CHAPTER 4 105
We ﬁnd that of 171 thousand couples both spouses die within our observa-
tion period. Furthermore, of 134 (378) thousand couples the wife (husband)
diesduringtheobservation period, whilethehusband (wife)isstill aliveatthe
endof the observation period. Ofmost couples (2.4 million), both spouses sur-
vive the entire observation period. Of the individuals who enter the data-set
as widow (widower), 410 (105) thousand die during the observation period
and the remaining 299 (43) thousand survive the observation period. From
these population statistics we can see that by far the largest part of our data is
left truncated and right-censored.
We investigate in more detail the couples for whom we observed both the
husband’s and wife’s age of death. In Table 4.2 the differences in time of






























































Time difference Number of As percentage of couples for whom As percentage
between the two deaths couples we observed both ages of death of all couples
At most 1 day 340 0.18 0.01
At most 1 week 943 0.52 0.02
At most 1 month 3,482 1.93 0.09
At most 1 quarter 8,615 4.79 0.22
At most a half year 15,778 8.78 0.40
At most 1 year 29,129 16.20 0.74
At most 2 years 53,980 30.02 1.37
At most 5 years 114,750 63.82 2.92
More than 5 years 65,036 36.17 1.66
Table 4.2 – The time between the death of the two spouses of all couples of whom
both spouses died during the observation period and the corresponding percentage of
all couples in the data-set.CHAPTER 4 107
Weﬁndthatof340couples(0.0087%ofallcouplesinthe data), both spouses
die at the same day. In slightly more than 0.7% of the sample, both spouses die
within one year. However, in contrast with this are the 342.1 thousand couples
of whom one of the spouses died before the observation period started and
the other spouse died or will die after the observation period ended. Of these
couples the time of death is typically more than 13 years apart.7 Note that the
time between deaths of the two spouses of all couples who were still alive at
the end of the observation period can also be very short.
4.2.2 Description of the sample actually used
Estimating the joint survival probabilities of spouses using the whole data-
set requires much computational time. Therefore, we take a random sample
of 50,000 couples and construct a conﬁdence interval for, among others, the
life expectancy of the two spouses at birth and the correlation between the
lifetimes of spouses at birth. To construct the random sample we draw 50,000
couples with replacement from the data-set.
7Some of the individuals may leave the data-set before the 13-year observation period has






























































Mortality status Entry age husband Entry age Wife
Husband Wife < 50 50− 65 65− 80 80+ < 50 50− 65 65− 80 80+ Total
D D 0.1 0.5 2.6 1.2 0.1 0.8 2.7 0.8 4.3
B D − − − − 0.1 0.5 4.4 5.6 10.5
D B 0.0 0.2 1.3 1.3 − − − − 2.7
A D 0.7 1.4 1.3 0.1 0.9 1.4 1.1 0.1 3.5
D A 1.2 3.2 4.7 0.5 1.7 4.0 3.8 0.1 9.6
B A − − − − 0.6 2.3 4.2 0.5 7.6
A B 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 − − − − 1.1
A A 38.8 17.5 4.3 0.0 42.9 15.0 2.7 0.0 60.6
Total 41.3 25.3 22.4 11.1 46.4 24.7 20.9 8.0 100.0
Table 4.3 – Mortality status and entry age of a sample of 50,000 couples in the data-
set in percentages. Both husband and wife can die either before the observation period
started (B), during the observation period (D) or after the observation period ended (A).CHAPTER 4 109
Table 4.3 displays a brief description of the sample, consisting of 1.3% of
the couples of the the census used to estimate the joint survival probabilities
ofspouses. Because of the large sample size, there are manycouples in most of
the subgroups. Ifwecompare the numbers in Table4.3 with the Italicnumbers
in Table 4.1, we see that we the composition of our sample is comparable with
the composition of the whole data-set.
4.3 Dependence between the remaining lifetimes
of spouses
In this Section we introduce some notation. In Subsection 4.3.1 we discuss the
left-truncation and right-censoring which occurs in our data-set. In Subsec-
tion 4.3.2 we discuss some notions of dependence. First we introduce some
notation:
• (X,Y)i for the bivariate age-at-death random variable of couple i.
• T(x) for the remaining lifetime of an individual aged x. Consequently,
T(x) = X − x.
• minxi and minyi for the minimal age of death of the husband and wife,
respectively.
• axi for the entry age of the husband of couple i and ayi for the entry age of
the corresponding wife in case the individual was alive at the beginning
of the observation period. We set axi = minxi (ayi = minyi) in case the
marital status of the wife (husband) of couple i is “widowhood” at the
beginning of the observation period.
• bxi and byi for the length of the observation period in the census of the
husband and wife of couple i, respectively. We set bxi = 0 (byi = 0) in
case the marital status of the wife (husband) of couple i is “widowhood”
at the beginning of the observation period.
Like in Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996), we consider models which as-
sume that the remaining lifetimes of spouses are correlated at birth. Carriere
(2000) criticized such models because it may be unrealistic that the lifetimes
are dependent at birth since the two spouses have not even met. Therefore,
Carriere (2000) proposes to couple the remaining lifetimes of spouses at the
momenttheindividualsmarry. However, in ourdata-setthe momentatwhich110
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individuals marry is typically not observed. Moreover, some couples may
have a very long relationship before they actually marry whereas other cou-
ples may only have a short history together. Either way, survival probabilities
are likely to be dependent before both individuals marry, meaning that the
actual coupling should be done before the couple marries. Moreover, when
“like marry likes” or “opposites attract each other”, the survival probabilities
are dependent before the spouses have met. Carriere (2000) does not observe
when couples marry either and therefore chooses to couple the lives as soon
as they enter the data-set. However, that is not possible in our case since we
also observe individuals who have already lost their spouse. Therefore, we
couple the husband’s and wife’s lifetimes at birth, like in Frees, Carriere, and
Valdez (1996).
4.3.1 Left-truncation and right-censoring
The data is left-truncated because we only observe couples of whom both
spouses are at least 18 years old and at least one of the spouses is alive at
the beginning of the observation period. The data is right-censored because of
most individuals we only observe a minimal age of death and not the actual
age of death.
Let z ∈ {x,y}. When the age of death of an individual aged azi at entry is
right-censored, T(azi) ≥ bzi. Consequently, instead of the remaining lifetime
T(azi), we might only observe the possibly right-censored remaining lifetime
T∗(azi): when the individual died during the observation period T∗(azi) =
T(azi), when the individual died before the observation period started or dies
after the observation period ended T∗(azi) = bzi. So, of each individual we
observe:
T∗(azi) = min(T(azi),bzi), z ∈ {x,y},
where in our case the maximum value of bzi is 13 years, which is the length of
our observation period. We deal with the right-censoring and left-truncation
similar as Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996).
Like Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996), we do not take future trends in
mortality into account. This allows us to compare our results with previous
research. Moreover, the length of our observation period is only 13 years,
which is too short to estimate possible trends over time.CHAPTER 4 111
4.3.2 Some notions of dependence
In this subsection we discuss some qualiﬁcations of dependence. Different
measures for dependence have been introduced in the literature. Let A and B
be two sets in R2. We consider the following relation:
P({X,Y} ∈ {A
 
B}) ≥ P({X,Y} ∈ A)P({X,Y} ∈ B), (4.1)
The random variables X and Y are associated if and only if inequality (4.1)
holds for all open upper sets A and B, see Esary and Marshall (1976).
A special case of association is positively quadrant dependent (PQD). The ran-
dom variables X and Y are positively quadrant dependent (PQD) if inequality
(4.1) holds for Aa = {(x,y)|x > a,y ∈ R} and Bb = {(x,y)|x ∈ R,y > b} for
all {a,b} ∈ R2, (see Lehmann, 1966). Negative quadrant dependence (NQD) is
deﬁned by reversing the inequality in the middle of (4.1). We use a parametric
benchmark which can capture PQD and a parametric benchmark which can
capture both PQD and NQD. A drawback of both association and quadrant
dependence is that both concepts are relatively strong.
Shaked (1982) introduced some weaker notions of dependence by allow-
ing the inequality above to hold only for some sets A and B. Deﬁne A and
B as two collections of sets in R2. The random variables (X,Y) are positively
dependent relative to A and B, if inequality (4.1) holds whenever A ∈ A and
B ∈ B. Similarly, we deﬁne negatively dependent relative to A and B by revers-
ing the inequality in the middle of (4.1). We consider positive and negative
dependence relative to sets like, for instance, A = {(x,y)|x < 85,y ∈ R} and
B = {(x,y)|x ∈ R,y < 95}.
Tocompare our results with previous research, we also determine the linear
correlation between the lifetimes of spouses as well as Spearman’s ρs.
4.4 Two parametric benchmarks and their estima-
tion
Two different bivariate Weibull models, are used as parametric benchmark
to estimate the joint survival probabilities of spouses. One of the reasons for
choosing these models is that previous research has found that the Weibull
marginal survival probabilities of married individuals ﬁt the data quite well
(see Frees, Carriere, and Valdez, 1996). The benchmarks are described in Sub-
section 4.4.1. The ﬁrst model captures only notions of positive dependence,112
ESTIMATING THE JOINT SURVIVAL PROBABILITIES OF MARRIED
INDIVIDUALS
whereas the second model can capture negative dependence as well.8 In Sub-
section 4.4.2 the estimation results are presented.
4.4.1 Two bivariate Weibull models
Both benchmark models have Weibull marginals given by:















, for z ∈ {x,y}. (4.2)
For z ∈ {x,y}, θz, denotes the scale parameter and βz denotes the shape
parameter. We denote Fz for the cumulative distribution function of z and
Fz for the survival function for z ∈ {x,y}. That is, Fz(z) = 1 − Fz(z) for
z ∈ {x,y}. Let F(x,y) denote the cumulative survival function of the hus-
band’s and wife’s ages of death. That is,
F(x,y) = P(X ≥ x,Y ≥ y).
We refer to the ﬁrst Weibull model, which is studied in Lu and Bhattacharyya
(2003), as the positively dependent Weibull (PW) model. In copula-format,
the model is parameterized as follows:












0 < δ ≤ 1, x,y ≥ 0.
δ is the parameter which captures the dependence and independence corre-
sponds to the boundary value δ = 1. It is the same model as proposed by
Hougaard (1986).
Thesecond bivariateWeibullmodel, alsoproposed inLuandBhattacharyya
(2003), allows for both PQD and NQD.9 We refer to this model as the pos-
itively and negatively dependent Weibull (PNW) model. In copula-format,
the model is parameterized as follows:
The positively and negatively dependent Weibull (PNW) model
F(x,y) = exp
 
−ln(Fx(x)) − ln(Fy(y)) + δFx(x)Fy(y)
 
, (4.4)
8A restriction of both models is that the models cannot be positively dependent for some
combinations of the husband’s and wife’s age (x,y) and negatively dependent for some other
combinations of the husband’s and wife’s age.
9The model cannot be positively dependent relative to some sets (A, B) and negatively
dependent relative to some other sets (A′, B′).CHAPTER 4 113
− 1 ≤ δ ≤ 1, x,y ≥ 0, 0 < θi, βi, i = x,y,
where independence corresponds to δ = 0, positive dependence to δ > 0, and
negative dependence to δ < 0. The linear correlation of this model isrestricted
to (−0.20,0.32), see Lu and Bhattacharyya (2003).
Weestimate the two parametricWeibull modelsusingthe sample described
in Subsection 4.2.2. The likelihood, similar to the one in Frees, Carriere, and
Valdez (1996), is given in Appendix 4.A.
4.4.2 Estimation results of the two bivariate Weibull models
Weestimate the parametersof the two parametric models(4.3)and (4.4)on the
random sample of 50,000couples asdescribed in subsection 4.2.2.10 The value
of the likelihood, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)11, and the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC)12 are also determined. Table 4.4 displays the re-
βx θx βy θy δ
ML estimates PW (4.3) 8.82 82.70 9.28 86.83 1
ML estimates IW (4.3) 8.82 82.70 9.28 86.83 -
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
ML estimates PNW (4.4) 8.82 82.39 9.21 86.43 0.56
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.01)
Likelihood BIC AIC
PW (4.3) -69,315 138,684 138,640
IW (4.3) -69,315 138,674 138,638
PNW (4.4) -69,241 138,537 138,492
Table 4.4 – The ML estimates, the corresponding standard errors of the likelihood, the
value of the likelihood, and the BIC and AIC based on the PW (4.3), the independent
Weibull (IW) model ((4.3) with δ = 1), and the positively and negatively dependent
Weibull model PNW (4.4).
10Since in the PW model (4.3) the parameter for dependence (δ) should be between 0 and 1,
the following transformation is used to estimate δ = Φ(δ), where δ ∈ (−∞,∞). For the PNW
model (4.4), the parameter for dependence δ should lie in the interval [−1,1]. Therefore, the
following transformation is used: δ = 2Φ(δ) − 1, where δ ∈ (−∞,∞).
11The Akaike Information Criterion is given by AIC = 2k − 2ln(L), for k the number of
parameters in the statistical model, and L the maximized value of the likelihood function for
the estimated model.
12TheBayesianInformation CriterionisgivenbyBIC = kln(n) − 2  ln(L),for k thenumber
of parameters in the statistical model, and L the maximized value of the likelihood function
for the estimated model, and n the sample size.114
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sults of the maximimum likelihood estimation based. The ML estimate of
dependence (δ) for the PW model indicates independence, which is a corner
solution. Therefore, we estimate the PW model under the assumption of in-
dependence (δ = 1). We refer to this model as the independent Weibull (IW)
model. The results of that estimation are also displayed in Table 4.4. The PNW
model ﬁnds positive dependence, which is in line with previous research.
Note that the likelihood of the PNW model is well above the likelihood of the
IW model. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistic equals 148. Consequently,
we reject the null-hypothesis that δ = 0 at all conventional conﬁdence levels.
These results suggest that the PW-speciﬁcation incorporates the correlation in
an inappropriate way, since in this model we ﬁnd no correlation while in the
PNW model we ﬁnd positive correlation.
The period life expectancy of the husband and wife, ignoring a possible
trend over time, are calculated using the estimates in Table 4.4. All paramet-
ric benchmarks have Weibull marginals, leading to the following period life
expectancy:
E(Z) = θzΓ(1 + 1/βz), for z ∈ {x,y},
(see Lu and Bhattacharyya, 2003).
Men
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model IW (4.3) 78.0 78.2 78.5
Model PNW (4.4) 77.7 78.0 78.2
Women
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model IW (4.3) 82.1 82.3 82.5
Model PNW (4.4) 81.7 81.9 82.1
Table 4.5 – The period life expectancy at birth and the corresponding 95% conﬁdence
intervals for a man and woman based on the estimates of models (4.3) and (4.4) as
described in Table 4.4.
Table 4.5 displays the period life expectancy of the husband and wife ac-
cording to the parametric models. Both parametric models ﬁnd similar life
expectancies for the husband as well as the wife.
In Figure 4.1 the estimated cumulative survival probabilities are displayed
for the two parametric benchmarks. Due to the large sample size, the 95%
conﬁdence intervals are quite small. Therefore, we plot only the estimated
cumulative survival probabilities. Figure 4.1a and 4.1b display the husband’sCHAPTER 4 115





































































(a) Husband (b) Wife (c) Husband and wife
Figure4.1 – The cumulative survival function for the husband (P(X > x)) (a), the wife
(P(Y > y)) (b), and the joint survival function for y = x − 3 (P(X > x,Y > x − 3)) (c).
The solid lines represent the cumulative survival probabilities under IW model. The
dashed lines represent the cumulative survival probabilities when the PNW model
(4.4) is used. Results are based on the ML estimates presented in Table 4.4.
and wife’s cumulative survival probability, respectively. Figure 4.1c displays
the probability that both spouses are alive. Figures 4.1a and 4.1b show that the
cumulative survival probabilities for both the husband and wife are slightly
lower based on the PNW model (dashed line) than the IW model (solid line).
However, differences are only marginal. Because of the positive dependence,
the probability that both spouses are alive under the PNW model is greater
than the probability that both spouses are alive under the IW model as of age
75. However, these differences are also marginal.
Figure 4.2a displays the probability that both spouses are alive according
to the estimates of the PNW model under dependence (P(X ≥ x,Y ≥ x − 3),
solid line) and independence (P(X ≥ x)P(Y ≥ x − 3), dashed line). First,
note that the difference between dependence and independence is negligible
at young ages. As of age 65 the inﬂuence of dependence becomes more visi-
ble. However, for providers of annuities, these ages are the most important,
inﬂuencing the value of their liabilities. Since the differences between inde-
pendence and dependence are small, Figure 4.2b displays the relative differ-
ence between the probability that both spouses are alive under dependence
and independence. The relative difference between the survival probabilities
based on dependence and independence is strongly increasing with both the
husband’s and wife’s age.
From the ML estimates, we know that the model is positively dependent116
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Figure 4.2 – The probability that both the husband and wife are alive at a given age
as a function of age (a) under dependence (P(X ≥ x,Y ≥ x − 3), solid line) and un-
der independence (P(X ≥ x)P(Y ≥ x − 3), dashed line). and the relative difference
in the probability that both spouses are live (b) under dependence and independence
(
P(X≥x,Y≥y)−P(X≥x)P(Y≥y)
P(X≥x,Y≥y) ) as a function of the husband’s and wife’s age. Results are
based on the ML estimates presented in Table 4.4 of the PNW model.
for each value of (x,y). We use the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm to sam-
ple from the distribution to determine the correlation between the remaining
lifetimes of the spouses in the PNW model.13
Linear Correlation
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model PNW (4.4) 0.14 0.18 0.21
Spearman’s ρ
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model PNW (4.4) 0.15 0.19 0.23
Table 4.6 – The linear correlation and Spearman’s ρ at birth and the corresponding
95% conﬁdence intervals based on the estimates of models (4.3) and (4.4) as described
in Table 4.4.
Table 4.6 displays the linear correlation and Spearman’s ρ for the PNW
model. Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996) ﬁnd a 95% conﬁdence interval of
Spearman’s rank correlation of (0.28,0.55). The dependence we ﬁnd based on
the estimates of the PNW model is much weaker than the dependence found
in Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996). A reason may be that our estimation
13The Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm is explained in Appendix 4.B.CHAPTER 4 117
results are based on a random sample of the whole Dutch population whereas
Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996) uses data of Canadian couples who volun-
tarily bought joint & survivor annuities. Previous research has indicated that
the marginal survival probabilities of those who voluntarily buy annuities
differ from the population survival probabilities (see for instance, Mitchell,
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999). It may be that not only the marginal
survival probabilities differ, but also the dependence between the marginal
survival probabilities. Carriere (2000) estimates Spearman’s rank correlation
for different copula’s. All these estimates of Spearman’s rank correlation are
well above our estimate.
Since our results so far are based on rather restrictive parametric models,
we extend the ﬂexibility of the model using the approach of Gallant and Ny-
chka (1987). The extensions are described in Section 4.5.
4.5 The semi-nonparametric model
The parametric models considered in the previous section may be too restric-
tive models to capture the dependence between the remaining lifetimes of
spouses in an appropriate way. Therefore, we study in this section ﬂexible
generalizations of the parametrice IW model. A natural approach is then to
use semi-nonparametric estimation employing well-chosen sieves, (see Chen,
2007). As repeated from Chen (2007), for econometric applications where the
only prior information on the unknown functions is their smoothness and
supports, the choice of a sieve space is not important, as long as the chosen
sieve space has the desired approximation error rate. We use as sieve a poly-
nomial to increase ﬂexibility of the models. In Subsection 4.5.1 we describe
the extensions made. In Subsection 4.5.2, the estimation results are displayed
based on the semi-nonparametric model. Furthermore, we compare the semi-
nonparametric model with the two benchmark Weibull models.
4.5.1 The semi-nonparametric model
To obtain the semi-nonparametric model, we use (4.3) under the assumption
ofindependenceasa starting model. We take independenceasa starting point
because we do not want to force the outcome of either positive or negative
dependence. Furthermore, the distribution function simpliﬁes such that we
can more easily trace the extensions analytically.
Following the ideas of Gallant and Nychka (1987), we extend the model by118
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multiplying the probability density with a squared polynomial. The polyno-
mial is then extended to increase ﬂexibility. In this way, we can easily guaran-
tee that the extension is again a density. First, because the squared polynomial
is nonnegative. Second, because the squared polynomial allows a straightfor-
ward calculation of the normalizing constant. The reason is that we can use
known expressions for the moments of the Weibull density. The resulting den-
sity turns out to have a very simple form. Moreover, given this speciﬁcation,
the likelihood can be obtained easily, as is shown in Appendix 4.A.
Under independence, the probability density is given by:















where   x := x
θx and   y :=
y
θy. The model will be enlarged using a polynomial.
By construction, the new density becomes




where the constant c is a normalizing constant to ensure that gα(x,y) inte-
grates out to one. Pα(x,y) is the polynomial, which is squared to ensure that
gα(x,y) remains nonnegative. The factor 1
cPα(x,y)2 can be seen as the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of gα(x,y) w.r.t. f(x,y). The polynomial Pα(x,y) is de-
ﬁned as














where 1[i,j] represents an indicator function if the combination of (i, j) is in-
cluded in the polynomial. The indicator function allows us to exclude some
interaction terms between x and y. Deﬁne α as a vector containing the compo-
nents αi,j such that we can rewrite the squared polynomial Pα(x,y)2 as
Pα(x,y)2 = α′P(x,y)α ≥ 0,
where P(x,y) is the corresponding align. An example of a polynomial used is
Pα(x,y) = α0,0 + α1,0 ˜ xβx + α0,1 ˜ yβy,





1   xβx   yβy
  xβx   x2βx   xβx  yβy
















The ﬁrst element of α (α0,0) is set equal to one to avoid identiﬁcation problems.
The polynomial is enlarged by adding either higher order or interaction
terms. Thepolynomialswehaveestimatedcanbefound inAppendix4.C. The
dependence for the semi-nonparametric model and the univariate survival
function are described in Appendix 4.D.
4.5.2 Estimation results of the semi-nonparametric model
We can now estimate the different models described in Subsection 4.5.1. Table
Polynomial Likelihood BIC AIC LR TS DF
IW model -69,315 138,674 138,638 - -
(i) -69,122 138,309 138,256 386 2
(ii) -69,122 138,320 138,258 386 3
(iii) -69,036 138,126 138,082 558 5
(iv) -69,012 138,154 138,049 606 8
(v) (TOP) -68,970 138,103 137,968 690 10
(vi) -68,967 138,139 137,971 697 15
(vii) -68,961 138,148 137,963 709 15
Table 4.7 – The value of the likelihood, the BIC and AIC for different polynomials and
probabilitydensity (4.7). TheLRTestStatistic(LR TS)isthe likelihood ratiotest statistic
of the model with the IW model. DF are the corresponding degrees of freedom. The
polynomials (i) until (vii) are displayed in Appendix 4.C.
4.7displaysthe valueof thelikelihood, the BIC,and the AICfor differentpoly-
nomials. Note that the value of the likelihood of the ﬁrst polynomial model
(i) is already well above the value of the PNW model although it has only one
more degree of freedom. Because of the large sample-size, both the BIC and
the AIC decrease when the polynomial is expanded for the ﬁrst expansions,
exceptwhen interaction terms are included. The computational time increases
exponentially when we increase the ﬂexibility of the model. The BIC reaches
its minimum for polynomial (v), which is given by:120
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Third Order Polynomial Weibull (TOP) model
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy + α1,1  xβx  yβy + α2,0  x2βx + α0,2  y2βy
+ α1,2  xβx  y2βy + α2,1  x2βx  yβy + α2,2  x2βx  y2βy + α3,0  x3βx + α0,3  y3βy (4.8)
To determine whether the semi-nonparametric model ﬁts the data better
than the PNW model, we perform a model selection test for overlapping mod-
els as in Vuong (1989). Note that the models overlap only for δ = 0 in the
PNW model and all components of α equal zero in the semi-nonparametric
model, except the ﬁrst component (α0,0) which was set to one. A brief sum-
mary of the test is displayed in Appendix 4.E. For more detailed information,
see Vuong (1989). We perform the test only for the TOP model, see (4.8). The
test consists of two sequential steps. First, we performed a variance test to
test whether the two distributions differ at the ML estimates. This led to the
conclusion that the PNW model and the TOP model indeed differ at the ML
estimates at all conventional conﬁdence levels. Second, we performed a like-
lihood ratio test, ﬁnding that we have to reject the null-hypotheses in favor
of the hypotheses that the TOP model performs better than the PNW model,
again at all conventional conﬁdence levels.
ML estimates of the TOP model are displayed in Table 4.8 with the corre-
sponding standard errors. We use the ML estimates to determine conﬁdence
intervals of the husband’s and wife’s period life expectancy. Table 4.9 dis-
plays the period life expectancy for a husband and wife at birth based on the
TOP model. The life-expectancies based on the semi-nonparametric model
are close to the life expectancy based on the parametric models for the hus-
band as well as the wife. So, the restrictive parametric models seem to capture
the ﬁrsts moments well.
The ML estimates as displayed in Table 4.8 are used to calculate the cu-
mulative survival probabilities. Figure 4.3 displays the cumulative survival
probabilities for the two parametric models and for the TOP model. Figure
4.3a shows that the husband’s marginal survival probabilities are about the
same for all models, in contrast with the wife’s cumulative survival probabili-
ties as showed in Figure 4.3b.The wife’s cumulative survival probabilities are
lower under the TOP model than under the IW and the PNW model for the
ages 30 until 73 and 90 until 100 and higher for the ages 73 until 90.
Again the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to determine the linear
correlation and Spearman’s rank correlation. Table 4.10 displays the linear
correlation and Spearman’s ρ based on the TOP model. We ﬁnd that both the
linear correlation and Spearman’s rank correlation are slightly lower for theCHAPTER 4 121















Table 4.8 – The ML estimates of the TOP model and the corresponding standard er-
rors.
Men
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model TOP (4.8) 77.5 77.9 78.3
Women
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model TOP (4.8) 81.3 81.9 82.3
Table 4.9 – The period life expectancy at birth and the corresponding 95% conﬁdence
intervals for a man and woman based on the estimates of model TOP as described in
Table 4.8.
TOP model than for the PNW model but higher compared with the IW model
(which ﬁnds independence). However, the differences in terms of Spearman’s
ρ and the linear correlation between the TOP model and the PNW model are
only marginal. Spearman’s rank correlation is much lower than the Spear-
man’s rank correlation found in Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996). The dis-
advantage of both the linear correlation and Spearman’s ρ is that they capture
the dependence in a single number, although the dependence may be stronger
for some ages and weaker for some other ages.
The dependence can be observed from Figure 4.4. Figure 4.4a displays the122
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Figure 4.3 – The probability that the husband (a) and the wife (b) are alive at a given
age as a function of age. The cumulative survival probabilities are displayed for the IW
model (solid lines), PNW model (dashed lines), TOP model (dashed-dotted lines).
Linear Correlation
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model TOP (4.8) 0.09 0.14 0.19
Spearman’s ρ
Gender Lower bound Estimate Upper bound
Model TOP (4.8) 0.11 0.17 0.21
Table 4.10 – The linear correlation and Spearman’s ρ at birth and the corresponding
95%conﬁdenceintervalsbasedon theestimates ofthe TOPmodel asdisplayedinTable
4.7.
probability that both spouses are alive according to the estimates of the TOP
model under dependence (P(X > x,Y > y), solid line) and independence
(P(X > x)P(Y > y), dashed line). The remaining lifetimes of spouses are
positively dependent. Figure 4.4b displays the relative difference between the
probability that both spouses are alive under dependence (P(X > x,y > y))
and independence (P(X > x)P(Y > y)), as a function of both x and y. The
relative difference in the cumulative survival probabilities under dependence
and independence is strongly increasing with both the husband’s and wife’s
age. When comparing Figure 4.4b with Figure 4.2b, we see that the increase
basedon the TOP model ismuch stronger than the increase found in the PNW
model.CHAPTER 4 123

























































Figure 4.4 – The probability that both the husband and wife are alive at a given (a)
age as a function of age under dependence (P(X > x,Y > y), solid line) under in-
dependence (P(X ≥ x)P(Y ≥ y), dashed line) for y = x − 3. The relative difference
in the probability that both spouses are live (b) under dependence and independence
(
P(X≥x,Y≥y)−P(X≥x)P(Y≥y)
P(X≥x,Y≥y) ) as a function of x and y. Results are based on the ML esti-
mates presented in Table 4.8.
4.6 The impact of dependent remaining lifetimes
In this section, we use the estimates of the TOP model to determine the con-
ditional survival probabilities and period life expectancy of the husband and
wife.
We determine the cumulative survival probabilities of the husband (wife)
given the wife’s (husband’s ) age of death P(X ≥ x|Y = y) (P(Y ≥ y|X =
x)). Figure 4.5 displays the probability that the husband or wife is alive as a
function of age given that the other spouse has died at some speciﬁc age.
When one of the spouses dies at a relatively young age (before age 75), the
surviving spouse has relatively low survival probabilities at young ages com-
pared to the unconditional survival probabilities. When one of the spouses
dies at a relatively old age (dotted lines), the surviving spouse has relatively
high survival probabilities compared to the unconditional survival probabil-
ities. The wife’s cumulative survival probabilities are more affected by the
husband’s death than the husband’s cumulative survival probabilities are af-
fected by the wife’s death. Summarizing, a spouse’s survival probabilities are
relatively high when the other spouse died at a high age and low when the
other spouse died at a low age, compared to the unconditional survival prob-
abilities.
In Figure 4.6 the cumulative survival probabilities are displayed as a func-124
















































































Figure 4.5 – The probability that the husband is alive (a) as a function of age (x) given
theageofdeathofthe wife(Y = y)andtheprobabilitythatwifeis alive(b)asafunction
of age (y) given the age of death of the husband (X = x). The crosses represent the
unconditional cumulative survival probabilities (P(X ≥ x) and P(Y ≥ y)). The other
lines represent the conditional cumulative survival probabilities (P(X ≥ x|Y = y) in
(a) and P(Y ≥ y|X = x) in (b)) for y in (a) and x in (b) equal to 30 (dashed lines), 55
(dasheddotted lines), 75 (dotted lines), and 90(dots). The TOP model (4.8)is used with
as parameter values the estimates as displayed in Table 4.8.
tion of the age of death of the other spouse. That is, we display P(X ≥ x|Y =
y) as a function of y for different values of x. Figure 4.6 displays the proba-
bility of being alive at a given age for the husband (4.6a) and wife (4.6b) as
a function of the spouse’s age of death. The probability of reaching age 30 is
only marginally affected by the age of death of the other spouse, which is in
line with the low dependence at young ages. The husband has lower survival
probabilities when the wife dies before age 84 compared with the uncondi-
tional survival probabilities. The husband’s survival probabilities are gener-
ally higher when the wife died after age 84 than when the wife died before age
84. The wife’s survival probabilities are increasing with the husband’s age of
death. The probability that the wife is alive at a given age is more affected by
the husband’s age of death for high ages of the wife compared with low ages
of the wife, which is in line with the increasing dependence with age.
Guiaux (2010) ﬁnds that an old widower has a decreased survival probabil-
ity after the death of the spouse whereas the survival probabilities of an old
widow are not affected by the death of the spouse. We ﬁnd that the effect de-
pends on the age of death of the former spouse. Moreover, we ﬁnd an effect
for both spouses.
Figure 4.7 displays the husband’s (4.7a) and wife’s (4.7b) conditional peri-CHAPTER 4 125
































































Figure 4.6 – The probability that the husband is alive (a) as a function of the wife’s
age of death y for different ages x. and the probability that the wife is alive (b) as a
function of the husband’s age of death x for different ages y. The lines represent the
conditional cumulative survival probabilities for x in (a) and y in (b) equal to 30 (solid
lines), 55 (dotted lines), 75 (dashed-dotted lines), and 90 (dotted-lines). The horizontal
ﬂat lines represent the unconditional cumulative survival probabilities (P(X ≥ x) and
P(Y ≥ y)) for the corresponding values of x and y. The TOP model (4.8) is used with
as parameter values the estimates presented in Table 4.8.




























































Figure 4.7 – The husband’s life expectancy (a) as a function of the wife’s age of death
y given he is alive at a certain age (E(X|X ≥ x,Y = y)) and the wife’s life expectancy
(b) as a function of the husband’s age of death x given she is alive at a certain age
(E(Y|Y ≥ y,X = x)). The lines represent the conditional conditional life expectancies
for x in (a) and y in (b) equal to 0 (solid line), 60 (dashed line), 75 (dotted line), and
85 (dashed-dotted line). The grey lines represent the corresponding 95% conﬁdence
interval.126
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odic life expectancy and corresponding 95% conﬁdence interval as a function
of the wife’s and husband’s age of death (E(X|X ≥ x,Y = y) E(Y|Y ≥ y,X =
x)).14 We ﬁnd that the husband’sandwife’slife expectancy are generallymore
volatile at young ages of death of the spouse than at high ages of death. The
wife’s life expectancy is more volatile than the husband’s life expectancy at
very high ages of death of the other spouse. This may because there are only
a few husbands in the sub-sample who die at a young age. Generally, the re-
maining lifetimes of both the husband and wife are increasing with the age of
death of the other spouse. The husband’s remaining life expectancy is increas-
ing steadily as of the wife’s age of death of age 70. The wife’s remaining life
expectancy is increasing as of the husband’s age of death of age 60.


























































Figure 4.8 – The husband’s (a) period life expectancy as a function of age x at the
moment his wife died (E(X|X ≥ x,Y = x − 3)) for the TOP model (solid line), and the
husband’s (a)period lifeexpectancy unconditional on the wife’s age of death(E(X|X ≥
x), dashed line). The wife’s (b) period life expectancy as a function of age y at the
moment her husband died (E(Y|Y ≥ y,X = y + 3)) for the TOP model (solid line),
and the wife’s (b) period life expectancy unconditional on the husband’s age of death
(E(Y|Y ≥ y), dashed line). The husband is assumed to be three years older than the
wife. The grey lines represent the corresponding 95% conﬁdence interval.
Figure 4.8 displays the husband’s (4.8a) and wife’s (4.8b) period life ex-
pectancy as a function of age conditional on the spouse’s age of death and
unconditional with corresponding 95% conﬁdence interval. When one of the
spouses dies at a relatively young age, there is a large uncertainty in the sur-
14To determine the remaining lifetimes we simulate couples using scrambled Halton
draws (see Halton, 1960; Train, 2002). Scrambled Halton draws are used to reduce the
variance. To draw from the distribution gα(x,y) as in Equation (4.7), we use E(X) =
1
c
   
xPα(x,y)f(x,y)dydx = 1
cEfx,yxPα(x,y)dxdy. See Appendix 4.D for more details.CHAPTER 4 127
viving spouse’s life expectancy. At young ages the period life expectancy of
the husband (wife) conditional on the wife’s (husband’s) age of death is well
below the husband’s (wife’s) life expectancy unconditional on the wife’s (hus-
band’s) death. The difference between the conditional and unconditional life
expectancy at young ages is larger for the wife than for the husband. At high
ages, the life expectancy conditional on the spouse’s age of death and the un-
conditional life expectancy are similar.
4.7 Annuity valuation with dependent mortality
The marginal and joint survival probabilities differ for the different models.
As a consequence, the actuarially fair value of annuities might also be dif-
ferent. The estimated survival probabilities are used to determine actuari-
ally fair values of different kinds of annuities, ignoring possible trends in
life-expectancy. We determine for each model the actuarially fair value of a
single-life annuity, a joint annuity, a survivor annuity, and a joint & 70% sur-
vivor annuities. A single-life annuity makes an annual payment up to the
death of the individual. The actuarially fair value of a single-life annuity for





P(X ≥ x + t|X ≥ x)
(1 + r)t ,
where r is the interest rate and τ the start date of the ﬁrst payment. For τ = 0,
we have an immediate annuity and for τ > 0 we have a deferred annuity. The
actuarially fair value of a single-life annuity for the wife with current age y is
obtained by replacing X with Y and x with y. A joint annuity makes an annual
payment as long as both the husband and wife are alive. The actuarially fair
value of a joint annuity for a couple with current ages (x,y) for the husband





P(X ≥ x + t,Y ≥ y + t|X ≥ x,Y ≥ y)
(1 + r)t .
Asurvivor annuityon the husband’s(wife’s)lifemakesanannualpaymentas
of the moment the wife (husband) hasdeceased until the death of the husband
(wife). The actuarially fair value of a survivor annuity on that pays out when





P(X < x + t,Y ≥ y + t|X ≥ x,Y ≥ y)
(1 + r)t .128
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We refer to the survivor annuity that pays out when only the husband (wife)
is alive as the husband’s (wife’s) survivor annuity. The husband’s survivor
annuity, deﬁned by Psurv,x is obtained by replacing y with x and x with y. A
joint & 70% survivor annuity pays the full beneﬁt when both spouses are alive
and a reduced beneﬁt (70% of the full beneﬁt) when only one of the spouse
is alive. The actuarially fair value of a joint & 70% survivor annuity for a
husband aged x and wife aged y is given by:
Pj&70surv = Pjoint + 0.7Psurv,y + 0.7Psurv,x.
The annual beneﬁt levels are normalized to one. Results for immediate an-
nuities for a husband aged 66 and wife aged 63 are displayed in Table 4.11,
assuming an interest rate r of 3%.
Model IW PNW TOP
Husband’s single-life 12.07 11.93 12.09
(11.99,12.17) (11.83,12.02) (12.03,12.13)
Wife’s single-life 15.30 15.12 15.57
(15.22,15.39) (15.03,15.21) (15.54,15.62)
Husband’s survivor 1.60 1.31 1.19
(1.55,1.64) (1.25,1.38) (1.16,1.20)
Wife’s survivor 4.83 4.63 4.80
(4.74,4.91) (4.54,4.72) (4.78,4.87)
Joint 10.48 10.69 10.97
(10.41,10.54) (10.61,10.77) (10.91,10.99)
Joint & 70% survivor 14.97 14.86 15.16
(14.91,15.04) (14.79,14.92) (15.12,15.19)
Table 4.11 – The actuarially fair values of different kind of immediate annuities using
the estimates as displayed in Tables 4.4 and 4.8 and the corresponding 95% conﬁdence
intervals. Annual beneﬁt levels are normalized to one. The interest rate (r) is assumed
to be 3%, the husband is aged 66, and the wife is aged 63.
We ﬁnd that the actuarially values of the single-life annuity for the wife,
the joint annuity, and the joint & 70% survivor annuity are higher based on
the semi-nonparametric model than on the parametric models. The actuari-
ally fair value of the husband’s survivor annuity is lower based on the semi-
nonparametric model than the parametric models. Moreover, the accuracy of
the values of the different annuities is much higher based on the TOP model
than on the parametric models.CHAPTER 4 129
The wife’s single-life annuity is the least expensive under the PNW model
and the most expensive under the TOP model. The latter is because between
the age of 73 and 90, the wife’s cumulative survival probability is higher un-
der the TOP model than under the PNW and IW model, increasing the value
of the single-life annuity. Note that the wife’s single-life annuity is more ex-
pensive than the husband’s single-life annuity because the wife’s single-life
annuity starts at a younger age and because the wife’s survival probabilities
are higher than the husband’s survival probabilities.
Thesurvivor annuitiesarethemostexpensiveunderindependencebecause
positive dependence between the remaining lifetimes of spouses implies that
both spouses are more likely to die either below their life-expectancy or above
their life-expectancy compared with independence. As a consequence, the
probabilitythatonlyoneofthe spousesisalivedecreases, decreasingthevalue
of the survivor annuity. On the other hand, the joint survivor annuity is more
expensive under positive dependence than under independence because the
probability that both spouses are alive is greater under positive dependence
than under independence. For the joint and survivor annuity, these effects
partly cancel out. If we compare the mean values of the actuarially fair an-
nuity prices, we ﬁnd that the husband’s survivor annuity is about 20% less
expensive under the semi-nonparametric models than under independence.
The joint annuity is 5% more expensive under the semi-nonparametric model
than under independence and the joint & 70% survivor annuity is about 1%
more expensive under the semi-nonparametric models than under indepen-
dence.
The joint & 70% survivor annuity is the most expensive under the TOP
model because of the high prices of the joint annuity and the wife’s survivor
annuity.130
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(f) Joint & 70% survivor annuity
Figure 4.9 – The relative value of a single-life annuity based for the husband (a) and
wife (b), respectively, the relative value of the survivor annuity for the husband (c) and
wife (d), respectively, the relative value of the joint annuity (e), and the relative value
of a joint & 70% survivor annuity (f). All ﬁgures are as a function of the start age of
the annuity. We display the PNW (solid lines) and TOP (dotted lines) relative to the
corresponding values of the IW models for a husband aged 66 and wife aged 63. An
interest rate of 3% is assumed.
Figure 4.9 displays the ratio of single-life annuities, survivor annuities, and
joint annuities for the different models with respect to the IW model. We in-CHAPTER 4 131
vestigate the ratios for both immediate and deferred annuities. Figures 4.9a
and 4.9b display the value of immediate and deferred annuities for the hus-
band (left) and wife (right), where the ﬁrst annuity payment for the husband
(wife) is made in the age range 66 (63) until 75 (72), conditional on being alive.
Figure 4.9c and 4.9d display the actuarially fair prices of survivor annuities
on the husband’s life (left) or the wife’s life (right). Figure 4.9e displays the
actuarially fair price of a joint annuity for different start ages and Figure 4.9f
displays the value of a joint & 70% survivor annuity for different start ages.
For all results we assumed an interest rate of 3%.
We ﬁnd that for a single-life annuity, the values of the annuity calculated
with the best estimates of the IW model and the PNW model are very similar,
i.e., the ratio is close to one. The semi-nonparametric models yield higher ac-
tuarially fair prices for the wife’s single life annuity than the parametric mod-
els. Moreover, the difference with the value of the wife’s single-life annuity
under independence is slightly increasing with the start age. The increased
ﬂexibility of the semi-nonparametric models compared with the parametric
benchmarks has not only led to more freedom to capture the dependence
structure, but also to more freedom to capture the marginal survival proba-
bilities.
The value of the survivor annuities for both husband and wife are typically
lower for the models that take the dependencebetween the survival probabili-
ties into account than for the IW model, especially for the husband. The value
of the joint annuity under dependence is increasing with the start age relative
to the value of the joint annuity under independence (because the dependence
is increasing with age).
When couples buy a joint & 70% survivor annuity, these opposing effects
cancel each other partly out, making the actuarially fair value of the joint
& survivor annuity under independence almost equal to the actuarially fair
value of the joint & survivor annuity under dependence. Because the actu-
arially fair value of the joint annuity is increasing relative to the actuarially
fair value of the survivor annuity when the start age increases, the joint & sur-
vivor annuity is almost constant with the start age. Frees, Carriere, and Valdez
(1996) ﬁnds that actuarially fair value joint & survivor annuities are reduced
by approximately 5% when dependent mortality models are used compared
to independence. We ﬁnd that the effects of dependence on the actuarially fair
annuity values is much lower. A reason for this may be that we ﬁnd a much
weaker dependence between the remaining lifetimes of spouses.
To conclude, ignoring the possible dependence may lead to an underesti-132
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mation of the value of a joint annuity and an overestimation of the value of the
survivor annuity. Imposing a restrictive dependence structure may lead to an
overestimation of the value of the husband’s survivor annuity and un under-
estimation of the value of the joint annuity and the wife’s survivor annuity.
4.8 Conclusions
Differentmethodsareusedtoestimatethejointsurvival probability ofspouses
using a random sample of the whole Dutch population. Previous literature
has found that the remaining lifetimes of spouses are positively dependent,
affecting the value of a joint & survivor annuity. We extend the literature by
allowing more ﬂexible models and by using a much richer data-set. The re-
maining lifetimes of spouses are estimated using two bivariate Weibull mod-
els. The ﬁrst model, which allows only for positive dependence and inde-
pendence, suggests that the remaining lifetimes are independent. The second
model, which also allows for negative dependence, indicates that the remain-
ing lifetimes of spouses are positively dependent. From this we see that the
choice of parametric model might inﬂuence the results. Incorporating the cor-
relation structure in an inappropriate way might yield invalid results. As a
consequence, we have extended the bivariate Weibull model under the as-
sumption of independence by enlarging it with a polynomial, based on the
approach of Gallant and Nychka (1987), increasing the ﬂexibility of the model,
such that a better ﬁt with the data can be found. The semi-nonparametric
approach also led to a positive dependence between the remaining lifetimes
of spouses. However, the dependence found with the semi-nonparametric
model is much weaker than the dependence found in, for instance, Frees, Car-
riere, and Valdez (1996).
We ﬁnd that the husband’s life expectancy at birth is generally increasing
with his wife’s age of death and the wife’s life expectancy at birth is gener-
ally increasing with the husband’s age of death. The prices of annuities differ
among the varying models. Ignoring the dependence between the remaining
lifetimes of spouses may lead to an underestimation of the value of a joint an-
nuity and an overestimation of the value of a single-life annuity. However, we
ﬁnd that the effects of ignoring the dependence between the remaining life-
times of spouses has less impact on the actuarially fair value of annuities than
previous literature has found.
Throughout the paper, we assumed that the marginal survival probabili-
ties of individuals did not change over time, although life expectancy has in-CHAPTER 4 133
creased signiﬁcantly. Not only the marginal survival probabilities may change
overtime, butalsothedependencebetweentheremaininglifetimesofspouses
may change over time. However, if the change in the bivariate age-of-death
is deterministic as a function of age and time, the dependence may remain
constant over time although life expectancy increases. We leave this for future
research.
Of all individuals, we have much more data like for instance ethnicity. In




We develop the likelihood as in Frees, Carriere, and Valdez (1996). To set up
the likelihood, we ﬁrst create a dummy for each spouse to indicate whether
the spouse’s remaining lifetime is right-censored. Dummy Dxi (Dyi) is one in
case the remaining lifetime of the husband (wife) of couple i is right-censored
and zero else.
To deal with right-censoring, three cases have to be considered.
1. No censoring occurs. This represents the case where both spouses die
during the observation period. That is 0 < T(ax) < bx and 0 < T(ay) <
by.
2. X is right-censored and Y is uncensored. X survives the observation pe-
riod or died prior to the start of the observation period while Y dies dur-
ing the observation period. Consequently, T(ax) ≥ bx and 0 < T(ay) <
by, where bx = 0 in case the individual died prior to the start of the ob-
servation period.
We also have this case for Y right-censored and X uncensored.
3. Both are right-censored, meaning that both spouses survive the observa-
tion period or one ofthe spouses diedprior to the start ofthe observation
period while the other spouse was still alive at the end of the observation
period. In this case, T(ax) > bx and T(ay) > by, where bx or by equals
zero in case the individual died prior to the start of the observation pe-
riod.
To ease notation, deﬁne Tx = T(ax) and Ty = T(ay). Because of the left-
truncation, we estimate the conditional distribution of T(ax),T(ay) deﬁned134
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as:
Fτ(tx,ty) = P(0 ≤ Tx ≤ tx,0 ≤ Ty ≤ ty|Tx and Tyare observed)
=
P(Tx ≤ tx,Ty ≤ ty) − P(Tx ≤ tx,Ty ≤ 0) − P(Tx ≤ 0,Ty ≤ ty)
P(Tx ≥ 0,Ty ≥ 0)
+
P(Tx ≤ 0,Ty ≤ 0)
P(Tx ≥ 0,Ty ≥ 0)
.
If both lifetimes are uncensored, all dummies equal zero and tx < bx, ty < by.
The contribution to the likelihood for a couple with entry ages (axi,ayi) and
remaining lifetimes (txi,tyi) equals:
∂2Fτ(axi + txi,ayi + tyi)
∂txi∂tyi
=
f(axi + txi,ayi + tyi)
F(axi,ayi)
.
When the husband’s lifetime is uncensored and the wife’s lifetime is censored,
we have Dx = 0, Dy = 1, such that for 0 < tx < bx,ty ≥ by
P(0 < Tx < tx,Ty = by)
P(Tx > 0,ty > 0)
= Fτ(tx,∞) − Fτ(tx,by).
The contribution to the likelihood for a couple with entry ages (axi,ayi) and







Fx(axi + txi,∞) − Fx(axi + txi,ayi + byi)
F(axi,ayi + byi)
.
The case where the husband’s lifetime is censored and the wife’s lifetime
is uncensored is similar to the previous case. When both lifetimes are right-




P(Tx > 0,Ty > 0)
=
P(Tx > bx,Ty > by)
P(Tx > 0,Ty > 0)
=
The contribution to the likelihood for a couple with entry age (axi,ayi) and
remaining lifetime (txi,tyi) is given by:
F(axi + bxi,ayi + byi)
F(axi,ayi)
The log-likelihood of a single observation is given by:
ln L(ax,ay,tx,ty, Dx, Dy) = (1 − Dx)(1 − Dy)ln f(ax + tx,ay + ty)CHAPTER 4 135
+ Dx)(1 − Dy)ln
 
Fy(∞,ay + ty) − Fy(ax + bx,ay + ty)
 
+ (1 − Dx)Dy ln
 















ln L(axi,ayi,txi,tyi,bxi,byi, Dxi, Dyi). (4.9)
The likelihood can now be maximized using the data-set described in Section
4.2. Standard function maximization routines yield the maximum likelihood
estimates and the variance-covariance align. Estimation results are presented
in Subsections 4.4.2 and 4.5.2.
Note that for the semi-nonparametric models, the derivation of the log-




















First, note that because of the truncation, the normalizing constant cancels out
inthelog-likelihood. Second, becauseweuse the IW model, wecandetermine



















for z ∈ x,y and k ∈ {0,..,2n}.
(4.11)























for z ∈ x,y and k ∈ {0,..,2n}.
To obtain for instance the integrals needed for F(ax + bx,ay + by), all needed






















for z ∈ x,y and k ∈ {0,..,2n}.
The integral needed for F(x,y) is displayed in Appendix 4.D.136
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4.B The Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm
To determine the linear correlation and Spearman’s ρs we sample from the es-
timated distribution function using the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm, ini-
tially developed by Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, and Teller
(1953) and generalized by Hastings (1970). We follow the procedure as de-
scribed in Train (2002).
We would like to draw a random sample of 50,000 of ages of death of a
married couple from the estimated density function f(x,y). The procedure
for one draw is as followed:
1. We start with drawing the ML estimates τ = (β,θ,δ), where
τ ∼ N(ˆ τ, ˆ Vτ/n), with ˆ τ the ML estimates of τ.







  1/βj for j = x,y,
where υj is uniform distributed on (0,1). By construction, ǫj follows a
Weibull distribution.
3. Thevarianceofarandom ageofdeathvariable Z, which followsaWeibull
distribution is given by Var(Z) = θ2
z ∗ Γ(2/βz +1)−(θz ∗ γ(1/βz +1))2
for z ∈ x,y (Lu and Bhattacharyya, 2003, see). We draw a trial value of
ǫ1 as ˜ ǫj
1 = ǫ0
j + ηj, where ηj follows a normal distribution with mean 0
and covariance align Σ = diag(Var(X),Var(Y)). 15
4. The density at the trial value ˜ ǫ1 is compared with the density at the
original value ǫ0. If f(˜ ǫ1) > f(ǫ0), ˜ ǫ1 is accepted and labeled ǫ1. We
then move to step 5. If f(˜ ǫ1) ≤ f(ǫ0), ˜ ǫ1 is accepted with probability
f(˜ ǫ1)/f(ǫ0), and rejected with probability 1− f(˜ ǫ1)/f(ǫ0).
5. We choose a trial value of ǫ2 as ˜ ǫ2 = ǫ1 + η, where η is drawn from g(η)
and apply the rule in step 4 to either accept or reject ˜ ǫ2.
The procedure described above is repeated until we have generated a sample
of 50,000 couples. Each sample of 50,000 couples is used to estimate the linear
correlation and Spearman’s ρ. To obtain a conﬁdence interval of the correla-
tion and Spearman’s ρ we have generated 400 samples of 50,000 couples.
15For the semi-nonparametric model we use the expression of E(XkYl) as given in Ap-
pendix 4.D to determine Var(X) and Var(Y).CHAPTER 4 137
4.C The different polynomials
(i)
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy;
(ii)
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy + α1,1  xβx  yβy;
(iii)
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy + α1,1  xβx  yβy + α2,0  x2βx + α0,2  y2βy;
(iv)
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy + α1,1  xβx  yβy + α2,0  x2βx + α0,2  y2βy
+ α1,2  xβx  y2βy + α2,1  x2βx  yβy + α2,2  x2βx  y2βy;
(v)
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy + α1,1  xβx  yβy + α2,0  x2βx + α0,2  y2βy
+ α1,2  xβx  y2βy + α2,1  x2βx  yβy + α2,2  x2βx  y2βy + α3,0  x3βx + α0,3  y3βy;
(vi)
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy + α1,1  xβx  yβy + α2,0  x2βx + α0,2  y2βy
+ α1,2  xβx  y2βy + α2,1  x2βx  yβy + α2,2  x2βx  y2βy + α3,0  x3βx + α0,3  y3βy
+ α1,3  xβx  y3βy + α3,1  x3βx  yβy + α2,3  x2βx  y3βy + α3,2  x3βx  y2βy
+ α3,3  x3βx  y3βy;
(vii)
Pα = α0,0 + α1,0  xβx + α0,1  yβy + α1,1  xβx  yβy + α2,0  x2βx + α0,2  y2βy
+ α1,2  xβx  y2βy + α2,1  x2βx  yβy + α2,2  x2βx  y2βy + α3,0  x3βx + α0,3  y3βy
+ α1,3  xβx  y3βy + α3,1  x3βx  yβy + α2,3  x2βx  y3βy + α3,2  x3βx  y2βy






























































4.D Moments and dependence in the semi-nonparametric model
In the previous subsection, we have explained the semi-nonparametric model we use to estimate the joint survival probabilities of spouses. In this subsection, we determine when the semi-nonparametric model is positive dependence or
negative dependence. We also determine the joint survival function and the moments. Moreover, we also determine the linear correlation (Corr(X,Y)) between the remaining lifetimes of spouses based on the semi-nonparametric model. To
determine the dependence, we rewrite the semi-nonparametric model as




















where Aθx,βx(x) and Bθy,βy(y) are displayed at the end of this appendix for the TOP model. A ⊙ B means that A and B should be multiplied componentwise (the Hadamadard product).








∀ x,y ≥ 0 (4.15)
where Aθx,βx(0) and Bθy,βy(0) do not depend on θx,βx,θy, and βy.
To determine the linear correlation, we use the following:
Deﬁne









E(XkYl) ≡ α′ ˜ G(k,l,θx,θy)α. (4.17)
and deﬁne
G(k,l) ≡ ˜ G(k,l,1,1). (4.18)
Since
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So, the correlation between the remaining lifetimes of spouses at birth does not depend on the scaling parameters (θx,θy).
To determine the matrices A(x) and B(y) for the TOP polynomial, note that in the TOP model
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The joint survival probabilities are given by:




















Note that the following holds:
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4.E A likelihood ratio test for overlapping models
To test whether the semi-nonparametric model is better than the PNW, we
perform the LR test for overlapping models as in Vuong (1989). We perform
the test only for the TOP model, see (4.8). The LR Test Statistic for the model
Fη against the model Gγ is:
LRn(ˆ ηn, ˆ γn) = log L
f
n(ˆ ηn) − log L
g
n( ˆ γn), (4.29)
where ˆ ηn and ˆ γn are the ML estimates of η∗ and γ∗.
The sequential procedure as given in Vuong (1989) is the following:
1. Test Hω
0 : ω2
∗ = 0 against Hω
A : ω2
∗  = 0 using the variance test based on
n ˜ ω2
n, where ω2
∗ denotes the variance of log(f(Zi|η∗)/g(Zi|γ∗)).
2. If Hω
0 is not rejected, conclude that both distributions cannot be discrim-
inated given the data.
3. If Hω
















< 0 using the normal model selection test based on
n−1/2LRn(ˆ ηn, ˆ γn)/ ˜ ωn, where in our case f is the probability distribution
of the PNW model, g is the probability distribution of the TOP model,
ˆ ηn represent the maximum likelihood estimates of the PNW model and
ˆ γn represent the maximum likelihood estimate of the TOP model.
Under Hω
0 n ˜ ω2
n converges to a chi-square distribution. Under H0,
n−1/2LRn(ˆ ηn, ˆ γn)/ ˜ ωn
D → N(0,1), whereas under Hf, n−1/2LRn(ˆ ηn, ˆ γn)/ ˜ ωn
D →
∞ and under Hg, n−1/2LRn(ˆ ηn, ˆ γn)/ ˜ ωn
D → −∞.
We ﬁnd that ˜ ω2
n = 0.001202 such that n ˜ ω2
n = 601. Consequently, Hω
0 is re-
jectedatallconventional conﬁdencelevels. Weﬁndthat n−1/2LRn(ˆ ηn, ˆ γn)/ ˆ ωn =
−101. We can reject H0 in favor of Hg at all conventional conﬁdence levels. So,
the TOP model ﬁts the data better than the PNW model.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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